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CABLE COMES OF AGE:

A

CONSTITUTIONAL

ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION OF "INDECENT"
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
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INTRODUCTION

The explosive growth of the cable television industry in the United
States during the past two decades has engendered a provocative new
social dilemma: the transmission of sexually explicit programs over
cable into communities and homes where cable television is desired, but
sexually explicit programming is not. Legislation designed to respond
to this problem has stimulated litigation raising an important question
of constitutional law: Does state and local regulation of nonobscene,
but indecent, sexually explicit programming over cable television violate
the first amendment or the supremacy clause of the Constitution? The
purpose of this article is to review the cases and commentaries which
have addressed this issue and to propose a model of analysis for assessing the constitutionality of cable television indecency regulations. The
article leads to two important, albeit unexpected, conclusions. First,
reasonable regulation of sexually explicit indecent cable television programming is permissible under the first amendment. Second, state and
local indecency regulations are not preempted by federal law.
Part I of this article describes the societal context in which the constitutional question arises, including the recent growth of cable television and of sexually explicit cable programming, the public controversy
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over sexually explicit "indecent" cable programming, and the enactment of laws regulating sexually explicit cable programming. Part II
contains a review and criticism of the cases and commentaries which analyze whether laws regulating nonobscene, but indecent, cable television
programming are constitutional. Part III presents and applies a model
of first amendment analysis for assessing the constitutionality of cable
television indecency regulations. Part IV examines whether state and
local regulation of indecent cable television programming violates the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, and explains why state and local
cable indecency regulations are not preempted.
I.

THE COMING OF AGE OF CABLE TELEVISION

The Rise of Cable Television and Indecent Cable Programming

A.

Cable television has experienced incredible growth during the past
two decades. In 1963, two decades after the first cable television system
began operating in this country, 2 there were approximately 1,000 cable
television systems in operation serving approximately 950,000 subscribers. 3 By 1973, more than 2,900 cable systems were in operation serving
approximately 7.3 million subscribers. 4 In just ten years the number of
cable television systems had increased by nearly thirty percent and the
number of subscribers had grown by more than 700 percent. During
the next decade the number of cable systems again doubled; the number
of subscribers quadrupled. By mid-1983 there were 5,748 cable television systems in operation in the United States serving an estimated 31.7
million subscribers. 5
In the same year, cable "penetration" reached 38 percent of all
homes with television sets in the United States. 6 ByJanuary, 1985, cable
penetration was at 43.7 percent, viewed in more than 37.2 million
homes. 7 It is estimated that cable penetration will reach fifty percent by
1988.8
Of course, the financial investments in the cable television industry
and the potential return on those investments are staggering. In 1984,
cable operators spent $1.138 billion to build, rebuild and upgrade cable
plants. 9 That same year, however, cable system operating revenues to2. REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE:
THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN COMM'N REP.].
3. TELEVISION DIGEST, INC. TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK No. 52, CABLE & SERVICE
VOLUME 1735 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION & CABLE FACTrOOK.]
4. Id.
5. Smith, Reporter's Notebook: Cable Meeting, N.Y. Times,June 18, 1983, § 4, at 48, col.
5 [hereinafter cited as Smith, Reporter's Notebook]. See also Hooking Up to Cable Households,

Apr. 18, 1983, at 68. By mid-1984 there were 6,400 cable television systems in
operation in the United States. TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 3, at 1735.
TIME,

6. Smith, Reporter's Notebook, supra note 5, § 4, at 48, col. 4. See also Nielsen Charts Cable

Universe at 35r&
Penetration, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 92.

7. Nielsen: U.S. Penetration Reaches 43.7 Percent, CABLEVISION, Jan. 14, 1985, at 17.
8. Cable Industry Growth Chart, CABLEVISION, May 13, 1985, at 48.

9. Dawson & Capuzzi, Slow but Steady: The New Era in CA TV Construction.
SION, Mar.

4, 1985, at 30.
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tailed $8.4 billionl 0 and industry profits reached $600 million.'' A 1984
study of 226 companies involved in ten different segments of the communications industry revealed that cable and pay television led all other
segments of the industry in overall financial performance in 1983.12
Today cable television system operators can offer subscribers dozens of television channels, clear cable delivery of broadcast television
channels, programs produced by the local cable system, and exclusive
entertainment and information channels produced for cable television
by independent "cable networks." In 1982, forty-seven different cable
"networks" offered a variety of specialty programming channels to local
cable system operators, including: all-sports, all-news, all-music,
children's entertainment, religious programming, Spanish language
programming, ethnic-oriented programming, family-oriented entertainment, variety entertainment, first-run movies and sexually-oriented
programming. 13 More than sixty additional cable networks are cur14
rently being planned.
The exploitation of sexual programming to attract subscribers has
been almost as dramatic as the growth of cable television. Initially, cable
systems functioned primarily to facilitate reception of broadcast television in areas where residential antenna reception was poor.'- Sexually
explicit programming was not a significant problem because federal law
forbids obscene or indecent utterances on broadcast television. 16 The
key, however, to the recent growth of the cable television industry has
been its ability to offer alternative programming not available on broad-7
cast television, which traditionally has been largely unregulated.'
10. Kahn, Study Predicts Cable Industry to Flourish, CABLEVISION, June 10, 1985, at 11.
11. In 1985 it was predicted that industry revenues in 1990 would exceed $16 billion
and profits would reach $1.7 billion annually. The prospects for healthy returns on cable
television system investments remain very promising. Id.; see also Roberts, FinancialAspects
of Cable Television in a New Era in CABLE TELEVISION IN A NEW ERA 51 (P.L.I. 1983).
12. The survey found that cable and pay TV led all other segments of the communications industry in compound annual growth between 1979 and 1983. In 1983, cable's revenue growth rate was more than twice that of the next highest group, which was the
advertising segment. In 1983, the cable segment ranked in the top three in all other measures of growth. Its operating margins were the second best in the communications industry; its cash flow margins were the best. Russell, Cable, Pay TV Lead the Pack in Growth Rate,
CABLEVISION, Dec. 17, 1984, at 36. According to the report, cable and pay television companies achieved compound annual revenue growth of 45.1 percent in the period between
1979 and 1983. Id.
13. Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's Been, Where It's Headed, 56 FLA. BARJ. 228, 230
(1983). See generally Waters, Cable TV: Coming of Age, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 44 [hereinafter cited as Waters, Coming of Age].
14. Davis, Current Regulatory Changes and Business Developments in the United States Communications Industry, 158 PRACTICING LAw INsTrrTE 9, 40 (1983).
15. SLOAN COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 24.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
17. Significant restrictions on the authority of the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC) to regulate the cable television industry were articulated in a series of
Supreme Court cases construing the federal statutes which define the regulatory authority
of the FCC. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157 (1968). The FCC's jurisdiction over cable is limited to that "reasonably ancillary
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Thus, largely unhampered by federal regulations, 18 some cable system
operators have opted to exploit sexual programming for profit.
For the most part, obscene "hard-core" pornography has not been
shown on public cable television systems, but "soft-porn" has been
available on cable television in a variety of formats. On a few local cable
systems, notably in New York City, basic cable service has included such
programs as "Midnight Blue" which features "topless dancers, sadomasochistic skits and visits to nudist colonies featuring full frontal expo20
sure," 19 "Men and Films" which features "takeouts from gay movies,"
and "The Ugly George Hour of Truth, Sex and Violence" in which "a
former porn-film actor ...roams the city with a portable videotape camera, brashly inviting strange women to come to his studio and disrobe
before his lens."'2 1 Additionally, at least six "cable networks" purportedly feature exclusively sexual programming. 2 2 In 1983, sex-network
channels were available as an extra-tier, additional charge service, in
2,000,000 homes over cable television. Some cable television systems
23
even feature hard-core, "X-rated" movies.
The major source of sexually explicit cable programming, however,
is not the basic local access channels or even the sex-networks but the
to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." Id. at 178.
It is important to note that these restrictions are statutory. In October, 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 which, inter alia, prohibits the
transmission over cable television of "any matter which is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution .... Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, § 639, 98 Stat. 2780, 2801; see infra notes 344-410 and accompanying text. The
contrasts between the regulation and sexual exploitation of broadcast and cable television
programming are noted in ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 282-83 (1986).
18. This is not to say that the cable industry has been totally unregulated in other
respects. In fact, the absence of preempting federal regulations of the cable television
industry created a void which agencies of state and local governments rushed to fill. The
resulting patchwork quilt of confusing, sometimes overlapping, often inconsistent, local
regulations is one of the primary reasons the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
was enacted. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-11 (1983); see infra notes 349-414 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra note 21.
20. Weinstein, Sex and Cable, CABLEVISION, Feb. 11, 1985, at 28, 32. The utilization of
high-tech telecommunications systems to convey sexually explicit programming was not
entirely unanticipated. For an intriguing and amusing literary forecast, see A. Clarke, I
Remember Babylon, in TALES OF TEN WORLDS 7 (1964).
21. Gunther, Pay TV Sex: How Far Can It Go?. TV GUIDE. Mar. 28. 1981. at 4.5: Waters,
Cable's Blues in the Night, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 48 [hereinafter cited as Waters,
Cable's Blues].
22. Id; see also Smith, Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1983, at AI, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Smith, Battle Intensifying]. The largest of the cable
TV sex-networks, the Playboy Channel, had 500,000 subscribers and was available on 275
cable systems in 1983. Id. at C22, col. 2. By October, 1984, Playboy reportedly had 457
affiliates with 720,000 subscribers. Taub, Brandman Named to Head Playboy Pr'ograms Inc.,
CABLEVISION, Oct. 29, 1984, at 11.
23. The National Cable Television Association claims that only about a half-dozen
cable systems show X-rated films. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at C22, col. 2. In
1985, an industry spokesperson reported that out of over 35 million total cable subscribers
there were only 700,000 subscribers to channels offering X-rated films. Ross, Pornography
Panel Hears Fox Testimony, CABLEVISION, Oct. 28, 1985, at 30.
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"all-around" movie channels such as Home Box Office (HBO) and
Showtime, which are generally available as an "extra" channel for an
additional fee. These popular general movie channels regularly feature
movies which explicitly portray nude men and women, heterosexual
lovemaking and homosexual activity. 2 4 In fact, forty percent of the movies shown by HBO on cable TV are reportedly rated "R."12 5 Moreover,
the sexual programming on these channels is not limited to movies.
offered "A New Day in Eden," described as
Showtime, for example, has '26
"a soap opera with nudity."
HBO has presented such documentaries
as "Strippers," described by one television critic as "a mindless diversion that provides a convenient showcase for assorted bumps, grinds
and bare breasts." 2 7 Lifetime offers "Good Sex" which features Dr.
Ruth Westheimer "bubbling over with talk about penises and ejaculations" and preaching that "everything will be all right if you're open and
28
honest and have a good orgasm."
B.

The Public Controversy and PoliticalReaction

Not unexpectedly, the offering of sexually-explicit programming
29
over public cable television has generated considerable controversy.
A substantial number of the television-viewing adults who desire the educational, cultural and entertainment advantages of cable television are
kept from subscribing to cable television services because they do not
want to invite sexually explicit programming into their homes. 30 By
24. Smith, Battle Intensifying supra note 22, at Al, col. 2; see also Weinstein, supra note
20, at 30.
25. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at C22, col. 4.
26. Id. at Al, col. 4.
27. O'Connor, Cable Displays a Growing Eagerness to Titillate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983,
§ 2, at 25, col. 4.
28. DiMatteo, 'Good Sex' Not Good Enough, CABLEVISION, Sept. 17, 1984, at 24. The
pronounced sexual programming on cable television arguably has had a deleterious impact on broadcast television as well. New York Times television critic John O'Connor has
charged that broadcast television programs have become more sexually explicit in order to
compete with the pandering fare offered on cable. O'Connor, The Networks Flirt With Sexual
Explicitness, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 2, at 37, col. 1; see also Gunther, supra note 21, at 6,
7.
29. See generally Waters, Cable's Blues, supra note 21; Waters, Coming of Age, supra note
13, at 46; Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at Al, col. 1; Gunther, supra, note 21, at 5.
In 1973 the FCC reported that the number of complaints about cable and broadcast
stations presenting offensive programming had jumped nearly thirty-fold in the past two
years. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 778 n.5 (1973).
30. Two studies done since 1980 found, respectively, that 25% and 33% of the persons surveyed "said they did not subscribe to [cable television] services because they did
not want their children exposed to some of its programming." Smith, Battle Intensifying,
supra note 22, at C22, col. 4. Even viewers of cable TV "adult programming" believe that
it is too explicit.
On Cable magazine conducted two surveys in March on attitudes about adult
programming on cable. One measured attitudes among adults in 506 cable
households, the other focused only on attitudes among adults in 484 cable households viewing adult programming. According to the results, viewers of the racier
fare closely agreed with their non-viewing counterparts .. . [a]dult programming,
the majority agreed, should be less explicit. Of the total 990 respondents, 66
percent of the [general cable viewers thought] adult-programs should turn down
the steam; 65 percent of adult-viewers agreed. Both surveys revealed the major-
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1983, it was reported that approximately 100 citizen groups around the
country were attempting to ban or curb indecent or obscene programming on cable television. 3 1 Legislation intended to curb the perceived
problem of "cableporn" has been proposed, and some of it enacted, by
federal, 3 2 state, 33 and local lawmakers. 34 Cable operators have been indicted for violating obscenity laws. 3 5 Popular initiative petitions or referenda have raised the issue in some communities. 3 6 Congressional
hearings have addressed the subject,3 7 and in 1985 the Justice Department appointed a national commission to assess the problem. The commission released its report in July of 1986.38
At least nine states and Congress have enacted laws designed to
deal with indecent cable television programming. 3 9 Most of this legislation has been enacted since 1980. These laws reflect six different approaches to dealing with the problem of sexually explicit cable
programming: (1) criminal statutes punishing the knowing distribution
of indecent material over cable television systems; 40 (2) nuisance statues
41
imposing "time, place and manner" standards on cable programming;
(3) statutes requiring cable system operators to provide "lockboxes" to
their customers; 4 2 (4) statutes authorizing municipalities or other govity of cable viewers prefer a separate channel for adult material, and indicated a
preference for local communities to establish adult-programming standards.
Some Like It Hot, But Won't Tell, CABLEVISION May 14, 1984, at 12 [hereinafter cited as
"Some Like It Hot"].
31. Id. at C22, col. 5.
32. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679-81.
33. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679.
34. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679.
35. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
36. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 29; see also infra notes 120 and 332.
37. S. 1090, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 5542-48 (1985); see Wolfe, Senators
Blame Cablefor "PornographyInvasion," CABLEVISION, Aug. 12, 1985, at 24; see also infra notes
337-40.
38. Pornography Commission Formed, CABLEVISION, May 27, 1985, at 15. In 1986 this
Commission published its report, a two-volume, 2000-page compilation entitled: ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986). The report criticized
the sexually-oriented programming on cable television as"highly explicit and offensive to
many." Id.at 283. The report also recommended that Congress enact tougher restrictions
against the transmission of obscene material via cable television. Id. at 434. The Commission also considered proposals that nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit programming should be banned from cable television, but was "deeply divided" about what type of
regulation, if any, was most appropriate. "[A]s a result there is no consensus among us
that would justify urging the regulation of cable encompassing more than the legally obscene." Id. at 400; see generally id. at 398-400.
39. The states include Arizona, California, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island (since repealed), South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin; see infra notes 40-45 and 341-43
and accompanying text.
40. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229 (Supp. 1983) (invalidated in Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982)); see also Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, § 639, 47 U.S.C. 559; § 601, 47 U.S.C. 521 (1984).
41.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1701 to -1708 (Supp. 1983).

42. A "lockbox" is an electronic scrambling device which may be attached to a cableconnected television set to prevent video reception of specific channels unless a key is
inserted or a code entered. Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, § 601, 47 U.S.C.
544 (1984). CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53006.4 (West Supp. 1984) (cost to subscribers set at 50
cents per month); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 829-1 (McKinney 1982) (cost plus 15%); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 134.43 (West Supp. 1983) (no extra fee); see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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ernmental units to regulate cable television in the public interest;4 3 (5)
statutes immunizing cable operators from liability for transmitting indecent programs which they did not originate; 4 4 and (6) statutes prohibitwhich
ing state agencies or municipalities from enacting regulations
45
control the content of cable television programming.
The seriousness of the problem of indecent explicit television programming in the United States is underscored by the fact that it has affected cable television regulation in other countries where the
development of cable television is just beginning. For example, the exploitation of sex and violence in "some of the programs receivable without restriction on cable channels in the United States" were specifically
criticized as unacceptable in the 1982 report to Parliament investigating
the future of British cable television. 4 6 Six months later, the official
White Paper containing the British government's policy recommendations singled out "adult" channels in the United States and Canada as
prime examples of the type of cable programming that should have "no
place" on cable television in the United Kingdom. 47 Consequently,
43. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 634(d)(1), 638,
98 Stat. 2780, 2797, 2801 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 554(d)(1), 558 (West Supp. 1985));
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 9-35-17, 18 (1981); see also R.I.

GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (1977), repealed by R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (Supp. 1983)) (statute
authorizing revocation of cable operator licenses for originating programs that are "offensive to commonly accepted standards of morality and decency" repealed and replaced with
provision authorizing revocation when origination programs which "have been adjudged
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be obscene").
44. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §§ 611, 612, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 531, 532
(West Supp. 1985). N.J. REV. STAT. § 48:5A-50 (Supp. 1983); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 830
(McKinney 1982).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-510 (Supp. 1983); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 829 (Mc-

Kinney 1982).
46. REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO CABLE EXPANSION AND BROADCASTING POLICY, CMD,
No. 8679, at 24, (1982) [hereinafter cited as CABLE INQUIRY.] While suggesting that the
overall amount of regulation of cable television should be much less than the regulation of
broadcast television, id. at 3, 11, the CABLE INQUIRY concluded that "the traditional broadcasting requirements relating to taste and decency, and the suitability of programmers for
children likely to be watching, should be imposed on cable operators," id. at 24, for three
reasons. First, the CABLE INQUIRY rejected the argument that cable television was analogous to print publication because, inter alia, "most people still see the carrying of programmers into the home [by cable television] as different in kind from the act of going out to
buy a book or a magazine." Id. at 4, 11. Second, the CABLE INQUIRY noted the risk that
without decency standards British cable operators would be tempted to show the kinds of
unacceptable sexually explicit or violent programs which were being offered in the unregulated American cable television market. Id. at 24. Third, the CABLE INQUIRY did not believe "that 'self-regulation' by the cable industry would be generally acceptable at a time
when cable is establishing itself and when, for example, there are clearly differing views
within the industry itself about the showing of programmes which could be offensive to
many people." Id. at 4. However, the CABLE INQUIRY recommended that programming
on optional extra-cost channels where the subscriber is provided with sophisticated electronic decoders "to lock out of from his set films of censorship categories which are not
wanted on the subscription channel for the time, while allowing other categories to be
received" should not be subject to the ordinary decency regulations. Id. at 24, 25.
47. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, CMD No. 8866, at 57, 137
(1983) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPER]. This WHITE PAPER, prepared by the Home
Office and the Department of Industry, accepted the CABLE INQUIRY'S recommendations
that, while cable television programming generally should not be subject to the same degree of regulation as broadcast television, it "should be subject to the same obligations as
those observed by the broadcasting organizations . . . that nothing distributed offends
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although the Cable and Broadcasting Act enacted by Parliament in 1984
generally implements a broad policy of nonregulation of cable television, a notable exception is that cable television services are required to
comply with the same standards of taste, decency and appropriate
scheduling applicable to the highly regulated British broadcast televi48
sion industry.
II.

CASES AND COMMENTARY CONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LAWS REGULATING NONOBSCENE BUT INDECENT CABLE
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

Although for many years the regulation of other aspects of the cable
television industry has been a matter of litigation 4 9 and scholarly discus-

sion, 50

until 1982 there was virtually no discussion of the constitutional-

ity of attempts to regulate or prohibit cable television systems from
transmitting nonobscene, but indecent, sexually explicit material. 5 1 The
against good taste and decency ... and to have special regard to programmes broadcast
when large numbers or children and young persons are likely to be watching." Id. at 56.
However the WHITE PAPER rejected the suggestion of the Hunt INQUIRY that decency restrictions need not apply to subscription channels to which access was controlled by electronic locking devices. Id. at 57. The government noted "a growing concern that violence
and pornography have already established too strong a presence in our society," and that
it would be "wholly undesirable if, in the face of [the recent legislative] move towards
increased safeguards, cable television was to give a new boost to those who seek to make
money out of the exploitation of sex and violence." Id. The "so called 'adult' channels"
of American cable television were referred to twice: once as an example of the kind of
sexually explicit and violent programming that could be expected to develop in Britain
"unless specifically prevented," and a second time as an example of precisely the kind of
programming which the authorities should not permit on British cable television. Id.
Thus, the WHITE PAPER concluded that "cable operators should have the same duties in
matters such as good taste and decency as those which now apply to [broadcast television],
across the totality of cable channels, with no special exemption for electronically lockable channels." Id.
(emphasis added).
48. The Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984 ch. 46, § 10, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) the [Cable] Authority shall do all that they can to secure that every licensed
service complies with the following requirements ... (a) that nothing is included
in the programmes which offends against good taste or decency or is likely to
encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public
feeling ....
49. See generally, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)(access channel
regulations; FCC jurisdiction); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972)
(access channel regulations; FCC jurisdiction); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968) (regulation of local origination and distant signal carriage; FCCjurisdiction); WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1982) (stripping vertical blanking interval of teletext information; copyright): Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982) (retransmission of
baseball game; copyright exemption), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (pay TV programming regulation), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (non-duplication
carriage transmission and FCC Procedural Rules; FCC jurisdiction).
50. See, e.g., Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under First
Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1981); Davis, Regulation of Cable Television by the Federal
Communications Commission, CABLE TELEVISION IN A NEW ERA 95 (1983); FORD ADMINISTRATION PAPERS ON REGULATORY REFORM, DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1977); SLOAN

COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 5,
51. One student-authored piece published in 1978 (and only mentioning in a footnote
the Supreme Court's decision in FCC n. Pacifica Foundation,438 U.S. 726 (1978)) raised the
issue but focused on obscenity. Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television Content, 31 Rutgers
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issue was obscured by the continuing debate concerning obscenity and
the first amendment. Sexually explicit material generally has been categorized as either obscene or nonobscene. Since it is well established
that any material that meets the strict Miller definition of obscenity may
be totally banned from all media, 52 attention has primarily focused on
whether cable television programming is obscene. The constitutionality
of regulating sexually explicit programming that is not legally obscene
but which under community standards is patently offensive and inappropriate for unrestricted transmission to the general public, has been
largely overlooked by commentators. There exists only one Supreme
Court decision on point, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,53 which involved the
regulation of indecent language broadcast on the radio. It should be
protection varies denoted, however, that the nature of first amendment
54
pending on the medium of communication.
The constitutionality of regulations restricting the transmission of
nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit material over cable television
systems is an issue whose time has come. 55 The increasing number of
cable television indecency regulations proposed or enacted around the
L. Rev. 238, 262 n. 158 (1978). However, law review writers were not reluctant to comment on the constitutionality of restricting or prohibiting "indecent" communications in
other media. See, e.g., Maltz & Hogue, On Keeping Pigs out of the Parlor: Speech as Public
Nuisance After FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 31 S.C.L. REV. 377 (1980); Powe, American Voodoo: If Television Doesn't Show It Maybe It Won't Exist, 59 TEX. L. REV. 879 (1981); Note,
Broadcasting Offensive Programming Under a New Communications Act, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 427 (1980); Note, FCC Empowered to Regulate Radio Broadcasts That Are Indecent But
Not Obscene, 52 TEMPLE L. Q. 170 (1979); Note, Regulating Indecent Speech: A New Attack on
the First Amendment, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 321 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Regulating Indecent
Speech].
52. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). A work "which depicts or describes
... sexual conduct" is obscene and may be banned if [1] "taken as a whole, [it appeals] to
the prurient interest," . . . [2] portrays sexual conduct "in a patently offensive way," and
... [3] taken as a whole, "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at
24. See Krattenmaker & Esterlow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets
the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606, 607 n.2 (1983). Indecency regulations are aimed
at sexually explicit programming which may be patently offensive to the community but
which does not fully meet the strict Miller test for obscenity and, thus, may not be banned
under the Miller doctrine. One alternative to the "indecency" approach to regulating sexually explicit and vulgar material on cable television might be to adopt a "variable obscenity" standard; e.g., establish that the standard for obscenity depends upon the medium of
communication used, and thus, allow certain material to be declared "obscene" if transmitted via cable or broadcast television while the same material might not be obscene if
presented in adult movie theaters, on video cassettes, etc.
53. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
54. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748-50; Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself'
and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each
method." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501. "Each medium of expression ... must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems." Id. at 501 n.8., (quoting Southwestern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 559 (1975)).
55. "Last year [1983] some three dozen First Amendment cases were brought by
cable operators, a surprising handful of which seem to be headed for the Supreme Court.
'There's going to be a veritable explosion of litigation,' says Robert Roper, an attorney
with the N[ational] C[able] T[elevision] A[ssociation]. 'It's happening right now.' " Gladstone, Taking the First, CableVision, May 7, 1984, at 36. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 2832.
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country both reflects and engenders deep concerns on the part of the
cable television industry,5 6 government officials, 57 public interest
groups concerned with mass media programming, 5 8 parents, and other
private citizens. 5 9 The courts and legal commentators have finally begun to wrestle with this question in earnest.
A.

The Supreme Court's Pacifica Decision

While the Supreme Court has yet to consider the regulation of indecent cable television programming, 60 it has considered the constitution-

ality of government regulation of nonobscene
programming.

but indecent radio

In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation6 ' the Supreme Court up-

held a declaratory order of the FCC which reprimanded the owner of a
radio station that broadcasted a nonobscene but "patently offensive"
adult comedy monologue one afternoon in October, 1973.62
The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the First Amend56. See National Cable Television Association, Inc., Memorandum to the Industry on Cable System
Carriageof Adult Programming (March, 1982); Gladstone, supra note 55, at 40; Gunther, supra
note 21, at 7-10.
57. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Cableporn-The Battle Is Joined, The National Decency Reporter
(Uul./Aug., 1982); Libertarians Release Cable Study, CableVision, Mar. 26, 1984, at 45; Ross,
supra note 23, at 30.
59. See generally Deseret News, Mar. 13, 1983, at BI, col. 1 (concern of a private citizens group); Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1982, at 37, col. 3 (concern of private citizens).
60. The Supreme Court almost considered the propriety of cable television indecency
regulations in 1979 when it decided FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
That case began when a cablecaster filed suit in 1976 in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit to enjoin enforcement of a series of cable television "access rules,"
promulgated earlier that year by the FCC. One provision of the access rules required
cablecasters to promulgate rules censoring indecent programming on access channels.
The Eighth Circuit held that the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating
the rules. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1035-45 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd,
440 U.S. 689 (1979). Although the Eighth Circuit also suggested that the censorship provision violated the first amendment, the Supreme Court did not consider that question
because the FCC had, in the meantime, withdrawn that particular provision and it was not
"in controversy" before the Court. 440 U.S. at 693-94 n.4. Following the Supreme
Court's decision, the Commission not only repealed the "indecency censorship" provision
but declared that the only other regulation proscribing the transmission of indecent or
obscene material over cable television would thereafter be applied "only to programming
which is subject to system operator editorial control." In the Matter of Amendment of
Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the Cable Television
Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251. 83 FCC 2d 147,
148 (1980). Later, the FCC rejected a request by the ACLU that it repeal its remaining
indecency regulation. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel
Requirements of Section 76.251, 87 FCC 2d 40 (1981). See infra note 70.
61. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
62. The FCC had received a complaint from a man who had tuned in to the broadcast
while driving in his car with his young son. Id. at 730. After investigation, the FCC did not
impose formal sanctions, but put the declaratory order into the station's license file to be
considered in the event that further complaints were received. The FCC did, however,
clarify its definition of "indecent" and prohibited such programs from being broadcast.
Id. The station appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit which overturned the FCC
order. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court
granted the Commission's petition for writ of certiorari, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Mr. Justice Stevens authored the majority
opinion as well as additional comments in which only a plurality joined.
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ment denies government any power to restrict the public broadcast of
indecent language in any circumstances." ' 6 3 A majority of the Court
concluded that it did not and upheld the FCC's action as a reasonable
restriction of the time, place and manner of broadcasting indecent material. The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Stevens, 64 noted
that the medium through which the message is communicated is important for first amendment analysis, and that broadcasting "has received
the most limited First Amendment protection" for two reasons: because
of its "pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" 6 5 and because
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children." 6 6 The time of broadcast, public access to the medium, content of program, audience, and
legal sanction were all identified as critical factors which supported the
67
conclusion that the FCC action did not violate the first amendment.
The Court concluded with a picturesque, constitutional simile:
As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a
63. 438 U.S. at 744. In interpreting the term "indecent" used in 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976) (making it a felony to utter "any obscene, indecent or profane language by means
of radio communication"), the Supreme Court was satisfied with the colloquial definition,
i.e., "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." 438 U.S. at 740-41. For a
review of other cases in which the term "indecent" used in section 1464 has been interpreted see Comment, Obscenity, Cable Television and the First Amendment: Will FCC Regulations
Impair the Marketplace ofIdeas?, 21 Duo. L. REV. 965, 979-85 (1983).
64. One part ofJustice Stevens' opinion,joined only by a plurality, argued that regulation of some content is constitutionally permissible as a general proposition. 438 U.S. at
744-45.
65. As Justice Stevens explained:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the first
amendment rights of an intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by
turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for battery is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity
or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
Id. at 748-49 (citation omitted).
66.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read .... Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young
without restricting the expression at its source ....We held in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, that the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'
and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own household' justified
the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in
Ginsberg, amply justifies (sic) special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Id. at 749-750 (citation omitted).
67. Justice Stevens emphasized:
This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a
dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an
occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that
this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The commission's decision
rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized
by the commission. The content of the program in'which the language is used will
also affect the composition of the audience, and differences between radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant.
id. at 750 (emphasis added).
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right thing in a wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of
the barnyard." Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926). We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a
pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power
68
does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.
Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment and in
most of justice Stevens's opinion, but they filed a concurring opinion to
emphasize that regulations channeling indecent programming to protect
69
children and the home are constitutional.
Pacifica is the key to the constitutional question of whether any regulation of nonobscene but indecent sexual programming on cable television is constitutionally permissible. The issue turns on whether the
Pacifica principle, which justifies regulation of indecent radio broadcasting, extends to indecent cable television programming.
B.

The Decisions of the Lower Federal Courts

To date the constitutionality of regulations prohibiting or restricting the transmission of nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit material over cable television has been addressed in four cases decided by
federal district courts and courts of appeals. 70 Thus far, no court has
68. Id. at 750-51.
69. Justice Powell emphasized:
The Commission's primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching
the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that
hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "channel" the monologue to hours
when the fewest unsupervised children would be exposed to it ....
A second difference, not without relevance, is that broadcasting - unlike
most other forms of communication - comes directly into the home, the one
place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and
offensive sights and sounds ....

Although the First Amendment may require

unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when
they are in public before they turn away .... a different order of values obtains in
the home.
Id. at 757, 759 (Powell, J. concurring).
70. The constitutionality of laws regulating indecent cable television programming
was peripherally discussed in another case decided in 1977. In Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Eighth Circuit held
that the FCC had exceeded its statutory jurisdiction in promulgating "access regulations"
for cable television, including a requirement that cable operators adopt rules prohibiting
the transmission of obscene or indecent material on access channels. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.252-.256 (1977). The court held that the regulations were not "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's statutory duty to oversee broadcast television. 571 F.2d at
1037-39. Resting its decision on the Commission's lack ofjurisdiction to enact the regulations, the Eighth Circuit also suggested, without holding, that the censorship provisions
were defective on first amendment grounds. The court noted that the mandatory access
requirements appeared to violate the cablecasters' freedom of speech and suggested that
the indecency censorship provision constituted an unlawful prior restraint. The court emphasized the practical difficulties of monitoring content under an open-access system such
as that mandated by the FCC, it criticized the absence of procedural safeguards respecting
prior restraints and noted the serious difficulties cablecasters would face in trying to define
"obscene" and "indecent." Finally, the court noted the practical impossibility ofcablecasters' implementing the Commission's suggestion that "distasteful" programs be transmitted at hours that would "minimize exposure to young children" in so far as cablecasters
would have no control over the scheduling of programs on the access channels. Id. at
1055-58. The court, however, did not suggest that it was unconstitutional per se to regulate
the transmission of indecent material over cable television. Rather, the court saw first
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upheld any cable television indecency regulation.
1. H.B.O
The first reported case to rule on the constitutionality of indecency
regulations applicable to cable television was Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 7 ' decided by the United States District Court for the District of
Utah in January of 1982. That case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a Utah statute making it a crime for any person to "knowingly distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material
to its subscribers." ' 72 The plaintiffs' attack was limited to the state's attempt to ban nonobscene, but "indecent" cable television programming. The validity of the proscription against the transmission of
"pornographic" material was not challenged. 73
After a brief review of the history of the regulation of pornographic
material, the court concluded that Miller v. California74 defined the
boundaries of permissible state regulation of sexual material. "States
may not go beyond Miller in prescribing criminal penalties for distribution of sexually oriented materials. For better or worse, Miller establishes the analytical boundary of permissible state involvement in the
decision by HBO and others to offer, and the decision by subscribers to
receive particular cable TV programming .... -75 The Utah legislation
was constitutionally defective because it sought "to deal with subject
matter beyond hard-core pornography [banning distribution of sexually
explicit material that was only indecent but not obscene]-to go beyond
Miller-and to do so without any of the safeguards mandated by
Miller." 76
The district court rejected the argument that the state's interest in
protecting children justified the legislation. The court distinguished the
amendment problems in the means employed, not in the objective pursued. The FCC did
not appeal this aspect of the judgment. See supra note 60.
71. 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981).
73. The term "indecent material" was defined by a reference to the following:
(1) Illicit sex or sexual immorality is defined as:
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation; sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic
region, buttock, or female breast.
(2) Nude or partially denuded figure means:
(a) Less than completely and opaquely covered:
(i) Human genitals
(ii) Pubic regions;
(iii) Buttock; and
(iv) Female breast below a point immediately above the top of
the areola;
(b) Human male genitals in a discernably turgid state, even if
completely and opaquely covered.
531 F. Supp. at 995-96 n.16; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1227 and § 76-10-1229(4)
(Supp. 1981).
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Seesupra note 52.
75. 531 F. Supp. at 994-95 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 995.
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Supreme Court's pre-Miller decision, Ginsberg v. New York, 7 7 which upheld a New York law prohibiting the distribution of nonobscene "girlie"
magazines to minors. Judge Jenkins believed that Ginsberg had to be
modified in light of Miller.78 He further noted that, even if Ginsberg justified some regulation of material provided to children, the Utah legislation would still be defective, because "by its terms it would be equally
applicable to cable TV programming reaching homes and environments
having no children at all." ' 79 Finally, the district court emphasized the
ease with which television viewers, especially cable television viewers,
could shield themselves from offensive programming by not buying a
television set, not subscribing to cable, or simply turning off the television. 80 The district court's judgment was not appealed.
2.

Roy City

A few months later, the same federal district court was involved in
assessing the constitutionality of another attempted regulation of cable
television indecency. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 8 1 involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance enacted by a small residential community in Utah. The cable television company had previously
obtained a license from the city to use its easements, streets and ways to
lay its cables. The new ordinance provided for the revocation of
licenses, franchise agreements, and permits on a finding that the holder
"[k]nowingly distributes any pornographic or indecent material as defined by law and in violation of the community standards of the community encompassed within the territorial area included within the Roy City
boundaries ....
82 Roy City conceded that its authority to regulate
77. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
78. 531 F. Supp. at 994-96.
79. Id. at 997. The court described its standard of constitutional review as follows:
"Looking at the statute as enacted, we ask the question: is this something that goes beyond
Miller and enters an area that the Supreme Court appears to have said is an impermissible
area to enter ...

?" Id. at 999.

80. According to Judge Jenkins:
At least under some definitions, a high percentage of what we see on television, I
think, could very well be brought under the umbrella of indecency ....
We put
up with it. What we do if we have occasion to be offended by something in a
program is we get up and turn it off. We do something else ....
That's one of
the nice things about TV-not just cable TV ....
There is no law that says you
have to watch. There is no law that says you have to purchase a television set.
There is no law that says you have to subscribe to a cable TV service .... Cable
television's peculiar advantages derive directly from this matter of choice. The
consumer is offered potentially limitless access to programming sources and content ....

Id. at 1001-02.
81. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
82. Roy City, Utah, Ordinance § 17-3-2(5), (quoted in 555 F.Supp. at 1174 (Appendix
A)). The term "indecent material" was defined to mean:
material which is a representation or verbal description of:
(a) An erotic human sexual or excretory organ or function; or
(b) Erotic nudity; or
(c) Erotic ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
(d) Erotic masturbation; which under contemporary community standards is
patently offensive.
Roy City, Utah, Ordinance § 17-3-6 (quoted in 555 F.Supp. at 1176 (Appendix A)).
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indecent transmissions over cable television was subject to constitutional limits. 8 3 The questions, therefore, were: what are those limits
and what are the standards by which the constitutionality of such regulations should be evaluated? Roy City asserted that its ordinance should
be assessed under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Pacifica. Community Television argued that Pacifica was inapplicable to
cable television, and the district court agreed. 84 The court declared:
"Pacifica, which deals with broadcasting, the transmission of electromagnetic radio waves through the publicly controlled airways, is not ap'8 5
plicable in this case. It is irrelevant."
The court arrived at this conclusion after analyzing and weighing
five criteria. The court first listed and contrasted some of the operating
characteristics of cable television and broadcast television, emphasizing
86
that the characteristics of each are dissimilar in several respects.
For the second criterion, the district court gave a very narrow, technical definition to the concept of "pervasiveness," which was a key element in the Pacifica ruling. The court stated: "The city as well
misapprehends the concept of pervasiveness. Literally it means everpresent. It is in the air, or diffused widely. In that sense, broadcasting
meets the definition. In that sense it is pervasive because its medium,
87
the air, is pervasive. Transmission by wire is not."
Third, the district court asserted that the fact that cable television
transmissions go directly into the home is irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis. 8 8 Fourth, the court asserted that cable television is distinguish83. 555 F. Supp. at 1165.
84. 555 F. Supp. at 1166, 1167.
85. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
86.
Cable

Broadcast

1.

User needs to subscribe.

User need not subscribe.

2.

User holds power to cancel subscriptions.

3.
4.
5.

Limited advertising.
Transmittal through wires.
User receives signal on private cable.

User holds no power to cancel. May complain to F.C.C., station, network, or
sponsor.
Extensive advertising.
Transmittal through public airwaves.
User appropriates signal from the public

6.
7.

User pays a fee.
User receives preview of coming attractions.
Distributoror distributee may add services

User does not pay a fee.
User receives daily and weekly listing in
public press or commercialguides.
Neither distributor nor distributee may

and expanded spectrum of signals or chan-

add services or signals or choices.

airwaves.

8.

nels and choices.

9.

Wires areprivately owned.

Airwaves are not privately owned but are
publicly controlled.
Id. at 1167. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 1169.
88.
The Court finds great difficulty in distinguishing (other than the popcorn) between going to the movies at a theater and having the movies come to me in my
home through electronic transmission over wire. The choice is mine. The location is different. The content is the same. Why should the non-"indecent" on
Main Street be transmuted by ordinance and municipal definition into "indecency" in my home? That does not make sense if we are talking about a standard
to be applied uniformly. There is no distinction made with the Miller standard as
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able from broadcast television because, with cable, "the spectrum of
choice is appreciably expanded." '8 9 In enumerating the various choices
available for cable television viewers, the court noted the initial election
to subscribe to cable service; the ancillary selection of the scope of cable
services proffered and accepted; movie channels which require an increased number of channels; and the ultimate choice of cable subscription cancellation.9 0 The court considered the surfeit of choices as a
primary reason for cable service subscription, contrasting the relative
dearth of choices available for broadcast television viewers. 9 1
The district court noted a final difference between cable and broadcast vis-a-vis acting in "the public interest." The court found that due to
the limited number of broadcasters and their attendant favored economic opportunity in their use of the limited public resource of controlled airways, "broadcasters must act in the public interest."'9 2 The
court determined that "[t]here is no such public interest charge to a
93
cable distributor" in the regulation of cable television systems.
Satisfied that the Pacifica standard did not apply to cable television,
the district court held that the Miller obscenity standard was applicable
to the constitutionality of cable television indecency regulations. 9 4 The
district court emphasized that it was beyond the power of the city or
state "to control communication that is on the protected side of the pornographic line set forth in Miller."'9 5 Applying the Miller test, the court struck
down as unconstitutional those provisions of the Roy City ordinance
which regulated the transmission through cable television of material
96
defined as indecent because it inhibited protected communication.
to whether one goes to the movies or prefers to have the movies come into one's
home.
Id. at 1170. But see infra notes 202-220 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 1168.
90. Id.
91. Id. But see infra note 145 and accompanying text.
92. Id.at 1169.
93. Id. But see infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.
94. The three-pronged Miller standard "is a national standard with a core of uniformity which allows for a degree of flexibility at a community level." Id. at 1169. The Miller
Court found that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 1169 n.23, (quoting Miller v. California, 438 U.S. at 24).
95. Id. at 1171 (emphasis added). The court stressed:
Beyond the line drawn in Miller public bodies must not step - indeed, cannot
step - in the control of artistic communication content. This isn't just what this
judge thinks .... In short, neither in the guise of licensing or franchising, nor in
the guise of authorizing the use of public property by a private business distributing electronic signals, can a municipality control message content that is not
pornographic.
Id. at 1172.
96. Roy City appealed the ruling of the district court in Community Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, but dismissed its appeal after the Utah legislature enacted another
law of state-wide application regulating the transmission over cable television of indecent
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Cruz (I) and Cruz (II)

In August of 1983, a third federal court opinion on cable indecency
regulations was handed down in Cruz v. Ferre.9 7 In January of 1983, the
city of Miami enacted a cable indecency ordinance which provided for
the regulation of indecent and obscene material on cable television. 98 A
month after the ordinance was enacted, a cable television service subscriber filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the
city ordinance. 9 9
The issue before the federal district court was whether the city

could constitutionally regulate the dissemination through cable television of material defined by the city as "indecent." 1 0 0 The district court
concluded that the city had exceeded constitutional limits by adopting
regulations and enforcement methods which violated the first and fourteenth amendments.' 0 ' Moreover, the court permanently enjoined the
city from enforcing those sections of the ordinance which prohibited the
0 2
transmission of indecent material on cable television.1

The court began its first amendment analysis 10 3 by noting that
Miller carefully defines the limits of "permissible obscenity regulation."

10 4

The court stated that indecent speech or material falls outside
the definitional boundaries of obscenity and is thus accorded protection

by the first amendment against state regulation.' 0 5 Finding that Miami's
ordinance prohibited the cable transmission of both obscene and nonobscene, indecent materials, the court concluded that "in regulating the
distribution of 'indecent' materials, the ordinance [swept] within its
bounds 'speech' subject to constitutional protection,"' 1 6 and thus was
10
"overly broad and facially defective."'

7

The court acknowledged that in Pacifica the Supreme Court had
material. Roy City v. Community Television of Utah, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982), appeal docketed, No. 83-1217 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-1217
(10th Cir. June 2, 1983). Additionally, the subsequently enacted state indecency statute is
currently being challenged in federal court. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
97. 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aft'd, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 127. City of Miami, Fla. Ordinance No. 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983) states, in pertinent part, that if probable cause were found to exist, that the City Manager could impose
sanctions if violations were determined to have occurred. Id.
99. 571 F. Supp. at 128. Home Box Office, Inc. intervened as a plaintiff; Cablevision,
the local cablecaster; intervened as a defendant. Id.
100. Id. at 126.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 127. The city was also permanently enjoined from implementing the procedural section by which the ordinance was to be enforced. Id.
103. The court also found the ordinance to violate the fourteenth amendment's procedural due process and equal protection guarantees. Procedurally, the ordinance was
deemed defective because it "concentratted] the functions of complainant, jury, judge and
'executioner' in one person .....Id. at 133. The court also summarily concluded that the
equal protection clause was violated because the ordinance applied "only to cable transmissions" and not "to other forms of transmission such as over-the-air microwave transmissions, subscription broadcast television, or movie theaters." Id. at 134.
104. Id. at 130.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 130-31.
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"found that even though indecent speech was afforded some constitutional protection, its content could be regulated under some circumstances,"' 1 8 but proceeded to distinguish Pacifica on two grounds:
[1] The ordinance . . . prohibits far too broadly the transmission of indecent materials through cable television. The ordinance's prohibitionis wholesale, without regard to the time of day or other
variables indispensable to the decision in Pacifica. [2] The rationale of Pacifica applies only to broadcasting. The medium of
cable television presents different first amendment concerns;
therefore, Pacifica is inapposite. 0 9
The "greater overall viewing control" in cable systems, resulting from
the availability of viewer guides and lockboxes, was deemed to be distinctively important. 110
The city of Miami appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court two years later
in Cruz v. Ferre ( Ill1).The first question the Eleventh Circuit had to
decide was whether the ordinance should be reviewed under the flexible
Pacifica indecency standard or under a strict Miller standard.' 12 The
Court of Appeals concluded that Pacifica was not applicable to the particular facts of the case." 3 Emphasizing that cable viewers must first elect
to subscribe to cable and then pay an extra fee for additional programming services, the court distinguished the "pervasiveness" of cable programming from that of radio programming."14 The court noted also
that the accessibility of indecent programming to children' 5 is significantly less in the case of cable than in the case of radio programming for
several reasons: parents can decline to subscribe to cable, can decline to
pay for extra services, can use program guides to control the programs
their children view, and can obtain a lockbox or parental key. 116 Additionally, the court determined that recent decisions of the Supreme
108. Id. at 131.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. The court emphasized that:
[T]o protect children or other immature viewers from unsuitable program ming,
subscribers [in Miami] need only use a free 'lockbox' or 'parental key' available
from Cablevision. This opportunity to completely avoid the potential harm to
minor or immature viewers sounds the death-knell of Pacifica's applicability in the
cable television context.
Id. at 132.
111. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
112. The Eleventh Circuit found that the enforcement sections of the Miami Ordinance
violated the due process clause of the Constitution because the procedural protections
were "not sufficient to protect the vital interests at stake." Id.at 1422.
113. Id.at 1420.
114. "The Court's concern with the pervasiveness of the broadcast media can best be
seen in its description of broadcasted material as an 'intruder' into the privacy of the
home. Cablevision, however, does not 'intrude' into the home." Id. at 1420. The court
neutralized the "pig in the parlor" language from Pacifica by noting: "It seems to us, however, that if an individual voluntarily opens his door and allows a pig into his parlor, he is
in less of a position to squeal." Id.at n.6.
115. The court found this to be "the more important justification" for Pacifica. Id.at
1420.
116. Id.
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Court "have largely limited Pacifica to its facts."' 17 The Eleventh Circuit
also stated that even if it were to apply the Pacifica standard to the Miami
ordinance it would affirm the district court because the total-ban ordinance was facially overbroad. The court found that the ordinance exceeded the regulatory bounds envisioned by the Pacifica Court in that it
failed "to account for the variables identified in Pacifica: the time of day;
the context of the program in which the material appears; the composition of the viewing audience." '1 18
4.

Wilkinson (I) and Wilkinson (II)

In Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson,1 19 the federal district court in Utah decided its third case in three years involving a constitutional challenge or an attempt to restrict the transmission of sexually
explicit material on cable television. The court granted a motion for
summary judgment holding the Utah Cable Television Programming
Decency Act' 20 to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and there117. 755 F.2d. 1415, 1421 (llth Cir. 1985) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)).
118. id. at 1422.
119. 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985). The district court's holding was very narrow.
The statute was challenged as facially overbroad. The court also discussed the federal
preemption doctrine but concluded that the preemption question was tied to the first
amendment question. Id. at 1101-1106. Judge Anderson concluded, very questionably,
that evidence concerning the type of material actually transmitted, the ability of the cable
company to prescreen material and delay showing it, and guidelines for implementingthe
law, adopted by the Attorney General, were irrelevant. Id. at 1106 n.3, 1107.
120. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-101-17-1 to -1708 (Supp. 1983). Before the Utah legislature convened inJanuary, 1983, anti-pornography groups had circulated an Initiative Petition proposing the Cable T.V. Decency Act, which would have made it a misdeameanor
"for any person to knowingly distribute within [Utah] any obscene or indecent material by
means of cable television." Cable T.V. Decency Act (And Initiative Petition), Sept. 15,
1982 (copy in author's possesion). Under Utah law, a bill proposed by initiative petition
must be considered by the legislature if five percent of the voters in the last election sign
the petition. If the legislature does not enact the bill, it must be submitted to a popular
vote during the next general election if the number of signitures the petition exceeds ten
percent of the registered voters who voted in the last election. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-111 to -4 (1984). The number of signatures on this petition exceeded ten percent of the
voters who voted in the last election.
The Utah Attorney General, David Wilkenson, after consulting several lawyers concluded that the bill proposed in the petition would be unconstitutional (inasmuch as it did
not significantly differ from the law that had been held unconstitutional two years earlier in
Roy City). Thus, he assisted several legislators drafting an alternative bill, the Cable Television Programming Decency Act, in an attempt to respond to the concerns of the citizenry
while avoiding the constitutional pitfalls which had nullified the earlier legislation. The
resulting act eventually won the support of the backers of the petition and passed both
houses of the legislature. The Governor vetoed the bill. Letter of Governor Scott M.
Matheson to Lieutenant Governor David S. Monson (Mar. 30, 1983) (copy in author's
possession). However, the state legislature overrode the veto and the Act became law
without the governor's signiture.
Even though the legislature had enacted a substitute law regulating indecent cable,
because the original petition had been signed by more than ten percent of the voters who
voted in the previous election it was put on the November, 1984 ballot. With the combined opposition of persons who opposed any regulation of cable television and of supporters of the substitute Act which the legislature had passed, the Initiative Petition
Proposal was defeated at the polls by a margin of nearly three-to-two. Deseret News, Nov.
7, 1984, at A-9 col. 1.
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fore facially invalid.
Unlike prior laws which have been challenged the Utah Act merely
regulated "the time, place, manner and context in which the material"
was transmitted over cable television - it did not absolutely ban indecent cable programming. Moreover, the Act only applied to "a continuing course of conduct" rather than isolated incidents, and it imposed
civil fines rather than criminal convictions. 12 1 Thus, the Act followed a
relatively passive regulatory approach, rather than a heavy-handed outright ban 122 on sexually explicit cable television programming.
The court began its first amendment analysis of the Act by revising
the Miller test for obscenity. It held that the Act was facially overbroad
under Miller because the statute "[did] not limit itself to [regulating] material that is legally obscene."' 123 The district court also held that the
statute was not a valid time, place and manner regulation for two reasons. First, the court summarily declared that "indecency" is a contentbased classification, and that constitutional time, place, or manner regulations cannot regulate on the basis of content.1 24 Moreover, the Act
was considered too vague "[b]ecause the meaning of the words 'time,
place, manner, and context' is unclear; section -1702 does not provide
the cable operators with notice of what material can or cannot be
shown." 125
Most of the district court opinion was devoted to rejecting the
state's contention that the Act was constitutional under the Pacifica doctrine. The court held that Pacifica was factually distinguishable because
the radio broadcast in Pacifica occurred in the mid-afternoon, while the
Utah statute was not explicitly limited to afternoon cable program121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1703 (Supp. 1983) provides that "[a] person shall be
deemed to have maintained a nuisance when, as a continuing course of conduct, he knowingly
distributes indecent material within this state over any cable television system or pay-forviewing television programming." (Emphasis added.) The term "indecent material" is
defined as follows:
a visual or verbal depiction, display, representation, dissemination, or verbal description of:
(a) A human sexual or excretory organ or function, or
(b) A state of undress so as to expose the human male or female genitals,
pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering or showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion below the top
of the nipple; of
(c) An ultimate sexual act, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
(d) Masturbation which the averageperson applving contemporary community standards for cable television or pay-for-viewing television programming would find is
presented in a patently offensive way for the time, place, manner and context in which the
material is presented.
611 F. Supp. at 1100 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1702 (4) (1983 Supp.))
(emphasis added).
122. The district court paid little deference to the subtleties of the Act's language and
described the Act as creating a "de facto ban of some cable material." 611 F. Supp. at I II
(emphasis added).
123. Id. at 1108. The Act did not limit itself to regulating material that appeals to the
"prurient interest" nor to material which, as a "taken whole, [Ihacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
124. Id. at 1116.
125. Id. at 1117.
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ming. 12 6 The court also noted that Pacifica involved a milder penalty. 12 7
Moreover, the district court observed that the United States Supreme
Court vote in Pacifica "was closely divided."' 128 The district court also
inferred that Pacifica had been limited to its facts by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 129 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal statute
prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives
was unconstitutional. The Utah federal district court interpreted the
Supreme Court's refusal to apply Pacifica in Bolger to mean that Pacifica
was limited to its facts. 130 The district court emphasized two "fundamental differences" between radio and television: unlike cable, radio has
physical spectrum limitations and historically radio has been regulated
while cable has not.13 1 The court concluded that "[tihe differences between radio and television make Pacifica easily distinguishable .... ,,132
Finally, the district court attempted to distinguish the rationale for
Pacifica. The court rejected Utah's argument that cable television was
more "pervasive" than the FM radio broadcast in Pacifica. The court
noted that it is only "pervasiveness which results in an unwarranted intrusion upon one's right to be left alone" that justifies regulation of FM
broadcasts. 133 The court concluded that "cable television is not an uninvited intruder." 134 Citing the amicus brief filed by the FCC, the district
court noted four distinctions between cable television and FM radio:
persons must subscribe to cable, they must pay an additional fee for
movie channels, lockboxes are available, and viewer programming
35
guides are available.'
The court also rejected the argument that the interest in protecting
children justified the regulation of indecent cable programming because
the Act failed to even mention children and, it failed "to provide any
126. "The Utah statute.., imposes a fine upon cable operators who distribute material
outlawed by the statute at any time." Id. at 1110. (emphasis in original). The Utah Attorney General promulgated guidelines providing that indecent cable programming could be
transmitted during " 'adult viewing hours' (midnight to 7 a.m.)" without violating the
"time, place, or manner" regulation. The district court disregarded those guidelines as no
cure for the constitutional infirmity because they were not legally binding on subsequent
attorneys general or on local municipal or county prosecutors, and thus protected speech
might subsequently be threatened. Id. at 1110, 1114-15; see also infra notes 295-99 and
accompanying text.
127. Id. at 1110.
128. Id. HereJudge Anderson made an arithmetic error. He noted that there were four
dissenters and two concurring Justices. However, he overlooked the fact that the two concurringJustices joined in the rele vant parts ofJustice Steven's opinion, which was denominated as the opinion of the Court representing the opinion of a majority, not just a
plurality.
129. Id.at 11
(citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 650 (1983)).
130. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1111. The court also noted that the two arguments
relied upon by Utah to defend the regulation of cable programming had been rejected by
the Court in Bolger as adequate justification for the total prohibition of mailed advertisements. Id.
131. Id. at 1112-13.
132. Id.at 1115.
133. Id.at 1113 (emphasis in original). Accord Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
134. Wilkinson (1),
611 F. Stpp at 1113.
135. Id.
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systematic procedure for protecting children."' 3 6 The court also noted
that "the scope of the Utah law extends far beyond the interests of chil38
dren."1 37 Thus, the Utah act was held to be facially unconstitutional.1
The State of Utah appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. In Wilkinson (II), a brief per curium opinion, the
appellate court summarily affirmed the judgment of the district court
"on the basis of the reasons stated in the [lower court's] opinion."' 3 9
However, in a separate and lengthy, concurring opinion, Judge Baldock
carefully analyzed the constitutional issues and repudiated the superficial analysis of the district court. First, he rejected the argument that
nonobscene but sexually explicit material is constitutionally immune
from any regulation because it is not obscene.14 0 While the Utah indecency statute did not satisfy the Miller test because it did not require that
a work as a whole appeal to prurient interests and lack serious social
value, 14 1 precedent suggests "that the Miller adult obscenity standard is
not the exclusive test to be applied to the regulation of sexually oriented
material." 142 In addition, the Miller test, appears to be both ineffective
and inapposite in the context of regulation of sexually explicit cable television programming.
Judge Baldock also explained that the district court had erred in
holding that Pacifica does not apply to cable television. Whether indecent programming on cable television may be regulated depends largely
upon how the medium of cable television is categorized. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet decided how cable as a medium is to be characterized, the extent of regulation of cable television will most likely
turn on a comparison of cable with other media, particularly broadcasting.' 4 3 Broadcasting has received the most limited first amendment
protection because of three characteristics: the physical scarcity of the
airwave frequencies, the pervasiveness of the medium, and the ease of
accessibility of children to the medium. Physical scarcity does not appear to be a limitation of the cable medium. However, cable and broadcast television are practically indistinguishable when it comes to
pervasiveness and accessibility to children. In Pacifica the Supreme
Court upheld the regulation of indecent broadcast programming pre136. Id.at 1114.
137. Id. at 1116 n. l.
138. Judge Anderson hinted that the law should be redrafted to provide specific guidelines concerning permissible times of indecent transmissions, emphasizing the importance
of "fair notice or warning." Id. at 1117. But the Attorney General guidelines, which he
ignored, already do that.
139. "The district court has written a comprehensive opinion with which we agree, and
to which we can add little of value. We affirm its judgment on the basis of the reasons
stated in the opinion." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 91 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
The rest of the opinion was devoted to another issue.
140. Id. at 996 (Baldock, J., concurring).

141. Id. at 997. However, he rejected the district court's conclusion that the Utah law
also failed to meet the "patently offensive" requirement of Miller. Id. at 998.
142. Id. at 999.
143. The Tenth Circuit previously held that cable is very different from publishing, and
some other appellate courts have reached the same conclusion. Id. at 1001.
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cisely because of these two characteristics, and the rationale of Pacifica is
equally applicable to cable television. Judge Baldock noted that the analytically significant characteristics of cable and broadcast television are
very similiar: both rely on television receivers, both provide similar and
often interchangeable products, in both cases transmissions emanate
from outside the home and are received in the home, both are pervasive
in our society, and in both cases other means of protecting viewers 14from
4
the unwanted intrusion of offensive programming are ineffective.
Judge Baldock specifically refuted the argument that government
regulation of indecent cable television is unnecessary because viewers
voluntarily subscribe to the medium. He stated that broadcast television
viewers also voluntarily elect and pay to have access to that medium by
purchasing a television set, yet the regulation of indecency on television
is permitted. Like broadcast television programs, cable programs are
disseminated to the public in general, not to specific purchasers such as
those who purchase a particular movie or book. "The cable viewer is
not purchasing a particular program at the time of viewing, rather he is
purchasing a wider range of programs than is available on broadcast television."' 1 4 5 There is no effective advance warning to viewers of offensive material on cable because viewers can tune in at any time.
Programming guides are burdensome and ineffective, and "lockboxes"
are ineffective because they involve "unwanted complexity" because
they block out entire channels not just particular programs. The argument that cable television subscribers constructively consent to indecent
cable programming "is too simplistic and is akin to the notion that one
who hears an indecent broadcast has an adequate remedy by turning it
off. This notion was expressly rejected in FCCv. Pacifica .... -146 Cable
television offers a valuable resource to families, and the opportunity to
utilize that resource "should be available to all who are willing to subindecent material bescribe, even those who object to patently offensive
14 7
ing presented during family viewing hours."'
Judge Baldock agreed that the Utah Cable Decency Act was unconstitutional because he thought it completely prohibited, rather that
merely regulated, transmission of indecent cable television programs.
Defining indecent cable programming by making statutory reference to
"the time, place, manner and context" in which sexually explicit programming is presented was ambiguous because it would, "cause people
of common intelligence to guess at the meaning of indecency and differ
14 8
as to the law's application."'
Thus, to date no court has upheld any attempt to regulate nonobscene sexually explicit cable television programming. On rather broad
grounds, the lower federal courts have declined to extend the Pacifica
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

998-1005.
1005.
1006.
1007. But see intfa notes 295, 312-15 and accompanying text.
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doctrine to cable television, rigidly insisting that Miller defines the only
permissible regulation of sexually explicit cable programming.
C.

The Analytical Errors In The Lower Federal Court Opinions

All federal courts which have attempted to restrict indecent cable
television programming have consistently overstated the legal doctrines
which they use to justify their judgments. Judge Baldock's concurring
opinion in Wilkinson (II) contains the most careful first amendment analysis to date, yet the other two judges who decided that appeal ignored it
and even Judge Baldock's analysis ultimately tripped on a misunderstanding of the statute involved. Surprisingly the lower courts' analytical overbreadth did not spoil the outcome in three of the cases which
involved laws totally banning all indecent cable programming. Nevertheless, these analytical overgeneralizations could, and in the Wilkinson
case clearly did, impair the analysis of and the judgment concerning
more carefully-conceived and drafted measures designed to reasonably
regulate, channel, and condition the transmission of sexually explicit indecent cable fare. The lower federal courts have committed two key analytical errors: they have suggested that sexually explicit material may
only be regulated if it is obscene, and they have held that Pacifica has
absolutely no application to cable television.
1. Some Limited Regulation of Nonobscene Sexually Explicit
Material Is Permissible
The courts that have invalidated cable television indecency restrictions have held that governmental bodies may not constitutionally regulate the distribution of material "that is not pornographic.' 14 9 This
conclusion has been based upon the mistaken assumption that Miller defines the absolute "boundary" of permissible state regulation of sexually
explicit cable television programming. 150 As both a factual and legal
matter this generalization is overbroad and erroneous. The essential
flaw is the simplistic reliance on a "pigeon-hole" analysis which insists
that sexually explicit material either is obscene and can be regulated or
not obscene and completely beyond regulation.
As a factual matter, sexually explicit material does not lend itself to
such a bifurcation. Even the movie industry does not try to categorize
films into just two categories. More important, however, as a matter of
constitutional law the lower courts have erred in assuming that Miller
defines the exclusive, absolute, universal boundary of permissible state
regulation of all sexually explicit material.
The Supreme Court has in many cases upheld some reasonable re149. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (D. Utah
1982). The term "pornographic" means legally obscene under Miller.
150. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1117 (D. Utah 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp.
125, 130 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 989, 994-95
(D. Utah 1982); Rov City, 555 F. Supp. at 1169. But see Wilkinson (I1), 800 F.2d at 995-997
(Baldock, J., concurring).
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strictions on nonpornographic sexual communication.1 5 1 For example,
in a case involving the regulation of nonobscene, sexually explicit "kiddie-porn," the Supreme Court noted that although some states may find
that the Miller approach accommodates their interests, the first amendment does not prohibit states from going further. Specifically, the Court
has said that Miller may fall short with respect to children. "The Miller
standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene,
does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest in
52
prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children."'
The Miller test was fashioned to assess the validity of laws which
prevent individuals from obtaining sexually explicit material they desire
to obtain, whereas cable indecency regulations are designed to protect
other individuals from the intrusion of sexually explicit material they do
not want to view. Miller is an effective test to protect legitimate constitutional interests in the former context, but it is inadequate and ineffective
to protect the legitimate constitutional interests in the latter context. If
protecting individuals and families from the intrusion of unwanted sexually explicit material is a constitutionally legitimate state interest - and
there appears to be no doubt about that - Miller is the wrong test for it
does not accomodate or allow states to effectively protect that constitutional interest.
2.

The Pacifica Doctrine Is Not Limited to Radio Regulations

The most serious mistake made by the lower federal courts was declaring that Pacifica absolutely does not apply to cable television indecency regulations. Their rejection of Pacifica has been overbroad. In
most of the lower court cases there was at least one compelling distinction between the case at bar and Pacifica: whereas Pacifica involved only
the regulatory channeling of indecent programming, the laws involved in
HBO, Roy City, Cruz (I) and Cruz (II) absolutely and totally banned sexually
explicit material from the entire cable television medium. Only two
courts, however, even mentioned this important distinction. 153 Generally, the lower courts have relied on potentially sweeping but surprisingly specious arguments to distinguish Pacifica. In Wilkinson (I), the
151. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (kiddie-porn restrictions); New
York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (restrictions on topless dancing
in bars); FCC v. Pacifica, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (indecent afternoon radio broadcasts);
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (restricted zoning of "adult"
theatres); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (statute authorizing Post Office to not deliver offensive mail to addressee at his request); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (prohibiting sale of "girlie magazines" to minors); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of
Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281
(10th Cir. 1983).
152. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. See also Wilkinson (I),

800 F.2d at 997-999

(Baldock, J., concurring).
153. This distinction was noted both in Cruz (1), 571 F. Supp. at 131 and in Cruz (I).
755 F.2d at 1421-1422. See also Wilkinson (II), slip op. at 10-16 (Baldock, J., concurring).
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court's reliance on overbroad generalizations to distinguish Pacifica
caused the court to err.
Two lower courts have cited Bolger to suggest that the Supreme
Court has "limit[ed] Pacifica to its facts."' 154 This suggestion is simply
erroneous. A quick review of citations to the case reveals that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on Pacifica even in deciding cases
involving non-broadcast media. 15 5 In Bolger, the Supreme Court simply
noted that Pacifica did not justify an absolute ban of all mailed contraceptive advertisements - a far cry from the conclusion that the Pacifica
approach does not apply at all to regulations of indecent cable television
programming. As Judge Baldock noted, Bolger is distinguishable because the Bolger Court "was satisfied that parents exercise substantial
control over the distribution of mail [advertisements for contraceptives]
received at home and that the restriction on this type of mail allowed
' 56
parents to control and eliminate its receipt."'
The effort of the lower federal courts to distinguish Pacifica reached
its nadir when Judge Jenkins created a "laundry list" contrasting some
15 7
of the operating characteristics of cable and broadcast television.
The impressive-looking list, however, is analytically irrelevant because
none of the characteristics described in it relate to the Supreme Court's
analysis in Pacifica. The district court failed to mention, much less distinguish, the characteristics of the broadcast media which the Supreme
Court identified as justifying a flexible standard of permissible regulation in Pacifica.
In Pacifica the Supreme Court acknowledged that there were three
particularly important reasons why the first amendment does not prohibit reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on broadcasts that
are indecent but not obscene: (1) because of the "pervasive presence"
of broadcasting in the lives of Americans; (2) because radio programming confronts citizens in the privacy of their homes; and (3) because
broadcast programming is "uniquely accessible to children."' 5 8 From
the perspective of these three key considerations there are no analytically significant differences between broadcast radio and cable television. With respect to pervasiveness, impact in homes, and accessibility
to children, indecent cable television programming is analytically indis154. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1111; see also Cruz (H), 755 F.2d at 1421-22.
155. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser. 106 S. Ct. 3159. 3165-66 (1986);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (kiddie-porn); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980) (residential picketing); see also Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
890 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (school libraries); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n
v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Reeves v. McConn, 638 F.2d 762, 763 (5th Cir.
1981).
156. Wilkinson (11), 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J.,concurring).
157. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp 1164, 1167. See
supra note 86. The appeal of the "laundry list analysis" is illustrated by the fact that it was
copied and endorsed in the Cruz (1) opinion by Judge Hoeveler, whose independent analysis of Pacifica was otherwise impressively sound. But seelWilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 1003-1006
(Baldock, J., concurring). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
158. 438 U.S. at 748-49. See supra note 65 and accomtpanying text.
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tinguishable from indecent broadcast programming. 159 While the
Pacifica principle may require a different application to cable television
than to radio, the absolute rejection of the Pacifica doctrine by the lower
courts in cable television cases is analytically unjustifiable.
D.

The Law Review Commentators

Legal commentators did not consider the constitutionality of the
regulation of nonobscene but indecent cable programming until
1983.160 Since then many articles or notes addressing this issue have
been published. 16 1 The lower court decisions invalidating cable television indecency regulations generally have been applauded by the law
review commentators.16 2 Paccifica, on the other hand, has not been popular with the law review writers. 163 Most of the commentators seem to
agree with the opinion of Professor Laurence Tribe that
[t]he result the Court reached in Pacifica seems a poor basis for
doctrinal extrapolation .... It would be regrettable, then, if
the opinions of the majority were allowed to leave any enduring
marks on First Amendment jurisprudence: Pacifica should be
confined to its facts and6 eventually
discarded as a "derelict in
4
the stream of the law."'
The general reluctance of legal commentators to endorse the constitutionality of regulations restricting indecent cable television programming appears to be at least partially premised on the belief that it is
dangerous for the state to interfere with the right of adults to have access to any communicative material they desire and that it is inappropriate for government to attempt to establish or preserve moral values
pertaining to sexual behavior. 16 5 However, the commentators who have
159. See infra pp. 650-51, 656-59 and 661-663.
160. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1983); Hofbauer, 'Cableporn' and the First Amendment: Perspectives On
Content Regulation of Cable Television, 35 F.C.C.L.J. 139 (1983); Krattenmaker & Esterow,
supra note 52; Riggs, Indecency on Cable: Can It Be Regulated, 26 ARIZ.L.REV. 269 (1984);
Comment, The Growing Pains of Cable Television, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 175 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Growing Pains];Note, Indecent Programmingon Cable Television and the First
Amendment, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 254 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indecent Programming]; Comment, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming: HBO v. Wilkinson, 9J. CONTEMP. L. 207 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming].
See also Note, supra note 63; infra note 332.
162. See Krattenmaker & Esterlow, supra note 52, at 608-11, 633; Note, Indecent Programming, supra note 161, at 263-68; see also Hofbauer, supra note 161, at 152-54, 176-81,
202-03; Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming, supra note 161, at 212-15; Comment, Growing Pains, supra note 161, at 188-92.
163. For example, Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 52, at 627 would treat Pacifica as
"a limited exception, for an extreme, virtually non-replicable case." See also Geller &
Lampert, supra note 161, at 615-16; Powe, supra note 51, at 895-905; The Supreme Court.
1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 148-63 (1978); Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra note
51, at 332-41.
164.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTiONAL LAw 67-68 (Supp. 1979).

165. For instance, after arguing that Pacifica should be given the narrowest possible
reading and that it should not be relied upon in assessing the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting indecent cable television programming, the authors of one article opposed to
indecency regulations concluded with this revealing caveat:
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argued most vigorously against cable television indecency regulations
have focused primarily on laws which totally prohibit such programming.166 Their analyses have tended to be as overbroad as the prohibitions they have in mind. A few commentators have recently suggested
that some regulations that partially prohibit or channel indecent programming on cable television should be constitutionally permissible
16 7
under the principles of Pacifica.
III.

A

MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS

RESTRICTING "INDECENT" SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CABLE
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

It is well established that the first amendment protects nonobscene
speech, even if it is patently offensive and indecent. It is equally clear
that the first amendment does not forbid all regulation of protected
speech. The question, therefore, is one of degree. And the degree of
permissible state regulation of nonobscene but indecent, sexually explicit material depends upon a variety of factors which fall into two categories: the intrusiveness of the speech and the intrusiveness of the
regulations.
Factors relating to the intrusiveness of the speech which are relevant to the analysis of cable television indecency regulations include: (1)
the "pervasiveness" of the medium; (2) the monopolistic use of a public
resource; (3) the privacy of the place into which the material intrudes;
(4) the degree of audience captivity; (5) accessibility of inappropriate
material to children; and (6) the offensiveness of the form of expression,
especially if it is sexually explict. Factors relevant to assessing the intrusiveness of the regulation include: (1)the characteristics of the medium
of communication; (2) the necessity for other regulation in the public
interest; (3) the type of regulation imposed; and (4) the context of enforcement. Finally, the balance of harm to the competing interests must
be assessed. All of these factors must be considered because "[t]he ability of government consonant with the Constitution to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing is .. .dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."' 16 8 These factors are considered below in the order
Consider the alternative. The danger of extending Pacifica to cable is self-evident.
Such an extension would not only open the door to limit what is increasingly
becoming an important additional means of disseminating diverse ideas and information, but also would threaten to destroy the first amendment rights of individuals to say, see and hear what they choose ....

The state simply may not

constitutionally regulate offensive material merely to protect its citizens' moral
sensibilities, certainly not when the acquisition of that material requires an affirmative, informed choice by an adult.
Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 52, at 635-36.

166. See, e.g., id. at 606, 608, 624-25, 627-28; Note, Indecent P'og'amming, supra note 161,
at 263-68.
167.

See e.g., Riggs, supra note 161, at 326-28; Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Pro-

gramming, supra note 161, at 214-15.
168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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listed.
A.

The Intrusiveness of the Speech
1. The Pervasiveness of the Medium

The first justification given by the Supreme Court for allowing government regulation of indecent radio programming in Pacifica was the
"uniquely pervasive presence [of radio broadcasting] in the lives of all
Americans." 169 Unfortunately, the lower courts have thus far misunderstood the concept of "pervasiveness." For instance, in Roy City, District
JudgeJenkins revealed his belief that "pervasiveness" merely referred to
the physical attribute of airwave transmission. 170 It is clear, however,
that the "pervasiveness" the Supreme Court was concerned with in
Pacifica was the intrusive presence of broadcast programming in the
daily lives of all Americans,' 7 1 not the technical characteristics of the
72
means of transmission.
From several analytically significant perspectives the intrusive presence of cable television is greater and more pervasive than that of FM
radio. The visual impact of television, both broadcast and cable, coupled with the auditory effect, gives television a greater impact than the
mere words of radio. The Supreme Court in Pacifica explicitly tied the
concept of pervasiveness to the presence of the medium in the home
and to the difficulty of protecting the listener or viewer from unexpected
1 73
program content.
Although each of these factors will be discussed in depth below, it is
important to note that from this protective or defensive point of view,
the intrusiveness of a particular program on cable television is indistinguishable from broadcast radio or television programming. In each case
the viewer has no control over channel programming. The viewer could
avoid the offensive program by turning the channel, by turning off the
set, or by avoiding the medium altogether. 174 Unlike purchasers of
books, magazines or video cassettes who obtain only the specific material they desire, television viewers are confronted with programming selected for them by others and transmitted to them on a continuing basis.
Cable television, like broadcast radio, reaches directly into the home
where specific indecent programs may be an unwelcome intrusion for
169. 438 U.S. at 748.
170. Judge Jenkins wrote that pervasiveness "means ever-present. It is in the air, or
diffused widely .... [Broadcasting] is pervasive because its medium, the air, is pervasive.
[Cable] [t]ransmission by wire is not." 555 F. Supp. at 1169. See also Krattenmaker &
Esterlow supra note 52, at 633.
171. 438 U.S. at 748.
172. For example, a "two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher" utilizes the same technology and medium - the public airwaves - as the commercial radio station involved in Pacifica; yet the Supreme Court implied that such
broadcasting was not pervasive. Id. at 750.
173. 438 U.S. at 748-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
174. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; see also IVilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock, J., concurring); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 128
(1973).
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many adult subscribers who do not desire to view, even inadvertently,
patently offensive sexual depictions, and where many children are in the
viewing audience during most of the day and early evening.
Finally, in terms of economic and social impact, cable television is
175
fast approaching the size and significance of broadcast television.
Cable television is now commonplace in virtually all communities. It is
not unfair to conclude that the pervasive presence of cable television in
the lives of Americans is as great or greater than that of FM radio in
1973 when the program complained of in Pacifica was broadcast.
2.

The Monopolistic Use of a Public Resource

Greater media regulation is permitted when the medium regulated
requires the use of public resources than when private resources are utilized. One reason broadcasting has been subject to greater regulation
of sexually explicit material than the print media is because broadcasters
use public resources and hold a public trust. A broadcaster enjoys the
"advantages .. .of a preferred position conferred by the Government"
and this justifies some "government[al] effort to assure that a broadcaster's programming ... serve[s] the public interest."1 76 Accordingly,
under the first amendment a broadcaster enjoys "the widest journalistic
freedom consistent with its public obligations ....,,177 Cable television
also involves the use of the public domain - in some respects to an even
greater degree than broadcast television. ' 7 8 Thus, cable television may
be regulated in some ways print publishers and other nonusers of public
resources are not.
The regulation of broadcast communications has been justified because of the conjunction of two unique characteristics of the medium:
broadcasting requires the use of a public resource and the number of
persons who can use that resource for that purpose is limited. Broadcasting requires the use of radio frequencies which belong to the public. 17 9 By the 1920's, it was apparent that radio frequencies could
accommodate only a limited number of broadcasters and that the demand to broadcast over the radio exceeded the supply of available fre175. See supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text. In the small residential community of
Roy City, Utah, apparently 78% of the eligible homes subscribed to the cable TV service
offered by the plaintiff in the Roy City case. Appellant's Brief, at 6, Community Television
of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, No. 83-1217 (10th Cir., May 17. 1983). See also

dilkinson
(H),800

F.2d at 1005 (Baldock, J., concurring).
176. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened
by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at the whim or
caprice of its owner; the broadcast station cannot.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
177. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110
(emphasis added); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 395.
178. See generally Kreiss, supra note 50, at 1024-26.
179. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973).
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Thus, the reasonable regulation of broadcast comquencies.18 0
munications, consistent with the legitimate public purposes to which the
public airwaves have been dedicated, has been upheld, 18s even though
similar regulation of media not requiring the use of limited public resources has been invalidated. 182 Likewise, reasonable regulation of
other media which require the use of limited public resources has been
upheld so long as the regulation has been consistent with the legitimate public purposes to which those public resources have been
83

dedicated.1

Like broadcasting, cable television requires the use of public
resources. Cable television companies must use public ways, alleys,
streets, easements and public condemnation authority to run and maintain their cables.1 8 4 Developing and maintaining a cable television system would be impossible without the right to enter, use, and possibly
disrupt public property or public easements on private property. Moreover, the public resources necessary for the operation of cable television
systems can only be used5 by a very limited number of cable television
18
operations at one time.
180. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 387-90; see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14, (1943). It is questionable whether the
"scarcity" rationale still is a valid justification at all for broadcasting regulations. See
Botein, Cable TV in the U.S.A.: The Legal and Regulatory Environment, 3J. MEDIA L. & PRAc.
320, 323 (1982); Fowler & Brennan, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982). But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376
n. 11.
181. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (federal
statute requiring broadcasters to sell airtime to candidates for federal office upheld);
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (penalty for broadcasting indecent radio program upheld); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the "fairness doctrine" which
requires broadcasters to give persons or causes criticized in editorials an opportunity to
reply).
182. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida
statute requiring newspapers to give free right to reply to political candidates whom they
had editorially criticized held unconstitutional by unanimous Court).
183. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (school district policy permitting union representing teachers to use internal school mail system but denying other unions from using
the system constitutional); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding military regulations banning partisan political speeches and literature disruptive to military morale on
military post); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city policy prohibiting use of advertising space on public buses for political advertising held to be constitutional even though the city allowed commercial advertising for public service groups,
churches, banks, cigarettes, liquor, etc.). Cf Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (Illinois
statute which prohibited residential picketing except in labor dispute invalidated); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (PSC ban on billing letter
inserts discussing controversial issues invalidated); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing on a public way near school invalidated); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (ordinance prohibiting public meetings and distribution of
printed material in streets without permit unconstitutional).
184. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
185. This is due in part to the intolerable disruption of the public ways created by the
repeated trenching, stringing, and repairing of the public ways which multiple cable systems could foster. See generally Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Omega Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 127; Communitv Communications Co., 660 F.2d
at 1397. But cf. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396,
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Because cable television systems require the monopolistic or oligopolistic use of certain public resources, 18 6 it is well within the province
of a local government to dedicate those resources to purposes consistent with the character of the community and the quality of its neighborhoods. As a condition to the use of their public resources, it is
reasonable for family-oriented communities to require a cable television
company to agree to provide programming that is not unfit for general
family viewing - at least during hours when families would be watching
television. Such requirements would be consistent with the legitimate
public purposes to which the public resources are dedicated: to protect
1406 (9th Cir.), cert, granted, 106 S. Ct. 302 (1985), aff'd and remanded 106 S.Ct. 2043 (1985)
("It has not been alleged that public utility facilities owned or controlled by the City can
only support the use of a single or a few cables.") The Supreme Court remanded Preferred
Communications for "fuller development of the disputed issues" of fact, e.g. the degree of
disruption and the dangers of having two cable operations. 106 S. Ct. at 2038. Another
factor is that cable television systems operate in most communities as "natural monopolies." Omega Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 126. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, described the "natural monopoly" of cable television this way:
The cost of the cable grid appears to be the biggest cost of a cable television
system and to be largely invariant to the number of subscribers the system has.
We said earlier that once the grid is in place - once every major street has a
cable running above or below it that can be hooked up to the individual residences along the street - the cost of adding another subscriber probably is
small.
If so, the average cost of cable television would be minimized by having a
single company in any given geographical area; for if there is more than one company and therefore more than one grid, the cost of each grid will be spread over a
smaller number of subscribers, and the average cost per subscriber, and hence
price, will be higher. If the foregoing accurately describes conditions . . . it describes what economists call a "natural monopoly," wherein the benefits, and indeed the very possiblity, of competition are limited. You can start with a
competitive free-for-all - different cable television systems frantically building
out their grids and signing up subscribers in an effort to bring down their average
costs faster than their rivals - but eventually there will be only a single company,
because until a company serves the whole market it will have an incentive to keep
expanding in order to lower its average costs. In the interim there may be wasteful duplication of facilities. This duplication may lead not only to higher prices to
cable television subscribers, at least in the short run, but also to higher costs to
other users of the public ways, who must compete with the cable television companies for access to them.
Id. While the existence of a natural monopoly does not warrant regulation of private communications media, the fact that a public resource realistically may be used by only one, or
a very few, cable system(s) at a time, necessarily and directly affects the public interest
upon which the constitutionality of cable television regulations depends. See, e.g., Omega
Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 127-28; Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379. The
validity of the restrictions imposed upon users of the medium must directly relate to the
legitimate public purposes to which it has been dedicated.
186. The Tenth Circuit noted these points in an excellent opinion, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982), wherein the court distinguished cable television from the print media and
held that cable broadcasting's attributes are sufficiently distinguishable from those of the
print medium to preclude applying "the nearly absolute strictures against direct government regulation of newspapers' disemmination of information . . . in wholesale fashion to
cable operators." Id. at 1377. In an incisive opinion for the court of appeals, Judge Seymour concluded that "government must have some authority in such a context to see to it
that optimum use is made of the cable medium in public interest," id at 1379, because of
the "natural monopoly" aspect of cable television, id. at 1378, and because cable television
systems must utilize public streets, ways, alleys and easements, causing "government and
cable operators [to be] tied in a way that government and newspapers are not." Id. at
1377-78.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

and foster the character of the community. Because the type of material
restricted would still be available to the members of the community
through private channels of communication, 187 the decision to so condition the use of the public resources could hardly be deemed censorship
of private communications.
Nothing in the first amendment requires local governments to provide public resources as a conduit for transmission of material that offends the values and subverts the character of the community. Nothing
in the first amendment prevents the government from requiring a communications company that enjoys the exclusive or oligopolistic use of
the public domain for private profit to refrain from transmitting at certain times or under certain conditions sexually explicit material that is
patently offensive to the community. 18 8 Dedication of public resources
to foster an atmosphere in which families can enjoy access to educational programs, coverage of current events, and quality entertainment
in their homes without having to risk the intrusion of unwanted sexually
explicit programming is a legitimate and important public interest. Insofar as the regulations imposed upon cable operators reasonably further that interest in a manner which is not overly broad and without
prejudice to particular viewpoints, the first amendment provides no basis for invalidating the regulations.
Board of Education v. Pico 189 provides strong support for this conclusion. The issue in that case was whether a local board of education
could remove from junior high school and high school libraries certain
books which it found to be "anti-American, anti-Christian, antiSem[i]tic, and just plain filthy."' 9 0 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the school board, but the court of appeals reversed and
remanded for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there
was a genuine issue of material fact. 19 1 Significantly, eight of the Justices specifically indicated that even though the books were not obscene
they could constitutionally be removed if they were vulgar. 19 2 If a
187. For example, video rental outlets, bookstores, theatres, etc. Moreover, this material might also be available on cable television at times when it was not devoted to furthering the dedicated purposes.
188. See Red Lion Broadcasting,395 U.S. at 389: "There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee.., to conduct himself as
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community .. ." See also Kreiss, supra note 50, at 1026. "The argument that the
cable operator ought to have complete editorial freedom in order to disseminate his own
views and ideas is considerably weakened when the cable operator is considered a
conduit."

189. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 857.
191. Id. at 869-75 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.); id. at
883-84 (White, J., concurring in the judgment only). Three Justices, in an opinion written
by Justice Brennan, argued that the first amendment protects a "right to receive information" and that school libraries occupy a unique and specially-protected place in the constella tion of first amendment rights. Id. at 863-69 (Brennan, J., opinion joined by Marshall
and Stevens, JJ., Blackmun, J., joined in part). Five Justices, however, explicity rejected
that broad theory. Id. at 875-80 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part); id. at 885-95 (Burger,
CJ., dissenting joined by Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
192. Id. at 871 (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall and Stevens, J.J.) ("pervasively vul-
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school or public library may ban or restrict access to certain nonobscene
books or magazines that some of its patrons want to read but which
would offend many others and are deemed to be vulgar,' 93 it is not unreasonable for state and local governments to similarly regulate programming on cable television systems which enjoy the privilege of
exclusive use of public resources.
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,19 4 several members of the
Supreme Court upheld the principle that public authorities may forbid
the use of public resources for sexually explicit programs. The Court
considered the refusal of a municipality to lease a city theater to Southeastern Promotions for presentation of the musical "Hair," which was
replete with scenes involving group nudity and simulated sex. A jury,
the trial court, and the court of appeals upheld the municipality's refusal, finding that the production was "obscene."' 9 5 The Supreme
Court did not review that finding, nor did the majority address the constitutionality of restricting use of public facilities for sexually explicit
programs. Emphasizing the narrow basis for its decision, the Court
found the municipality's refusal unconstitutional because the decision to
refuse to lease was made "under a system lacking in constitutionally re96
quired minimum procedural safeguards." 1
In separate opinions, however, three dissenting Justices addressed
the lurking first amendment issue and explicitly endorsed the propriety
of a public entity monitoring for decency the material presented on a
publicly-owned stage. Justice White, who refrained from addressing the
first amendment question in Pico, emphasized in a dissent which was
joined by the ChiefJustice that a public entity "may reserve its auditorium for productions suitable for exhibition to all citizens of the city,
adults and children alike."' 9 7 Justice Rehnquist declared:
[I]f it is the desire of the citizens of Chattanooga, who presumably have paid for and own the facilities, that the attractions to
be shown there should not be of the kind which would offend
any substantial number of potential theatergoers, I do not think
gar"); id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) ("offensive language" or inappropriate
to age group); id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.) ("random vulgarity" would be sufficient); id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("vulgar or racist").
193. When school libraries are involved, the constitutional analysis is different than
when the library involved is an ordinary public library. While there has been substantial
litigation concerning censorship in school libraries, see supra note 191 and Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1983), there has been surprisingly little litigation
concerning censorship or restriction of materials in public libraries. See, e.g., O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973); O'Neil, Libraries,
Librarians and First Amendment Freedom, 4 HUMAN RTS. 295 (1975); Schmutz, The Purity Patrol,

10 STUD. LAW., Oct. 1981, at 14, 16; Appleson, Lawscope: Out of Reach, 67 A.B.A.J. 825
(1981).
194. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
195. Id. at 550-52.
196. Id. at 552.
197. Id. at 569 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
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the policy can be described as arbitrary or unreasonable. 198
Finally, the Pacifica opinion further supports the principle that public bodies may regulate vulgar programming on communications systems using limited public resources to operate. The significance of
cable operators' use of public resources is emphasized by the Supreme
Court's distinction in Pacifica of private, closed-circuit cable systems.
The Court noted that "differences between radio, television, and perhaps
closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant [to the constitutional analysis]."' 19 9 Therefore, private "closed circuit" cable television systems
operated on private property present an analytically distinguishable situation. 20 0 Public cable television systems, however, are not "closed circuit" in any sense that was relevant to the constitutional analysis in
Pacifica. To impose reasonable restrictions on the transmission of sexually explicit material over public cable television systems, which must
use the public domain to operate does not, however, constitute an intrusion on the constitutionally protected first amendment or privacy interests of cable operators or subscribers. Clearly, then, the public interests
of decency and good taste justify some regulation of speech communi201
cated via media using public resources.
3.

The Privacy of the Place into Which the Material Intrudes.

The place where the communication occurs is extremely significant
for first amendment analysis. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
the reasonableness of a time, place and manner regulation depends
upon "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."' 20 2 The
Court has repeatedly distinguished communication that occurs in public
from communication that intrudes into the privacy of the home. The
latter has consistently been subject to greater regulation under the first
amendment than the former. As a place of refuge, the home has been
accorded the status of a constitutionally protected sanctuary. 20 3 The
Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe state's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society." 20 4 This special status derives
from our constitutional traditions of extraordinary respect for personal
privacy 2° 5 and deference to family autonomy. 20 6 The value of protect198. Id. 572 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
199. 438 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added).
200. For example, closed-circuit cable systems operated by "x-rated motels" which
show sexually explicit movies to thier customers might call for a different analysis. Those
systems are analytically more similar to private "x-rated" movie theatres than to public
cable television systems.
201. 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). See infra note 309.
202. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See generally Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-BalancingThe Individual And Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv.463 (1983).
204. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
205. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into defendant's home to make routine felony arrest unconstitutional); Stanley v Georgia,
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ing the sancity of the home is so important that the Supreme Court has
upheld statutes protecting the residential character of entire neighborhoods, not just individuals' residences, from unwanted intrusions of
20 7
protected sexual activity.
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,20

8

the Court upheld

the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the mailer of material

which the recipient considered to be "sexually provocative" to remove,
upon request, the name and address of the recipient from the mailer's
mailing list. The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution permits a vendor "to send unwanted material into the home of another"

because "[t]he ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into
which 'not even the king may enter' has lost some of its vitality .... ,,209

This factor was emphasized in both the majority and concurring
opinions in Pacifica. There the Court said: "Patently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right
to be left alone plainly outweighs the first amendment rights of an intruder. "210 Concurring, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, un394 U.S. 557 (1969) (overturning conviction of defendant for merely possessing obscenity
in his home); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (insertion of "spike mike"
into heating duct of defendant's home unconstitutional); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954) (illegal entry to install microphone in bedroom of defendant "flagrantly ... violate[d] the... Fourth Amendment," but exclusionary rule held not applicable to states);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced stomach pumping to recover illegal
drugs unconstitutional). In fact, the Court has repeatedly declared that "physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). "The fourth
amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home-a home that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms ....
" Payton, 445 U.S. at 589; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (conviction of family planning employee for violating law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives or contraceptive information overturned).
206. See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (law authorizing parents to commit their
child to mental hospital over child's objection without adversarial hearing upheld); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-506 (1977)(conviction of grandmother for
violation of zoning statute prohibiting her from allowing two grandsons to reside with her
overturned); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(conviction of Amish parents for not
sending their children to school past the eighth grade overturned).
207. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning ordinance requiring motion picture theaters that show non-obscene but sexually explicit movies to be dispersed throughout the city upheld). Cf Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance prohibiting live entertainment was applied to prohibit
nude dancing, held unconstitutional, with dicta stating that "if there were countywide zoning, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only selected areas of the county
and to exclude it from primarily residential communities ..... id. at 76). In Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974),Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared:
"The police power is not confined to eliminating filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is
ample to layour zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuaryfor people. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
208. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
209. Id. at 737, 738.
210. 438 U.S. at 748. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Pacifica defended the restriction on indecent radio broadcasts because of the distinction that "adults who feel the need
may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words." Id.
at 750 n.28.
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derscored the significance of this intrusion:
[B]roadcasting-unlike most other forms of communicationcomes directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds .... Although the First Amendment may
require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but
protected speech when they are in public before they turn
away, .

.

. a different order of values obtains in the home.

"That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other
sound[s] does
211
not mean we must be captives everywhere."
In many cases where laws regulating speech in public have been
invalidated on first amendment grounds, the Supreme Court has been
careful to distinguish this factor and has reiterated that regulation in the
interest of protecting the privacy of the home is permissible. For instance, in Cohen v. California,2 12 the Supreme Court overturned the "disturbing the peace" conviction of a young man who wore a jacket in a
public courthouse bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft." The Court
stated that the privacy interest of individuals who are offended by seeing
a printed vulgarity while "walking through a courthouse corridor ...

is

nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted expression in the
confines of one's own home." '2 13 The Court has recognized that "government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into
the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be
'2 14
totally banned from the public dialogue."
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,2 5 the Court declared unconstitutional a local ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from
showing any film that contained nudity. Again, however, the Court carefully distinguished the greater interest of the state in protecting the privacy of the home from the "limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets." 2 1 6 The Court observed that the kind of regulations enacted by the city of Jacksonville "have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home ...or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." 2 17 In Carey v. Brown 2 18 the Court held that an Illinois statute
prohibiting picketing at residences, except labor picketing, unconstitutionally violated the equal protection clause. The Court, however, emphasized that the defect in the statute was its unconstitutional
preference for one type of speech,2 1 9 and went to great lengths to reit211. Id. at 759 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (Powell, J.
concurring)).
212. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
213. Id. at 21-22.
214. Id. at 21.
215. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
216. Id. at 212.
217. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
218. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
219. Id. at 461-63.
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erate that the protection of homes from unwanted speech was a valid
objective of state legislation. "Preserving the sanctity of the home ... is
surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for
the right of an individual 'to be let alone' in the privacy of the home,
'sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.' "220
The nature and degree of intrusiveness into the home of cable programming is virtually identical to that of broadcast television. Indecent
cable television programming reaches directly into the homes of all persons who subscribe to the medium, some of whom deeply resent the
intrusion of sexually offensive materials into the havens they have created for their families. Protecting the sanctuary of the home justifies
reasonable regulations which enable families to avoid unwanted intrusions of sexually explicit indecent material into their homes without
foregoing an entire medium. As with broadcast television and radio,
cable television should be reasonably regulated to achieve this goal.
4.

Audience Captivity

Because the television viewer has no control over the television programming, he is, in a sense, a captive of the programmer whenever he
turns on the television set. This is just as true of cable television as it is
of broadcast television. This type of intrusiveness was emphasized by
the Supreme Court in Pacifica as one of the main justifications for the
constitutionality of the regulation of broadcast indecency. 22 1 Many
viewers subscribe to cable for programs such as news, sports and general entertainment but do not want to see, even inadvertently, sexually
explicit programs. Their invitation of the cable medium into their
homes is no more an invitation of sexually explicit cable programming
than was the purchase of FM radio an invitation to George Carlin's indecent monologue which was heard by the complainant and his son in
Pacifica. The Supreme Court, in Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 2 22 upheld the FCC's finding that a television
broadcaster had not violated the Fairness Doctrine by refusing to sell
time to responsible entities to present views on public issues. The Court
noted that "in a very real sense listeners and viewers constitute a 'captive audience.' ",223 Quoting Judge Bazelon, the Court observed:
" 'Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act ....[A]n ordinary habitual television
220. Id. at 471 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J.,concurring)). The Court further emphasized that " 'no mandate in our Constitution leaves
States ... powerless to pass laws to protect the public from ...

conduct that disturbs the

tranquility of spots selected by the people ... for homes ...." Id. at 470-71.
221. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings
cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To
say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.
Carey v. Brown, 438 U.S. at 748, 749. See also id. at 759 (Powell,J., concurring) (emphasizing that "a different order of values obtains in the home").
222. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
223. Id. at 127.
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watcher can avoid [messages] . . . only by frequently leaving the room,
changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act.' ",224
Even in cases not involving the home, the Court has justified state
regulation designed to protect captive audiences from unwanted intrusions. 22 5 Most recently the Court emphasized this factor in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp. 226 Distinguishing the Pacifica statute prohibiting indecent radio broadcasting from the statute before it, which prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, the
Court found mail to be "far less intrusive and uncontrollable" than radio or television broadcasts. 2 2 7 The Court opined that the "short,
though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an acceptable
burden" to impose upon persons who receive unsolicited contraceptive
2 28
advertisements through the mail.
The lower courts which have invalidated cable indecency regulations have emphasized the ostensibly greater freedom which cable television affords its viewers as compared to broadcast television. 229 The
courts, however, have confused different methods of making the same
choice with different choices. They have embraced the fallacy that one is
freer, or has more choice, if four steps arie required to tune-in than if the
process only requires three steps.
There is no analytically significant distinction between the "entry
choice" made by the viewer of broadcast television and the viewer of
cable television. The entry choices are made in different ways23 0 and
involve different market CoStS, 2 3 1 but they are functionally equivalent. 23 2 The choice to subscribe to cable television service and receive
a prepackaged set of cable channels is functionally no different than the
purchase of a television set with channel capacity limited to the twelve
ordinary frequency bands, or a television set with the capacity to receive
six higher frequency channels, or a radio with AM and FM tuning. The
choice to tune in to a program is the same, whether the viewer must
manipulate three knobs or four. The choice to tune out or turn off a
television program is the same whether the program is transmitted over
cable or broadcast television.
224. Id. at 128 (quoting Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)(emphasis in original)).
225. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollack, 343, U.S. 451 (1952); Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
226. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
227. Id. at 74.
228. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Comm'n of Motor Vehicle, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
229. See, e.g., Cruz (I), 571 F. Supp. 125, 132; Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1168-69. The
courts have emphasized that cable viewers must voluntarily subscribe. Cruz (H), 755 F.2d
at 1419; Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1113; Cruz (1), 571 F. Supp. at 132; Roy City, 555 F.
Supp. at 1169-70; H.B.O., 531 F. Supp. at 1001-02; see also G. SHAPIRO, P. Kurland &J.
Mercurio, "Cable Speech" The Case for First Amendment Protection 42-48 (1983).
230. Different ways are: T.V. purchase versus purchase plus cable subscription.
231. For example, $25 per month on installment to buy the television set versus $35
per month-$25 for the television set plus $10 for the cable service.
232. From the Pacifica perspective, it is noteworthy that FM radio is an "extra" level of
radio service, purchased as an "extra" supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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More important, once the cable television subscriber has made his
entry decision, to buy the television and subscribe to cable, he is every
bit as much a "captive" of the system's programming as the broadcast
television viewer. A television network or cable system executive in New
York or elsewhere chooses which programs to present and when to
transmit them. 2 33 Unlike a book-buyer or movie-goer, the T.V. purchaser or cable subscriber has selected specific content. Thus, to a large
23 4
extent, the viewer is at the mercy of cable television programmers.
Without some public regulation the individual who seeks benefits of
cable television but without the risk of viewing, even inadvertently, patently offensive, sexually explicit material may be forced to chose all or
nothing. He or she must either take cable programming in whatever
preselected package the cable system or channel operator chooses or
23 5
forego the benefits of cable television altogether.
5.

Accessibility to Children

The dissemination of nonobscene, but "patently offensive," sexually explicit material by means of a communication system that is easily
accessible to children creates a serious problem. In Pacifica the Court
held that greater regulation is permissible in such circumstances. In his
concurring opinion Justice Powell explained that
[s]ellers of printed and recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may be required to shut
their doors to children. . . . The difficulty is that such a physical separation of the audience cannot be accomplished in the
broadcast media. During most of the broadcast hours, both
adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
without also reaching children. This . . . is one of the distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which we have
often adverted as justifying a different treatment
of the broad23 6
cast media for First Amendment purposes.
Likewise, in Rowan, the Court identified the parents' interest in protecting their children when it upheld the constitutionality of a postal
233. See also Weinstein, supra note 20, at 31 (stating that programmers, not consumers,
make the choices); supra note 145-56 and accompanying text.
234. See Ross, supra note 23, at 30 (concerns of public interest representatives about
cable operators' control of programming).
235. At present, the technological devices which are designed to screen out or lock out
undesired programming do not appear to be very reliable. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note
20, at 32; Goldstein, Cable TV's Shame: 'Gore-nography',N.Y. Times,July 3, 1984, at Y27, col.
6. The state of Utah proffered evidence in Wilkinson (I) that less than one percent of cable
subscribers have lockboxes. Wilkinson (I), 800 F.2d at 1003 (Baldock, J., concurring).
Judge Baldock described the devices for screening out sexually explicit programming (program guides and lockboxes) as ineffective, burdensome, and complex. Id. at 33. He concluded that the benefits of cable television "should be available to all who are willing to
subscribe, even those who object to patently offensive indecent material being presented
during family viewing hours." Id. at 34.
236. 438 U.S. at 758, 759 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87.
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regulation allowing a homeowner to have his name removed from mailing lists: "Nor should the householder have to risk that offensive mate23 7
rial come into the hands of his children before it can be stopped."
The Court has emphasized that protecting the well-being of a minor
constitutes a compelling state interest, 238 and that a state may enact regulations to support the rights of parents to shelter their children from
offensive expression and offensive behavior such as child pornography.2 3 9 In 1968, the Court upheld a New York statute which prohibited
the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors under the age of seventeen,
even though the Court acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene and that sale of them to adults could not be prohibited. 2 40 Affirming a conviction under the statute, the Ginsberg Court declared that
the parents' authority to direct their children's upbringing in the home
is a basic part of American society. "The legislature could properly
conclude that parents ... who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."' 24 1 Thus, there is a powerful state interest
in preserving and supporting the authority of parents as guardians and
supervisors of what enters the home and is accessible to children. The
state also has a strong interest in protecting children from exposure to
material that may be harmful to their moral, emotional and social
24 2
development.
Because of the accessibility of children to television at all hours of
the day and night 2 4 3 the government's right to restrict the transmission
237. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
238. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
239. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 750; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
240. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
241. Id. at 639. In another case Justice Powell explained why state support for parental authority in childrearing has traditionally been favored by the Court.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (plurality opinion).
242. See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 5159 (1986); Ginsberg, 390
U.S. at 640 Patterson v. Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64, 69, 436 P.2d 613, 618 (1968); see also Chng
& Giles, Television, Children and Sexuality: The Need for Parentsas Mediators, 18 FAM. PERSPECTIVES 179 (1984) (citing studies establishing "the potential damage children may incur in
several areas of the development: intellectual, social, psychological and sexual" from
watching inappropriate television shows).
243. See V. PACKARD, OUR ENDANGERED CHILDREN: GROWING UP IN A CHANGING WORLD
94 (1983) (reporting Nielsen findings that close to 10% of preschool children and a quarter of grade school children are watching TV between ten and eleven p.m.; nearly five
percent of preschoolers and 10% of gradeschoolers are watching TV between eleven p.m.
and midnight); Chng & Giles, supra note 242, at 181 (Studies show that children spend
18,000 hours watching television, 50% more time than they spend in school, that children
aged two to five watch an average of 31 hours of television each week, adolescents 25
hours per week, and that "from a very young age many children watch programs that were
intended for adult audiences.").
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of indecency over broadcast television is clear. 2 44 The Pacifica rule allowing reasonable regulations to protect children from indecent material carried over a readily accessible broadcasting medium is equally
24 5
applicable to cable television.
6.

The Manner or the Form of Expression

The form of expression or speech affects its intrusiveness. The circumstances, method and manner of speech may make an enormous difference in the constitutional analysis. In his classic statement of this
principle, Justice Holmes noted that "the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent

protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic."' 24 6 The nature of the government's interest implicated by this factor was identified by the Supreme
Court in ParisAdult Theater I v. Slaton 2 4 7 as a concern for quality of life in
our democracy. 2 48 Material that is patently offensive because it contains
244. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 750.
245. It is important to note that Pacifica upheld the "channeling" of inappropriate material away from children, not the total banning of it. If effective and reliable lockboxes and
programming guides are available and affordable, and time-channeling is required, the
interests of children may be largely capable of protection by the same method emphasized
in Ginsburg - by parental supervision.
246. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). If one were to calmly invite
theater patrons to leave the building because of fire danger, Justice Holmes' example
would wither, because the form of expression, "shouting fire," is a key element in his example. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words may be
proscribed); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel may give rise to liability for damages).
247. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). It is important to distinguish this factor-the form of expression-from the other factors which pertain to the intrusiveness of speech. All four factors
involve dual interests-the interest of the individual as well as the interest of the government. Thus, the privacy of the home or place of communication implicates the individual's
interest in personal privacy as well as the government's interest in preserving the right to
be left alone. The captivity of the audience implicates the individual's interest in choice and
the government's interest in preserving the value of individual autonomy. The accessibility
of children to indecent material implicates the interests of parents in raising their children
and the governmental interest in protecting future generations from potentially corruptive
material. Likewise, the manner or expression of the speech implicates the individual's right to be
free from unreasonable and unsolicited influences which sabotage the quality of life as well
as the government's interest in maintaining a safe and decent society. Of course, the government's interest in maintaining a safe and decent society will not support interference
with the pursuit of nonthreatening but unpopular lifestyles by some individuals. See, e.g.,
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 581 (1965) (Black, j., concurring and dissenting); Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
262, 272-73 (1951). See generatty New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTsONAL LAw 580-88 (1979).
248.
Quite apart from [any linkage between obscene material and] sex crimes, however, there remains one problem of large proportions aptly described by Professor Bickel:
It concerns the tone of society, the mode ... the style and quality of life
now and in the future .... Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes,
effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is
commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or
not. ...
As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of the Nation and of the
States to maintain a decent society."
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lurid descriptions of sexual organs or activities is more intrusive upon
the privacy, autonomy and decency which the Constitution protects than
many other kinds of regulable speech. 2 49 Sexually explicit material has
a tendency to degrade and cheapen women, to present women as objects to be used, and to deny women their right to individual dignity and
2 50
choice.
The regulation of sexually explicit material is really regulation of a
form of expression than regulation of content. 25 1 Vulgarity is a matter
of style, not substance; manner, not content. Any message or idea conveyed with offensive, sexually explicit depictions, or vulgar descriptions,
can be conveyed without the offensive sexual depiction or vulgar description. The use of sexually explicit language or depictions jars for the
same reason the use of profane, racist, or sexist language jars. Just as
there are valid justifications for restricting the use of such language in
certain contexts, 2 52 the restriction of sexually explicit expression may be
reasonable in some contexts. This is what the Court meant in Pacifica
2 53
when it likened pornography to a "pig in the parlor."
This point may be difficult to comprehend if one is wedded to the
pigeonhole doctrine of the first amendment that views sexually explicit
material as either obscene and wholly unprotected or nonobscene and
wholly protected. That "either/or" framework is not only overly simplistic and unrealistic, but inaccurate as a matter of fact and law. Factually, the line between technically obscene material and nonobscene,
sexually explicit material, which is patently offensive to community values, is hazy at best. Indecent, sexually explicit material offends "for the
same reasons that obscenity offends,' '2 54 only not to the same degree.
413 U.S. 49, 58-60 (citations omitted).
249. It is important to distinguish material that is sexually explicit and patently offensive from material that merely contains nudity. This distinction was noted by the Court in
Erznoznik. The Jacksonville drive-in movie ordinance which was invalidated prohibited
outdoor movie theaters from showing films containing any nudity. Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, emphasized that
[t]he ordinance is not directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it otherwise
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would
bar a film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim,
or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might
prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers on a beach.
422 U.S. at 213.
250. Note, Antipornography Laws and FirstAmendment Values, 98 HARv. L. REV. 460 (1984).
251. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
("proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression") (emphasis added).
252. For example, restrictions on the use of profane, racist or demeaning sexist language in courtrooms, classrooms, or churches, are not uncommon or unreasonable. See
Riggs, supra note 161, at 273 n.78. See also infra note 259.
253. 438 U.S. at 750, 751.
254. 438 U.S. at 746 (Stevens,]., plurality opinion). Sexually explicit material in some
respects partakes more of the characteristics of a drug than communication. See F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 181 (1982). The effects of sexually
explicit material upon the immediate sexual condition of the recipient, may far exceed
whatever impact it has on his or her rational-cognitive senses, if any. In this sense, sexually explicit material is more like a substance than speech; its transfer more clearly resembles commerce than communication.

1986]

CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

And it may be restricted for the same reason that obscenity may be restricted, only not to the same degree.
Constitutionally, the "either/or" categorization of sexually explicit
material is also inaccurate. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., a majority of the Court agreed that "there is surely a less vital interest in the
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas
of social and political significance .... "255 Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and three other members of the Court, expressed an even more
forceful point of view when he added that "society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate .... -256 While the
Court has held that nonobscene sexually explicit communication "is not
'2 5 7
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation,
the Court has never declared that patently offensive, sexually explicit
material is entitled to the same degree of protection under the first
amendment that is provided for political speech, "the search for truth"
in the sciences, and artistic expression. 25 8 Indeed, in a number of contexts, especially those involving children, the Court has emphasized that
the constitutional protection accorded nonobscene but sexually explicit
2 59
indecent material is of a lesser magnitude.
255. 427 U.S. at 61.
256. Id. at 70 (Stevens J., plurality opinion); see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In Pacifica,JusticeStevens expressed his opinion that: "At most... the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive ref-

erences to excretory and sexual organs and activities. While some of these references may
be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern." 438 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added). He further explained:
The question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive words
dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content. Obscene
materials have been denied the protection of the First Amendment because their
content is so offensive to contemporary standards .... [Indecent materials]offend for
the same reason that obscenity offends. Their place in hierarchy of First Amendment
values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: "[Sluch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth than any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id. at 745, 746 (emphasis added).
257. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66.
258. Id. at 65. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 374 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964): "[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self
government."
259. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 757 (1982), the Court acknowledged that the
constitutional protection extended to certain lewd, albeit not obscene, sexual material was
not very great. "The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."
Id. at 762. Although the Court was sharply divided in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982), concerning whether a public school library could remove nonobscene but
somewhat offensive books, eight of the nine Justices expressed their opinion that the
books could have been removed if they had been "pervasively vulgar." Id. at 871 (plurality
opinion); id. at 890 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165-66 (1986), the Court held that the
first amendment does not prevent a high school from disciplining a student for giving a
speech filled with indecent sexual innuendoes in a school assembly.

666
B.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

The Intrusiveness Of The Regulations

Balanced against the degree of intrusiveness of the speech is the
degree of intrusiveness of the regulation. Pigeonhole thinking on this
side of the equation can be just as unrealistic and dangerous as pigeonhole notions about protected speech.
1.

The Characteristics of the Medium of Communication

The nature of first amendment protection varies depending on the
character of the medium being regulated. "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing
' 260
natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.
The significance of the medium of communication for first amendment analysis does not depend upon the technical characteristics of the
particular medium of expression. Rather, the constitutional significance
of the medium of communication depends upon the impact that use of a
particular medium may have upon protected constitutional interests.
Each particular medium has some immutable limitations, and some media unavoidably implicate constitutionally significant factors such as the
site of the communication, the degree of captivity of the audience and
the accessibility of children. Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of
the regulation of indecent material transmitted over cable television systems, the characteristics of cable television which affect other significant
261
constitutional interests must be considered.
2 62
For purposes of indecency regulation,
the analytically relevant
characteristics of cable television are comparable to those of broadcast
television. 2 63 Like broadcast television, cable television has a "pervasive
260. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981). "[D]ifferences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Each medium of communication "tends to present its own peculiar problems." Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). See also Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
261. The media characteristics which are analytically significant for one issue might be
irrelevant to the analysis of another issue. Thus, the characteristics of cable that are significant for analysis of the constitutionality of indecency regulations may differ from those
deemed relevant in assessing the constitutionality of access rules or antitrust regulations.
262. In assessing the constitutionality of other types of regulations including "mustcarry" rules, access rules, and restrictions on competition, some courts have concluded
that the analytically significant characteristics of cable television do not resemble broadcasting. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447-54 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396, 1403-10 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1034
(1986). But cf. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 137580 (10th Cir. 1981) (city's districting ordinance may consittute a first amendment violation), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976, 983-88 (D.R.I. 1983) (Rhode Island's mandatory access regulations do not violate the
first amendment). However, even if the analytically significant characteristics of cable and
broadcast television are distinguishable when the issue involves some sort of economic,
market or operational regulation, they are indistinguishable when the issue is indecency
regulations.
263. See Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 1004-06 (Baldock, J., concurring). In Midwest Video (H1)
the Court acknowledged that cable television had become "enmeshed in the field of televi-
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presence in the lives of all Americans, ' 2 64 requires the near-exclusive
use of a limited public asset 2 6 5 and sends its programs directly into the
home 2 66 where sexually explicit programs may assault unsuspecting
viewers 26 7 - including children. 268 These reasons justify the fact that
broadcasting has received less
first amendment protection than all other
26 9
forms of communication.
Cable television might also be compared with telephone communications because it is a cable-delivered communications medium. The
transmission of indecent telephone communications, however, has long
been prohibited by federal law in a similar manner and to a similar extent as indecent broadcasting. 2 70 In 1983, for instance, Congress
amended the existing prohibition of indecent telephone communications to specifically address the problem of "dial-a-porn." 2 7 ' As
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 223 makes it a crime to knowingly make an obscene or indecent communication by telephone to anyone under eighteen years of age or to anyone without consent. 27 2 The FCC enacted
regulations providing that it would be a defense to prosecution if the
defendant operated only between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. or required
payment by credit card before transmitting the indecent message.2 73 In
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,2 7 4 the Second Circuit, while suggesting that some regulation would be permissible, set aside this order
because the FCC had failed "to demonstrate that the regulatory scheme
is well tailored to its ends or that those ends could not be met by less
drastic means." 2 75 The Commission then promulgated a new regulation which provided a defense if the defendant had required payment
for the telephone message by credit card or had required an authorized
access or identification code which was issued only to applicants over the
2 76
age of eighteen.
The important distinction between the regulation of "dial-a-porn"
and indecent cable television programming is that with "dial-a-porn"
the objectionable communication is specifically obtained by the recipision broadcasting" and that cable operators were "engage[d] in the functional equivalent
of broadcasting" when they provided origination cablecasting. 440 U.S. 689, 700 (1979).
264.

See supra pp. 650-51.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra pp. 650-56.
See supra pp. 656-59; see also note 80.
See supra pp. 659-61 and 663-65.
See supra pp. 661-63.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726, 748-749.
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1984).
47 U.S.C. § 609 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also H.R. REP. No.356, 98th Cong.,

1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2219, 2235. See generally

Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constrainst on Shielding Children From Dial-APorn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503 (1985).

272. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (b)(l).
273. 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996, 25,003 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
274. 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
275. Id. at 121. "The FCC must give us a record that shows, convincingly, that the
regulations were chosen after thorough, careful, and comprehensive investigation and
analysis." Id. at 123.
276. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
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ent affirmatively requesting it, whereas cable television subscribers who
receive the entire medium and specific cable television programs are not
individually selected. 2 77 Thus, "dial-a-porn" regulations can be limited
to the specific telephone number from which the offensive communications emanate, but indecent cable television programming, for better or
worse, must be regulated on a broader basis. 27 8 In any event, the Carlin
court did not suggest that the statute prohibiting indecent telephone
communications to youth or unwilling recipients presented any constitu2 79
tional problems.
2.

The Necessity for Other Regulation in the Public Interest

The legitimate need for government to regulate cable television systems in the public interest is well established.2 8 0 In fact, the Tenth Circuit has declared that "government and cable operators are tied in a
way" that necessitates the regulation of cable television in the public
interest. 28 1 "That is, government must have some authority in such a
context to see to it that optimum use is made of the cable medium in the
public interest. ' 28 2 Although the extension of such regulations to encompass matters of programming decency is a relatively recent development, the power to protect the public interest in cable television 28 3 has
long been recognized. 2 84 Since government must extensively regulate
cable television, the resulting governmental entanglement creates a
measure of public responsibility which may justify greater regulation of
communications than would be justifiable if purely private means of
communications were involved. Moreover, since cable television requires the use of the public domain, the public has a direct interest in
preventing the exploitation of the public asset for private gain.
277. The analogy to cable television would be closer if "dial-a-porn" messages were
automatically sent to all telephone subscribers, who only needed to pick up the telephone
receiver to receive them, whether they wanted them or not, or if cable television systems
operated on a pay-per-program basis. The latter is technically feasible and operational.
278. Like telephone communications regulations, cable television indecency regulations could also regulate at the reception point, not the point of transmission. But the
burden imposed upon users for the benefit of the commercial profiteer and the difficulty of
practical enforcement renders this manner of regulation less preferable. See generally 50
Fed. Reg. at 42,702-07 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
279. 749 F.2d at 123. The court did not address the constitutional issue. See also Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 461 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 1984)
(upholding tariff on intrastate telephone calls prohibiting obscene or sexually explicit
communications).
280. See S. RIVKIN, CABLE TELEVISION: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATIONS(1974); Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 508-18
(1977); Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
685, 690-708 (1972). See generally infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
281. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 1001 (1982).
282. Id. at 1379. See supra note 186.
283. The public interest includes the morals of the community and the privacy of its
citizens as well as the property interest of the city whose easements carry the cable.
284. The British CABLE INQUIRY stressed the public interest in preventing the "impoverishment" of television programming. CABLE INQUIRY, supra note 46,at 7; see also WHITE
PAPER, supra note 47, at 6.
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The Type of Regulation Imposed

28 5
While regulation of media-operators is not unconstitutional,
nevertheless, regulations which may restrict the dissemination of speech
are closely scrutinized. The more comprehensive the regulation or the
more severe the sanction imposed upon violators, the greater the burden ofjustifying the regulation. With respect to cable television regulations, two considerations are' paramount: whether the regulation
absolutely prohibits communication or merely channels it through
"time, place, and manner" regulation, and whether the sanctions imposed are civil or criminal.

a.

Time, Place and Manner Restrictions

If a regulation is deemed a time, place, and manner regulation of
speech, the standard of first amendment review shifts from strict scrutiny to something less inflexible. The Court looks to whether the regulation reasonably advances an important state interest. 28 6 If so, the time,
place, and manner restrictions must be upheld. To be reasonable, restrictions on communication must provide alternative times, places, and
manners in which the communication may occur. 2 8 7 In other words,
"[w]hile the first amendment does not guarantee the right to employ
every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all
places ....
a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the re' 28 8
maining modes of communication are inadequate.
This was the fatal flaw in the federal statute which totally prohibited
mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives which the
Supreme Court invalidated in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.289 Distinguishing Rowan, which upheld a statute giving addressees the right to
prevent purveyors of personally offensive, sexually explicit materials
from sending such materials to them through the public mails, the Court
stressed the difference between narrowly drawn restrictions and blanket
prohibitions. "[W]e have never held that the Government itself can shut
285. For example, the first amendment does not immunize owners and operators of
communication systems from nondiscriminatory regulations and responsibilities. Owners,
operators and users of mass communications media may be liable for violating sexual vice
laws, Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1968); antitrust laws, Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945); labor laws, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); laws
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); for ignoring subpoenas, or refusing to give testimony, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
and for general tax liabilities, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
286. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980).
287. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Kovaks v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949).
288. City Council of Ios Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810-13
(1984); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-4 (1983); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); Globe

Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607; Gravned, 408 U.S. at 117.
289. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially
be offended."' 290 Acknowledging the importance of protecting family
privacy in the home and what children see, the Court emphasized that
the means of achieving those purposes were overbroad. "We ... conclude that the justifications offered by [the Government] are insufficient
to warrant the sweeping prohibition on the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements." ' 29 ' Thus, a total ban of all indecent cable
television programming would be subject to a stricter standard of judicial scrutiny than regulations merely attempting to "channel" indecent
material to times and channels where unsupervised children and unwill2 92
ing adults would not be exposed to it.
Channeling cable television programing is not as simple as channeling printed matter. The purchaser of printed matter can inquire about
the content before accepting a book or magazine, and the content of the
book or magazine does not change. Distribution can be accurately and
somewhat effectively channeled at the point of sale of the printed matter. On the other hand, the subscriber or purchaser of cable or broadcast television obtains a medium that generally delivers a continuous
flow of programming, the content of which is continually changing and
not known at the time of purchase. Thus, regulating the sale or subscription of the television set or cable hook-up would not effectively
channel the programming. Nevertheless, some degree of "channeling"
sexually explicit cable television programming may be achieved without
absolutely banning it.
Most of the cable indecency laws that have been invalidated have
not been "channeling" regulations. The statute and ordinances involved in the HBO, Roy City and Cruz cases appeared to totally ban all
nonobscene but indecent programming from cable television. In so doing, Roy City, Miami, and the state of Utah may have committed the
293
same error condemned by the Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan,
where it noted: "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult
294
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."
On its face, however, the Utah statute involved in Wilkinson only re290. Id. at 72.
291.

Id. at 75. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), the Court observed that

"[biroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect." Id. at 438.
292. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell,J., concurring); see also Metromedia v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521-27 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 553-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
293. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
294. Id. at 383. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Pacifica upheld the application of a similar statute which, on its face, also appeared to totally prohibit all indecent
broadcasts by construing the prohibition to entail consideration of the time, place, and
manner of the broadcast. 438 U.S. at 742, 750. It is possible that the Roy City and Miami
ordinances could also be interpreted in the same manner. Both ordinances explicitly defined "indecent material" with reference to "community standards" and "patently offensive." Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1176; Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 127. These terms could be
interpreted as requiring consideration of the time, place, and manner in which the sexually
explicit material was transmitted. However, this modest construction apparently was not
intended by the draftsmen of either ordinance.
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quired cable operators to broadcast sexually explicit programming at a
time or in a context that was not patently offensive to the community of
cable television watchers. The district and appellate courts' failure to
grasp the significance of that distinction, the mischaracterization of the
Utah law as a de facto ban of indecent cable programming, and the reliance on inapposite cases dealing with laws that totally prohibited indecent cable programming were major flaws in the Wilkinson courts'
2 95
analyses.
A reasonable time, place, and manner restriction cannot be based
upon the content of speech. 2 96 It has been argued that regulations restricting the communication of sexually explicit indecent material cannot be analyzed under the "time, place, and manner" test because such
regulations are content based. 2 9 7 However, the very title of "time,
place or manner" regulation recognizes that regulation of the manner or
form of expression is not necessarily content or viewpoint regulation.
Thus, some restrictions based upon the form of expression, including
fighting words, 298 and sexually explicit material or activities have also
2 99
been reviewed under a less demanding standard of review.
In fact, the Court has never applied strict scrutiny to regulations
295. After an excellent analysis of other issues, Judge Baldock's concurring opinion
stumbled on this point when he summarily concluded, without analysis, that the Utah law
entails an absolute prohibition even though it referred to "time, place, manner and context" of programming. Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J., concurring). His and
Judge Anderson's concern over the vagueness of the broad "time, place, manner, and
context" standard seems premature in a case involving a facial challenge to a newly enacted, never enforced state law, especially in light of the precise guidelines issued by the
Utah Attorney General. Id. See also infra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
296. For instance, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an order of the New York Public Service
Commission prohibiting inclusion by utilities in their monthly bills of inserts discussing
public issues. In explaining why that regulation was subject to a strict standard of scrutiny,
the Court stated that "when regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental
action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's view.' " Id. at 536 (quoting
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring)). The Court
went on to declare: "Governmental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject
matter 'slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about
content.' Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech." Id. at 536 (quoting
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (citation omitted). See generally
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
297. See generally Stone. Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 87, 111-12 (1978). But see Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (finding a park rule that banned camping
to be content-neutral, even though only advocates of one political position sought to express their position by camping in the park).
298. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-51 (1919).
299. See Clark, 468 U.S. 298-99; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Young v. American MiniTheaters, Inc., 427 U.S. at 58; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; see also Bethel School District, 106 S. Ct.
3159 (1986); Local Educators Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub
nom., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983). In
Erznozkik, the Court specified two clear exceptions to the proposition that content-based
restrictions are not reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. "Such selective restictions have been only upheld when the speaker intrudes upon the privacy of the home ...
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which attempt to channel, rather than totally ban, sexually explicit indecent material. This is because indecent sexual explicitness is more akin
to a form of expression, rather than content.30 0 Therefore, viewpoint30
neutral regulations restricting vulgar or indecent sexual explicitness, '
may be subject to a more deferential standard of judicial review as rea30 2
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
b.

Sanctions

A second factor to be considered in evaluating an indecency regulation is the severity and type of sanctions involved. The Court in Pacifica,
apparently found the absence of criminal sanction significant in analyzing the permissibility of the regulation involved in that case.3 03 Likewise, the civil nature of the nuisance penalty imposed on an adult
bookstore was particularly noted by the Supreme Court when it approved the closure of a bookstore. 30 4 Justice Stevens has repeatedly
emphasized the difference between criminal sanctions and civil sanctions. In his dissenting opinion in Smith v. United States,30 5 he questioned
the suitability of criminal prosecution as the mechanism for regulating
the distribution of erotic material. He was dismayed that "the guilt or
innocence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity trial is determined
primarily by individual jurors' subjective reactions to the materials in
30° 6
question rather than by the predictable application of rules of law."
Justice Stevens noted that "the line between communications which 'offend' and those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct. ' '3 0 7 Additionally, when sanctions are considered, the "chilling"
effect of such measures must be taken into account. An excessive sanction may have a very broad impact if it is so severe that persons will be
compelled to take extreme precautions to avoid its imposition. On the
other hand, modest sanctions3 0 8 which do not involve the taint of criminal enforcement or the direct risk of incarceration might be accorded
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure." 422 U.S. at 209
300. There are many less offensive and harmful ways to communicate the message that
sexual intercourse is pleasurable than to show a happy man and woman copulating. Advocates of traditional, strict morality, as well as advocates of new, liberated moralities are
obliged to refrain from vulgar forms of expression.
301. For example, depictions of sexual activities which are patently offensive to the
community.
302. In ConsolidatedEdison the Court described the ordinance in Erznoznikas one which
"discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content." 422 U.S. at 211. The ordinance, however, was written to ban nudity in movies; not sexually explicit indecent material. Nudity per se is not necessarily vulgar, indecent, or even sexually explicit (e.g. nude
babies and naked tribal natives, etc.) Viewed in this light, there is no disharmony between
Erznoznik and Rowan.
303. 438 U.S. at 739 n.13, 750.

304. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
305. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
306. Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. Id.
308. Examples of modest sanctions include license suspension, civil liability, and nuisance abatement.
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9
more leeway in judicial review. 30

4.

The Context of Enforcement

In Pacifica the Supreme Court emphasized that "context is all-important. '3 10 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens added that "indecency
is largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the
abstract. '3 '1 Thus, it appears that the constitutionality of regulations
restricting indecent programming on cable television will turn, at least
in part, on the context of enforcement.
Without the concrete setting of an actual case, there is a significant
risk that a court may sacrifice justice to theory. As the Seventh Circuit
has noted: "There is, however, a big difference between the danger of
an abuse and the abuse itself; and it is a fair question how far the courts
should go in making municipalities rewrite their cable television ordi3' 1 2
nances to prevent dangers that may be largely hypothetical.
Deciding the constitutionality of indecency regulations without the
benefit of a complete factual record which sets forth the context of enforcement is disfavored, in part, for much the same reason that prior
restraints on speech are disfavored: a court may base its judgment on
assumptions concerning statutory interpretation or application which
have no factual foundation. Two hundred years of constitutional history
teaches us that the best rules for governing the affairs of free citizens do
not spring fully developed from the pens of our judges or the mouths of
our legislators; rather, they evolve from the process of applying proven
legal principles to actual life experiences. Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of cable television indecency regulations, courts must be wary
of prematurely pronouncing judgments intended to establish or vindicate general principles of law. The best safeguard against judicial dogmatism is the traditional rule requiring an actual case and controversy
before judges may rule on the constitutionality of controversial laws.
Only when all the facts are known may the challenged regulations be
accurately adduced, allowing for a realistic appraisal of the risks, benefits, and excesses of the law.
On this point both of the courts in Wilkinson committed error. Dealing with a unique time, place and manner statute that was challenged
immediately upon its enactment for facial unconstitutionality, the dis309. In Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court emphasized that it had long
ago "rejected the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted
exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public
nuisance." Id. at 805.
310. 438 U.S. at 750.
311. Id. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring).
312. Omega Satellites Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982).
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit underscored the importance of the particular facts:
Whether that power [to regulate cable television] has been permissibly exercised
by the City in this case calls for a particularizedinquiry into the unique attributes of
the cable broadcasting medium. The district court is best suited for such inquiry
in the first instance upon afully developedfactual record.
Community Communications, 660 F.2d 1370, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).

DENVER UNIVERSITY IL W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

trict court refused to consider evidence of the nature of programming
shown over the long cable system. The court also rejected as immaterial
evidence of the technological ability and legal right of the plaintiff cable
operator to prescreen questionable programming and to "time-shift"
potentially offensive programming to later hours. 3 13 The court's only
justification for its abstract approach was that "[flew facts are relevant to
a facial challenge, because the issue is not analyzed in a factual context."' 3 14 This is both a misstatement of the rule and a misapplication of
it. Indecency, like obscenity, "cannot be adequately judged in the abstract. '"315 The Tenth Circuit's summary affirmance also neglected this
principle.
C.

The Balance of Harm

In a broad sense, the constitutionality of a law regulating the transmission of sexually explicit indecent programming over cable television
entails a balancing of the regulator's rights against the public's interest.
Functionally, the constitutional analysis entails consideration of (1) the
nature and comparative value of the competing interests; (2) the relative
cost and burden to individuals of vindicating those interests; (3) the ability to obtain redress for speech-created harm through means other than
regulation; and (4) the availability of effective, less-restrictive measures
to protect legitimate public interests.
1. The Value of the Competing Interests
Opponents of cable indecency regulations defend two legal interests: the general interest in protecting uncensored communications and
the specific interest in protecting sexually explicit indecent materials.
The former is of paramount value; the latter is trivial. Freedom of
speech is the premiere constitutional right because it is an indispensable
ingredient of self-government. The extraordinary judicial protection accorded the right to speak underscores the preeminence of this constitutional interest. Yet even freedom of speech is not absolute. Despite the
occasional chiding of articulate dissenters, the Supreme Court has never
given a literal construction to the declaration that "Congress shall make
no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech ....-316
The second interest is less noble. Indeed, the value of sexually explicit indecent material to society and to individuals is de minimis. At best
it may have some entertainment value; at worst it may cause exploitive
and demeaning anti-social behavior. Our democracy, nevertheless, tolerates such material, not because erotic material has any significant intrinsic social or personal merit, but because society is concerned about
the grave dangers of abuses of power inherent in the suppression of any
313.
314.
315.
316.

Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (D. Utah 1985).
Id.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added).
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speech.
Proponents of indecency regulations are also concerned with protecting two interests: the interest in decency and the interest in access
to and use of modern mass communication systems. Protecting the latter interest contributes to the quality of life and enhances the processes
of social interaction and interdependence upon which our democracy
depends. The interest in decency implicates another aspect of the first
amendment, because it involves the practice of moral beliefs. Indeed, to
the extent that cable television involves government action, the right to
be free of morally offensive intrusions assumes greater constitutional
importance. Yet, the primary claim to constitutional protection of decency relates to individual's right to be let alone, 31 8 without having to
forego a valuable educational and social medium.
2.

The Cost of Vindicating Protected Interests

The cost and burden of vindicating these conflicting interests requires an appreciation of the realities of cable television programming
and marketing as well as an understanding of the practical and legal effects of the challenged indecency regulation. Without regulation, cablecasters may force those who object to having sexually explicit indecent
material accessible through their television to make an all-or-nothing
choice: either to forego the benefits of cable television altogether or to
accept some encroachment upon their personal standards of decency.
On the other hand, cable operators may voluntarily segregate sexually
explicit indecent programming so that the real benefits of cable television are available to subscribers without offensive programming.
A total prohibition of all sexually explicit indecent programming on
cable television may significantly inconvenience consumers by forcing
them to go elsewhere to receive such entertainment. 31 9 Mere "channeling" regulations, however, would impose less onerous burdens upon
3 20
those who wish to have access to erotic material via cable television.
Once the competing burdens are clarified, one must weigh the costs
of access to a constitutionally protected interest against the cost of
avoiding injury to that constitutionally protected interest. Sexually explicit programming may reasonably be viewed as an "extra" service pro317. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-4.
318. See Redrup v. New York. 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
319. On the other hand, since there are a number of established communications outlets for sexually explicit communications such as "adult" bookstores, "adult" video stores,
"adult" theatres - a total ban of sexual programming from a pervasive, indiscriminant,
home-based medium of communication might not be deemed to significantly burden access to such entertainment. After all, the ban would not close down any preexisting media
of sex communication, nor would it preclude development of new technologies which are
not public and pervasive.
320. Of course, if cable channel owners or operators were unable to legally or technologically screen out, edit or delay telecasting sexually explicit material, the burden of some
regulatory schemes would be heavy indeed, but that does not appear to be the case. See
generally Motavalli, New Pay Service Plannedfor HBO, CableVision, Nov. 4, 1985, at 11
(describing new offering by HBO for older people with some films "possibly being edited
to tone down strong language, sex and violence").
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vided by cablecasters, for which an extra cost or burden is
appropriate.3 2 1 Regulations requiring cablecasters to "channel" their
indecent programming can be viewed as merely "time-shifting" or
"channel shifting" measures. Time, place and manner restrictions on
transmission of this material merely places the burden of taking the initiative on those who wish to view sexually explicit indecent material on
their cable system. Such restrictions eliminate the correlative burden of
avoidance from those who do not want to have sexually explicit material
intrude into their homes and families at all hours of the day. As Judge
Baldock explained, "it is unreasonable to shift an affirmative duty onto
every parent to study all cable television program listings each week,
'3 2 2
even assuming such listings provide adequate warning."
3.

The Ability to Obtain Redress

Public regulation of communication should be permitted only to the
extent that private remedies fail to adequately compensate persons injured by communication. The principle of private accountability is one
of the unarticulated assumptions upon which the first amendment is
predicated. 32 3 The first amendment expresses a preference for private
redress over public regulation as a means of achieving the legitimate
goals concerning communications. 3 2 4 To the extent that individuals can
obtain private redress for injuries inflicted through communication, the
anti-government regulation policy of the first amendment is enhanced.
Ideally, cablecasters should be held accountable though private civil
litigation for harms caused by their unreasonable programming, and
there should be no need for public regulation of cable programming.
But in our imperfect world it is sometimes necessary to supplement private remedies with public regulation to achieve justice. Some types of
injuries are not appropriate for private monetary restitution, and many
plaintiffs cannot afford the time, energy or money to pursue private remedies. The "chilling" consequences of some private actions might seriously impair values and practices protected by the first amendment.
Public regulations are not as precise and may not achieve the quality of
justice in some cases as private remedies, but they may achieve a greater
measure of justice for some individuals and for society as a whole. In
fact, for some types of injuries, public regulation may provide a more
adequate and just form of relief than any private remedy.
321. See generally 50 Fed. Reg. 42,706-07 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1) (it is
inappropriate to put the burden of restricting access to "dial-a-porn" on an individual
telephone subscriber).
322. Wilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 1006 (BaldockJ., concurring).
323. That is, as between public accountability through public regulation such as laws
and ordinances and private accountability through private channels of influence such as
religion, morals, and market forces, the first amendment chooses private accountability.
324. That is, by prohibiting laws restricting speech, the first amendment forces parties
to resort to methods and institutions of private redress to implement and protect legitimate interests affected by speech. The primary concern of the first amendment is to keep
the potentially oppressive tools of public regulation away from disputes about speech and
expression.
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Private redress is an inadequate means of protecting adults and children from sexually explicit programming. Community interests are subverted by the unrestricted exploitation of cable programming for private
profit. Market forces have not deterred cable operators from disregarding these interests in their pursuit of maximum capital return. The kinds
of injury inflicted by offensive, sexually explicit cable programming is
not amenable to relief by ordinary private adjudication. Both the nature
of the private interests affected and the improbability of significant monetary recovery discourage private actions.
Reasonable regulations requiring cablecasters to channel the presentation of sexually explicit indecent programming so as to shield discriminating viewers from the unwanted intrusion of indecent
programming fall well within constitutional bounds under the principle
of accountability through regulation. 3 25 Regulations requiring cablecasters to channel their indecent programming provide a "floor" of protection to minimize the infliction of injuries that are inadequately remedied
through traditional private actions. Such regulations may also serve to
protect the cable television industry from excessive litigation, thereby
providing an alternative means of dispute resolution. Laws banning all
nonobscene "indecent" programming on cable television, however, go
beyond accountability. Blanket prohibitions of all nonobscene but indecent programming usurp rather than complement the function of private restitution.
4.

The Availability of Less-Restrictive Regulations

The first amendment also mandates a preference for less-restrictive
regulations over more-restrictive regulations so long as the former preserves legitimate governmental interests. Even restriction of communications intended to further an important public interest will be sustained
only if it is "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'3 26 Regulations which only affect the time, place or manner of
communications must reasonably advance important public interests
and may not shut off access to alternative channels of communication.
In short, the first amendment mandates that speech restrictions be narrowly drawn and that the regulation "extend only as far as the interest it
serves." 32 7 Thus, laws absolutely banning indecent cable programming
must pass stricter judicial scrutiny than laws requiring the channeling of
such programming. Given the emphatic judicial solicitude for free
speech in all media, an absolute ban of cable indecency is unlikely to be
325. See generally supra, pp. 669-73.
326. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 411 (1974); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1451 (D.C. Cir.1985);
Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405-06 (9th Cir.
1985).
327. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565
(1980) (citation omitted); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk
County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972).
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upheld by any court - despite the existence of alternative media for
328
communicating the same material.
There are, however, many methods of channeling sexually explicit
cable programming which provide substantial protection for viewers
who do not wish to be confronted by offensive programming in their
homes. For instance, laws could effectively segregate sexually explicit
programming on cable television by: (1) requiring cable system operators to disclose to potential customers at the time of subscription the
type of potentially offensive programming conveyed over specific channels; (2) restricting all offensive programming to certain channels or
pay-for-viewing systems; (3) requiring that channels transmitting offensive programming be optional or extra-tier services; (4) requiring that
transmission of offensive programming via cable be "scrambled" so that
only viewers with decoding devices 3 29 could receive it; (5) requiring that
effective lockboxes 3 30 that scramble unwanted signals be made available
at no or low cost to subscribers; (6) restricting offensive programming to
those times when children would be less likely to be in the viewing audience; or (7) requiring program guides that identify potentially offensive
programming be provided at no or low cost to all subscribers. These
regulations would entail less restriction of and impose less burden upon
first amendment interests than an absolute ban of indecent cable television programming. These restrictions should be upheld, because they
only channel the time, place or manner of a particular form of expression; clearly further legitimate public interests, 33 1 and they leave reasonable opportunity for cable communication of offensive nonobscene
programming to those who desire it.
Finally, while the first amendment mandates less restrictive alternatives it does not require states to employ ineffective regulatory mechanisms simply because they are less restrictive than effective regulations,
nor does it demand that the particular regulatory scheme be the very least
restrictive. The "superlative" standard suggests an illusory, objective
determination when, in reality, the differences between different regulatory schemes are more a function of subjective judgment and knowledge
of particular circumstances. Politically responsible local officials are best
suited to make these determinations. A "superlative" standard merely
provides a smokescreen by which philosophically fossilized judges might
substitute their own judgment for those who are better informed. Time,
328. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. Pacifica approved of a statute that
facially prohibited indecent radio broadcasting. The Court's emphasis on the specific context, however, underscores the assumption that some applications of across-the-board
prohibitions would surely fail judicial review. See 437 U.S. at 750, 751.
329. Such devices are already available for telephone communications. See 50 Fed.
Reg. at 42,702-707. Similar technology is used in pay-per-view cable television
operations.
330. At present lockboxes are ineffective; they block whole channels, not just particular
programs, and "the unwanted complexity that these devices introduce into television viewing is attested to by their lack of use." Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock,J., concurring). See supra note 235.
331. They protect viewer choice, prevent viewer "capitivity," protect the welfare of
youth and children, and foster the family quality of the community.
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place and manner regulations need not submit to such subjective, transitory analyses - they should be sustained if they are narrowly drawn and
reasonably necessary to further legitimate public interests.

IV.
A.

FEDERAL NONPREEMEPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION

State and Local Regulations

The controversy over indecent cable television programs has captured the attention of a growing number of lawmakers in state and local
government. Recently, in more than a dozen states legislation has been
proposed to regulate the flow of offensive programming over cable television. 3 32 Additionally, ordinances restricting the distribution of offensive programming over locally licensed cable television systems have
333
been proposed or enacted in many towns and cities.
In June of 1983, a grand jury in Cincinnati "indicted Warner Amex
Cable communications on four obscenity counts for the showing of two
sexually explicit films on the Playboy Channel.13 3 4 Likewise, in February of 1985, a grand jury in Virginia Beach, Virginia, indicted a cable
television company on seven counts charging violations of the state antiobscenity statute for transmitting seven movies that were carried on The
Playboy Channel. 3 35 In August of 1985, an Oklahoma City grand jury
considered indicting a cable company which carried The Playboy
336
Channel.
B.

FederalStatutes and Regulations

Recently there have been significant indications that federal
lawmakers are concerned about the transmission of sexually explicit material over cable television.33 7 Until October 30, 1984, the only relevant
332. Operators Opposing Penn. Obscenity Bill, CableVision, Jan. 20, 1986, at 23; Florida Systents Prepare to Fight 'Obscenity 'Ban, CableVision,Jan. 20, 1986, at 23 (eleventh bill to restrict
cable porn in six years in Florida); Smith, supra note 22, at 22, col. 3; Hofbauer, supra note
161, at 174-81; Calif. Faces 'Cableporn' Bill, CableVision, May 7, 1984, at 57.
333. Such ordinances have been enacted in Miami, Florida, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
Roy City, Utah, and have been proposed in many other communities. See Weinstein, supra
note 20, at 29 (describing attempts to restrict sexual cable programming in Rochester,
New York, Buffalo, New York, Memphis, Tennessee, and Vista, California); Newswire,
CableVision,June 18, 1984, at 11 (reporting defeat of Escondido, California, ballot proposition to ban "indecent" cable programming by 289 votes: 7,955 for, 8,244 against).
334. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at 22, col. 6. The case was later settled.
335. Obscenity Charges Brought Against Cox Cable System, CableVision, Feb. 18, 1985, at 11.
The investigation began when local ministers and church groups petitioned the city council to not grant a rate increase requested by the cable company unless it dropped The
Playboy Channel. The city council balked at the pressure, but passed a resolution asking
the commonwealth's attorney to investigate the complaint. The prosecutor showed nine
Playboy Channel movies to a grand jury which handed down seven indictments. Id. Three
weeks later the cable company announced that it was dropping The Playboy Channel. Cox
OperatorDrops Playboy Channel in Face of Obscenity Indictments, CableVision, Mar. 4, 1985, at
16.
336. Wolfe, Indictments Against Cox System Mixed, CableVision, Aug. 26, 1985, at 20. The
grand jury decided not to indict, finding the program ming was not "legally obscene." Id.
337. In 1976 Senator Pastore, acting at the request of the Federal Communications

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

statute was 18 U.S.C. § 1464 which prohibits the uttering of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. .... ,,338 Section 1464, however, specifically addresses "radio"
broadcasting. While cable television arguably uses "radio" to receive
microwave, satellite, and broadcast transmissions, programming
originated by a cablecaster and transmitted through its cable system
would not be covered. 33 9 Since this section only penalizes one who "utters language" it would not appear to cover the transmission of
3 40
pictures.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,341 however, contains two provisions designed to control the problem of sexually explicit
indecent cable programming. Section 639 imposes a penalty of up to
two years' imprisonment or a fine of $ 10,000, or both, upon anyone who
"transmits over any cable system any matter which is obscene or otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution ....
.,342
Additionally, section
624(d)(2)(A) requires cable operators to provide customers upon request a device to prohibit the viewing of a particular cable service during
Commission, introduced Senate Bill 3858. S. 3858, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
33,359 (1976). This bill would have amended section 1464 to explicitly prohibit transmission of obscene or indecent material over cable television. It would have provided an
affirmative defense to the dissemination of indecent material, however, if the material had
been transmitted on a pay-per-program basis or by other means which would have minimized the risk that children under twelve or unwilling adult viewers would be exposed to
the indecent material. Id. In 1982 Senator DeConcini proposed Senate Bill 2136. This
bill would have made it a federal crime, punishable by up to one year imprisonment
and/or a fine of up to $5,000, for "distributing any indecent or profane material, by means
of television or cable television communications." S. 2136, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982).
In 1984, Senator Helms introduced Senate Bill 2769. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. § 7320-23 (daily ed. June 14, 1984). That bill would have amended section
1464 by adding the term "indecent" to the prohibition sections; it would have specified
that "broadcasting, telecasting, or cablecasting" of obscene, indecent or profane material
was prohibited; it would have clarified that indecent "material" as well as "language" is
prohibited; and it would have expressly preserved the authority of state and local governments to regulate obscenity, indecency, and profanity "in a manner which is not inconsistent with this section." Id. (statement of Senator Helms). In May, 1985, Senator Helms
introduced and Congress enacted the "Cable-Porn And Dial-A-Porn Control Act," to outlaw the transmission of "obscene, indecent or profane" material on cable television, and to
subject offenders to the possibility of two years in prison, a $50,000 fine, or both. S. 1090,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
338. See supra note 16. However, two additional statutes could arguably apply to cable
programming: § 1462, which prohibits interstate carriage on common carrier of "any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ... " 18 U.S.C. § 1462(a)(1982)
(emphasis added), and § 1465, which proscribes the transportation in interstate commerce
"for the purpose of sale or distribution [of] any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book,
pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image,
cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription, or other article capable of producing
sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character ....
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1982) (emphasis added).
339. The Justice Department is studying whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1464-65 may be
applied to cable programming, Justice Probes Cable Obscenity Issue, CableVision, May 20,
1985, at 11.
340. See Letter from Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
to Senator Helms (May 24, 1984) reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. S7,321 (June 14, 1984).
341. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-59 (West Supp.) [hereinafter cited as C.C.P.A.].
342. 47 U.S.C.A. § 559 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). This provision
originated as as amendment proposed by Representative Dannemeyer.
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selected periods so that subscribers may "restrict the viewing of pro3 43
gramming which is obscene or indecent."
At present there are no federal regulations prohibiting or restricting nonobscene sexually explicit cable television programming.3 4 4 Following enactment of the C.C.P.A. of 1984, the FCC repealed its only
cable indecency regulation, because it was covered by the newly-enacted
statutory provisions.3 4 5 The FCC has never been very active in attempting to regulate indecency or obscenity on television, much less cable
television. Indeed, the Commission has never brought an enforcement
action against a television station or programmer, broadcast or cable,
for violation of the indecency or obscenity standards. 3 4 6 If anything, the
Commission has indicated a strong preference for local or state regulation in that area. In 1981, the Commission recommended to Congress
that the statute giving the FCC responsibility for enforcing obscenity
and indecency regulations be repealed, leaving the responsibility to the
states and the Justice Department. 34 7 While Congress was considering
the C.C.P.A., the Chairman of the FCC wrote to Senator Helms expressing "serious reservations" about the Commission's role in regulating
indecency and obscenity on cable television.3 48 Nearly a year after the
C.C.P.A. was enacted an FCC official, speaking at a cable industry meeting, reportedly "made it clear that the FCC would not be a factor in the
' 3 49
controversy over 'indecent' programming on cable television.
343. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). This provision
originated as an amendment proposed by Representative Bliley.
344. Until 1984, the only FCC regulation concerning the transmission of indecent material over cable television provided: "No cable television system operator when engaged

in origination cablecasting shall transmit or permit to be transmitted on the original cablecasting channel or channels material that is obscene or indecent." 47 C.F.R. § 76.215
(1984). The term "cablecasting" referred to "(p]rogramming (exclusive of broadcasting
signals) carried on a cable television system over one or more channels and subject to the
exclusive control of the cable operator." Id. at § 76.5(V). The FCC has emphasized that
there is a distinction between the programming on "access type channels," on the one
hand, and "programming subject to the system operator's editorial control," on the other
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channels Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,
178 (1980); see also Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of
Section 76.251 [sic], 87 F.C.C.2d 40 (1981).
345. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,656 (1985) (deleting 47 C.F.R. § 76.215).
346. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Senator Helms (May 14, 1984)
reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. 7321 (June 14, 1984) (statement of Sen. Helms); see also
WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978) (FCC rejects petition of antiindecency group to deny license renewal to owner of station that broadcast programming
which is allegedly "offensive, vulgar and . . .harmful to children").
347. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, supra note 346.
348. Id. In his May, 1984, letter to Senator Helms, Chairman Fowler acknowledged
that "the Commission will impose sanctions where warranted [for violating a federal obscenity and indecency statute], or will defer to local officials or the Justice Department, as may
be appropriate." Id. (emphasis added).
349. Censorship Issue Tops Atlantic Show's "Great Debate", CableVision, Sept. 23, 1985, at
24.
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Cases ConsideringPreemption of State and Local Cable Indecency
Regulations

Because several provisions of the C.C.P.A. address the subject of
the transmission of sexually explicit cable programming, opponents of
state restrictions on cable indecency argue that state and local indecency
regulations are preempted. 3 50 Were this argument to prevail, it could
have a significant impact on the effectiveness and enforceability of cable
indecency regulations, because, while state and local governments have
aggressively enacted and enforced such regulations, the FCC has traditionally been reluctant to enforce restrictions of sexually explicit programming. Moreover, such a policy change would be inconsistent with
the current trend toward deregulation in federal administrative agencies. However, the relevant case law indicates that preemption depends
upon congressional intent, and the expression of congressional intent in
the comprehensive C.C.P.A. clearly authorizes and encourages state and
local indecency regulation.
1.

Crisp

While only two federal courts 3 5' have directly considered the question of preemption of cable indecency regulations, the Supreme Court
recently applied the preemption doctrine in a case dealing with another
3 52
type of cable television regulation. In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
the Court unanimously held that Oklahoma's constitutional and statutory provisions which prohibited liquor advertising could not be applied
to prevent in-state cable television systems from telecasting cable television programs originating from out-of-state which contained wine advertisements, because regulation of that aspect of cable television
operations had been preempted by the FCC regulations.3 53 Even
though the lower courts had not considered preemption, the conflict between federal and local law was so apparent that the Court decided the
3 54
case on that basis.
The Supreme Court stated that federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes, and that "[t]he power delegated to
350. See, e.g., Shapiro, First Amendment Considerations in
(1985)-A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,

POLICY ACT of 1984 at 137,
143. Mr. Shapiro has represented the cable networks or operators in suits challenging
state or local indecency regulations.
351. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985) and Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 119-148; see also infra text accompanying notes 366-78.
352. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
353. The Court also rejected Oklahoma's argument that the liquor advertising ban as
applied to cable television and the importation of foreign broadcast signals was a valid
exercise of state power under the twenty-first amendment. Acknowledging that the
twenty-first amendment provides states with broad power to regulate the importation and
use of liquor, the Court noted that the Oklahoma statute was merely an indirect regulation
of the sale or use of liquor and that it directly conflicted with express federal policies.
Thus, the state's interest was not of the same importance as the FCC's interest in fulfilling

its statutory obligations. Id. at 2707-09.
354. id. at 2699.
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the FCC plainly comprises authority to regulate" television signals being
rebroadcast over cable television systems if such regulation is necessary
to achieve delegated responsibilities. 35 5 The Court determined that the
Oklahoma prohibition of liquor advertisements originating in out-ofstate television broadcasts retransmitted in-state over cable television
would be preempted "if the FCC has resolved to pre-empt" that area of
cable television regulation and if it was reasonably necessary to achieve
3 56
FCC policies.
The Court found irrefutable evidence of preemptive intent in, inter
alia, the "deliberately structured dualism" adopted by the FCC allowing
state and local authorities to regulate local incidents of cable operations,
while maintaining FCC exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects.3 5 7 Further evidence was found in the "must carry" rules of the
commission which require cable operators to retransmit signals of
broadcast television stations in specific geographic zones, including outof-state stations located in those zones,3 5 8 and in FCC rules prohibiting
cable operations to alter or delete signals imported from out-of-state
broadcast television stations. 35 9 Indeed, the unequivocal intent of the
FCC to preempt state and local regulation of commercial advertising on
cable television had been emphatically reiterated only one year earlier in
360
an important published Commission opinion.
The Court also found that the FCC preemption decision was reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate FCC policies. The Court noted
that it would be "prohibitively burdensome" for Oklahoma cable operators to monitor each broadcast signal imported from out-of-state and
delete every wine commercial before retransmitting the signal, 3 6 1 and
that the commission had "retained exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable communication, including signal carriage and
'36 2
technical standards.
Some commentators interpret the Crisp opinion to suggest that state
and local regulation of indecent programming on cable television must
also be superceded.3 6 3 In sweeping terms, Justice Brennan's opinion
referred to the cable industry's need for "breathing space ...to expand
vigorously and provide a diverse range of program offerings to potential
cable subscribers," ' 364 as well as to the FCC's preference for local
355. Id. at 2700 (quoting Fidelity Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
356.

Id. at 2701.

357. Id. at 2702 (quoting Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 207
(1972)).
358.

Id. at 2703-04.

359. Id. at 2704.
360. Community Cable TV, Inc., 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1351, 1359 n.20, (Nov. 15,
1983), cited in Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2704 n.ll.
361. 104 S.Ct. at 2705.
362. Id. at 2702.
363.

See, e.g., Witt, Cable Television Regulation After Crisp: Is There Anything Left?, 17 URB.

L. REv. 277, 293-97 (1985); Barbash, High Court Limits State, Local Power in Cable Television,
Washington Post, June 19, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
364. 104 S. Ct. at 2705.
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nonregulation of many aspects of cable television services.3 6 5 The holding of the Court in Crisp, however, was very specific: the FCC clearly
intended to preempt and, with congressional approval, clearly had preempted, state and local regulation of commercial advertising contained
in broadcast signals imported for retransmission over local cable television. In fact, the emphasis in Crisp on the indisuputable evidence of the
intent of Congress and the FCC to specifically preempt state regulation
of commercial advertising in broadcast programs retransmitted by cable
might suggest that similarly unequivocal evidence of preemptive intent
must be shown before state regulation of indecent cable programming is
deemed to be preempted.
2.

Wilkinson (I) and Wilkinson (II)

The first court to consider the question whether state or local regulation of indecent cable programming is preempted by federal law was
the federal district court in Utah. The preemption analysis ofJudge Anderson began with a lengthy review of the Crisp decision, suggesting that
Crisp would support a finding of preemption, but eventually acknowledging that "the Supreme Court did not explicitly consider whether state
indecency regulations were preempted." 3 66 The court next turned its
attention to the C.C.P.A. The district court reviewed selected provisions
of the Act and found some evidence of intent to preempt state indecency
regulations. First, the court noted that sections 611 and 612 provide
specific methods of restricting indecent cable programming on public
access or educational channels and precluding other types of regulation. 36 7 More importantly, however, the district court rejected Utah's
argument that the cable indecency regulation was authorized by section
638 which explicitly preserves criminal and civil liability under
"[f]ederal, [s]tate or local law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement,
invasions of privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other similar
365. It is, of course, possible that Justice Brennan was subtly trying to lay the groundwork for a future holding that local regulation of indecent cable programming is preempted under his last-mentioned basis for federal preemption. Certainly the broad
discussion of the cable industry's need for "breathing space" and of the federal policy to
not interfere with the development of this new industry could be a useful entree to such a
holding. But this part of the opinion is better read in context, with reference to the particular type of regulation before the Court. This discussion was knitted closely into the analysis of the specific state regulation being assessed in Crisp. It could be misleading to
transpose that general discussion into a different regulatory context.
366. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1102.
367. Section 612(h) provides that, on "special access channels," cable services shall not
be offered, or shall be provided subject to the condition that the service not transmit material "obscene ... filthy or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution." 47
U.S.C.A. § 532(h) (West Supp. 1986). The district court found the Utah law to be defective on two counts under this section: first, the Utah law applied to all channels, not just
"special access channels;" second, the statute only authorized conditioning or forbidding
cable service, not the regulation of specific programming itself. Thus, the district court
concluded that section 612 expressly preempts "the Utah law with regard to these channels." 611 F. Supp at 1103. Similarly, the district court read section 611(e) which prohibits the exercise of editorial control on public education channels, as preempting the Utah
indecency law as applied to those channels. Id.
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laws .... ."3 6 8 The district court emphasized that "indecency" was not
specifically mentioned in section 638. Since that term was used in other
sections, the court declared "that Congress deliberately omitted indecency" from section 638 and thereby intended to preempt local regulation of indecency on cable television. 36 9 The court emphasized that
" 'indecent' expression is not wholly unprotected speech," so it ought
not to be read into the catch-all phrase "other similar laws."' 3 70 Statements of members of Congress which indicated that the Act would not
preempt state and local regulation were dismissed, because Representative Nielson's remarks were not officially transcribed and Senator Goldwater's remarks were inserted into the Congressional Record rather
37
than spoken on the floor of the Senate. '
Nevertheless, the district court noted that the House Report suggested a congressional intent to link regulatory power with constitutional principle. 3 72 Thus, after strongly suggesting that Congress
intended to preempt state and local regulation of indecent cable programming, the district court reached a different conclusion. Judge Anderson concluded that if the state regulations were unconstitutional
under the first amendment, they were also preempted under the
C.C.P.A.; presumably if they were not unconstitutional, they would not
be preempted.
On appeal in Wilkinson (II), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's decision in a brief per curiam
opinion. The Court of Appeals apparently read Judge Anderson's opinion as holding that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of
nonobscene sexual cable programming, 3 73 and without any independent analysis affirmed the judgment of the lower court "on the basis of
'3 74
the reasons stated in the [district court] opinion.
Judge Baldock, concurring specially in the judgment, explicitly disagreed with the conclusion that federal law preempts state regulation of
sexually explicit cable programming which is not obscene. The C.C.P.A.
prevents the states from imposing criminal or civil liability based on the
content of programs transmitted on leased access or public, educational
or governmental channels. 3 75 To that extent state regulation of indecency is partially preempted. However, even as to those channels, the
Act authorizes state and local franchising authorities to regulate program content insofar as it is not protected by the Constitution. 3 76 And
368. 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1986).
369. 611 F. Supp. at 1104.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1105.
372. Id.
373. Id., n.2. This is one reason why Judge Baldock refused to subscribe to the per
curiam opinion. Wilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 992 (BaldockJ., concurring) ("I do not agree
with this court's apparent conclusion that federal law preempts state regulation of sexually
oriented content which is not obscene.") Id. (emphasis added).
374.

Wlilkinson (11), 800 at 992.

375. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
376.

47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 544(d)(I) (Supp. II

1985).
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as to all other cable channels, the Act explicitly preserves state and local
authority to impose liability under laws regulating obscenity "or other
similar laws." '3 77 The relevant House of Representatives Committee Report clearly reveals unequivocal congressional intent to allow state and
local governments to regulate indecency if the courts hold such regulations constitutional. The committee was aware of uncertainty regarding
the constitutionality of indecency regulations and intended to incorporate the evolving constitutional standards. The provision of the
C.C.P.A. requiring lockboxes to be made available shows that Congress
considered the use of lockboxes to be one way, but not the only way, to
3 78
deal with the problem of indecent cable programming.
The analysis of the preemption question in Wilkinson (I)is, regrettably, self-contradictory and erroneous. Although Judge Anderson began
his preemption analysis with a clear understanding that the question was
ultimately one of congressional intent, his opinion abandoned the
search for congressional intent to engage in a rather superficial semantic
exercise. In the end, however, the district court correctly concluded that
the intent of Congress was to permit state regulation of indecency to the
extent it is not prohibited by the first amendment. The preemption
analysis of Judge Baldock is much more perceptive and coherent, but it
failed to receive the endorsement of the other judges on the Tenth Circuit panel. Since the opinion in Wilkinson (I), which was endorsed by two
judges in Wilkinson (II), does not do a very good job of analyzing the
preemption question, and since most of the court's analysis seems to
contradict the conclusion reached, the matter deserves clarification here.
D.

State and Local Regulation of Indecent Cable Programmingis Statutorily
Authorized, Not Preempted, by the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984

The supremacy clause of the Constitution3 79 establishes the preeminence of all federal laws enacted pursuant to the constitutional scheme
of specifically allocated federal powers. When a state law conflicts with a
valid federal law, the state law is preempted and superseded by the superior federal law. When federal preemption is claimed to result from the
exercise of a power granted to Congress, the question is one of congressional intent and the court's responsibility is to discern whether Con3 80
gress intended to preempt state law.
Earlier in this century, the Supreme Court was willing to liberally
infer congressional intent to preempt state legislation which impeded in
any way the furtherance of federal policies that it favored. 3 8' This approach has been tempered in recent years by judicial reluctance to pre377. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
378. Vilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 992-995 (Baldock, J., concurring).
379. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
380. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292, 293 (2d. ed. 1983).
381. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941).
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sume or infer intent to preempt state -laws in the absence of clear
evidence of congressional purpose to supersede.3 8 2 In Crisp,3 8 3 Justice

Brennan summarized the "familiar and well-established" doctrine of
preemption. Federal preemption of state regulation may be found in
three circumstances: (1) when Congress has "expressed a clear intent to
preempt state law;" (2) when federal legislation so comprehensively regulates the field that " 'no room for the states to supplement' federal law"
remains; or (3) when compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or compliance with state law would effectively frustrate achievement of the full objectives of Congress.38 4 Thus, in the face of clear
congressional intent to preempt, a judicial finding of preemption is
impermissible.
Four months after the Supreme Court decided Crisp, Congress
passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.385 The C.C.P.A.
is the only comprehensive regulatory statute for the cable television industry that has been enacted by Congress. Its language and history provide dispositive evidence of congressional intent regarding preemption
of state and local regulation of indecent cable programming.38 6 Because the question of preemption of local and cable regulation of sexually explicit programming is specifically addressed in the text of the
C.C.P.A. and was discussed in Congress during the passage of the Act,
resolution of the preemption question must be determined under the
first standard summarized in Crisp, as set forth above. 38 7 Both the Act
and the legislative history evidence a clear congressional intent not to
preempt state and local regulation of indecent cable programming.
The C.C.P.A. contains a general declaration of congressional intent
to preempt conflicting state or local regulation of cable television. Section 636(c) of the Act provides that state and local laws or franchise restrictions which are inconsistant with the Act are "preempted and
382. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); New York
State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
383. 104 S. Ct. at 2700.
384. Id.; see also Hillsborough County v.Automated Medical Laboratories, 105 S.Ct.
2371, 2375 (1985).
385. The Senate version of this cable television deregulation bill,
sponsored by the
National Cable Television Association, S.66, passed on June 14, 1983. See generally Phone
Rate Policy isAdded Beo're Senate OKs Cable Bill, 41 CONG. Q.WEEKLY REP. 1237 (1983): Cities.
Cable Operators Reach Agreement, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 637 (1983); Cities Divided Over
Measure Curbing Regulation of Cable, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 845 (1983); 41 CONG. Q
WEEKLY REP. 1885, 2270 (1983). The House version, H.R. 4103, passed on October 1,
1984. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655. A compromise version, the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, passed both houses of Congress on October 11,
1984, and was signed into law by the President on October 30, 1984. 47 U.S.C. § 521-59
(West Supp. 1985).
386. See Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1102.
387. If an intent not to preempt is clearly expressed by Congress in the text or legislative history of an Act, the courts are not free to declare that state laws are, nonetheless,
superceded by the creative application of constructive intent under one of the other tests
described by Justice Brennan.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:4

superceded. ' '3 88 Congress also explicitly prohibited federal, state and
local authorities from imposing regulations "regarding the provision or
3 89
content of cable services except as expressly provided" in the Act.
It is also clear that Congress was concerned about the transmission
of sexually explicit indecent programming over cable television. "In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent," section 624(d)(2)(a) requires cable operators to make lockboxes
available. 3 90 Section 639 makes it a crime to transmit obscene or otherwise unprotected material over cable television systems. 39 ' While regulation of content or editorial control of public, educational and
governmental channels is generally prohibited, 3 92 Section 614(d)(1) of
the Act specifically authorizes state and local agencies to prohibit or regulate cable services "if such cable services are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States."' 393 Likewise, while
cable operators are generally immune from liability for programs shown
on designated commercial access channels, 3 94 section 612(h) prohibits
or authorizes state and local government to regulate programming on
such channels which "is obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unpro'39 5
tected by the Constitution of the United States."
Aware of the potentially preemptive consequences of the enactment
of a broad regulatory scheme and of the provisions regulating indecent
programming on cable television, however, Congress inserted two provisions in the C.C.P.A. intended to preserve local regulation of sexually
explicit cable television programming. Section 624(d)(1) of the Act
provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed as prohibiting a
franchising authority and a cable operator from specifying, in a
franchise agreement or renewal thereof, that certain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if such cable services are
obscene or are otherwise unprotected
396
by the United States Constitution.
Also, section 638 of the Act, specifically preserves the authority of state
and local lawmakers to enforce obscenity and similar laws:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to affect the criminal or
civil liability of channel programmers or cable operators pursuant to the Federal, State or local law of libel, slander, obscenity,
388. Cable Communications Policy Act § 636(c), 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (West Supp.
1985).
389. Cable Communications Policy Act § 624(f)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(l)(1) (West Supp.
1985) (emphasis added). As noted earlier, however, regulations of indecent forms of expression ought not to be considered regulations of cable "content."
390.

See supra note 344 and accompanying text.

391. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
392. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 611 (e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (Supp. III
1985); see also C.C.P.A. § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
393. C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
394. C.C.P.A., § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
395. C.C.P.A., § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
396. C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(1), 47 U.S.C.A. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
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incitement, invasions of privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other similar laws, except that cable operators shall not
incur such liability for any program carried on any public, educational, governmental use, or on any other channel under section 612 [public
access channels] or under similar
39 7
arrangements.

Since neither of these sections specifically mentions state or local
authority to regulate indecency, the critical question is whether Congress
intended indecency regulations to be included by use of the broader,
categorical terms preserving state and local regulation of material that is
"obscene or otherwise unprotected" and preserving state and local laws
'398
restricting "obscenity ...or similar laws."
In Wilkinson (I), Judge Anderson concluded that Congress did not
intend to include indecency regulations, "because 'indecent' expression
is not wholly unprotected speech." '3 99 While the conclusion that indecency is not "wholly unprotected" by the Constitution is not bad as first
amendment theory, it is erroneous as a finding of fact regarding congressional intent. In section 612(h), the drafters of the C.C.P.A. explicitly included indecent material in the list of examples of material which
they described as "unprotected by the Constitution of the United
States." '40 0 Moreover, in the very next subsection after the drafters referred generally to materials that are "obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the United States Constitution," they referred specifically to
materials that are "obscene or indecent." '40 1 Thus, the text of the
C.C.P.A. reveals congressional understanding that "indecent" cable
programming was "unprotected" by the Constitution and "similar" to
obscenity.
Both the House and Senate Reports also provide unequivocal evidence that Congress intended not to preempt state and local regulation
of indecent cable programming. The Senate Report noted that the proposed Act "continues to give local governments the authority over local
areas of concern and authorizes them to protect local needs."' 40 2 Concerning the
predecessor of section 624(d)(1) the Senate Report notes:
Lastly, section 607 [the Senate version counterpart of § 624]
makes it clear that this bill does not preclude or prohibit
franchising authorities and cable operators from specifying, in
a franchise agreement or renewal thereof, that certain cable
services shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to
conditions, if such cable services are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the U.S. Constitution. The standards for making
397. Id. at § 638, 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
398. The omission of the term "indecent" is not conclusive because the terms that
were used are facially even broader and more inclusive. The intent of the draftsmen was
to use a catch-all phrase rather than to attempt to specify each and every particular type of
speech that could be regulated.
399. 611 F. Supp. at 1104.
400. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. See also C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(2)(A), 47
U.S.C.A. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
401. C.C.P.A. § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
402. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (emphasis added).
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such determinations are established and applied by the courts
....
This section would apply to future U.S. Supreme Court
decisions which may find that other
kinds of speech are unpro40
tected under the Constitution.
The House Report concerning section 624(d)(1) likewise reveals
that the draftsmen intended that state and local authorities would continue to be empowered to go as far as the courts would permit them to
go under the first amendment to regulate sexually explicit material. The
drafters of the House Report noted that the Supreme Court had ruled
that regulation of indecent radio programming was not prohibited by
the first amendment, but that several lower courts had ruled that regulation of indecent cable programming was impermissible. 40 4 Nevertheless, the drafters of the House Report noted:
The provision covers not only obscene speech, but other
speech which may also be unprotected by the Constitution of
the United States. This provision would also permit change in
constitutional interpretations to be incorporated into the standard set forth in 624(d)(1), should those judicial interpretationsat
some point in the future deem additional standards,
such as indecency,
40 5
constitutionally valid as applied to cable.
Finally, two formal statements by the Chairman of the relevant
House Committee and by the Chairman of the relevant Senate Subcommittee 40 6 unequivocally establish that Congress intended not to preempt state and local regulation of indecent cable programming. When
H.R. 4103, the House counterpart of S. 66, came before the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce for markup in late June of 1984,
there was a significant undercurrent of concern about protecting the
rights of state and local governments to prohibit indecent and obscene
cable programming. The same day the Dannemeyer and Bliley amendments were introduced, 40 7 Congressman Howard Nielson and Chairman John Dingell engaged in a formal colloquy -to clarify the legislative
intent behind section 639 which became section 638 of the Act and section 624(d) that state and local regulation of indecent cable programming would continue to be allowed "if constitutionally permitted."
Cong. Nielson: I would also like to clarify that laws regulating
indecency are included under section 639, through the use of
the phrase "other similar laws," as long as these laws are
constitutional.
Chairman Dingell: Yes. Indecency is similar to obscenity, and
thus would be included.
403. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. It was the Senate version of the bill that
was passed in lieu of the House bill after compromise amendments had been adopted.
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws4655.
404. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., at 69, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4706 (emphasis added).
405. Id. (emphasis added). See also Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1105.
406. Both congressmen represented their respective houses in the Conference Committee which put together the C.C.P.A. 130 CONG. REC. 14,281-89, (Oct. 11, 1985).
407. See supra notes 342 and 343 and accompanying text.
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Cong. Nielson: I note that under section 624(d), a franchising
authority can specify that certain cable services shall not be
provided if they are obscene or are otherwise unprotected by
the U.S. Constitution. I feel strongly that local authorities should
have authority to prohibit such programming. I assume that, to the
extent that programming which is indecent is not constitutionallyprotected, it could also be subject to such agreements.
Chairman Dingell: Restrictions on indecent programming have
been upheld by the Supreme Court in a broadcast context. In
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the court said that indecency could
be regulated. For example, it could be restricted to certain
times of day, in order to protect children. Such restrictions4on
08
indecency, if constitutionallypermitted, are not prohibited by this bill.
Another crucial colloquy took place in the Senate on October 11, 1984,
the day the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was voted on and
passed in both houses of Congress. Senator Goldwater, the Chairman
of the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, the sponsor of S. 66, and one of the Senate conferees, clarified
the understanding of the conferees that section 638 of the Act preserved
and did not preempt state and local regulation of obscene or indecent
cable programming.
Mr. Trible. I am particularly concerned about a recent Supreme
Court decision regarding the question of FCC preemption. In
Capital Cities Cable, Inc., et. al. against Crisp, Director,
Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the Court held
that conflicting State regulations are precluded when the FCC
resolves to preempt an area of cable television regulation ....
Although the Court did not specifically address the questions of obscenity and indecency, that case is already being cited by
plaintiffs attempting to over turn a Utah statute regulating
cable television content. Is section 638 addressed directly to the
Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cities?
Mr. Goldwater. Yes, it is and that is the understandingof the conferees.
Section 638 makes clear that nothing in this measure is to be
interpreted as granting exclusive authority for regulating cable
television content to the FCC. Rather, States and localities retain
any authority which they would have in this area if the Communications Act of 1934 had never been enacted.
Mr. Trible. I also wish to ask whether section 638 applies to
408. Colloquy between Congressman Nielson and Chairman Dingell before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, June 26, 1984 (emphasis added) (copy of transcript in
author's possession). See also Thone, Energy and Commerce Committee Move to Control Cabe TV

Content, The Daily Herald (Provo, Utah), June 28, 1984, at 19, col. 1; Del Porto, Measure
Could Free Way for Local Cable Restrictions, Desert News (Salt Lake City, Utah),June 28, 1984,

at 12A, col. 1. At the time this colloquy took place, the relevant sections of both the Senate bill and the House version provided: "Nothing in this title shall be deemed to affect
the criminal or civil liability of channel programmers or cable operators pursuant to the law
of libel, slander, obscenity, [etc.]." S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 612 (1983); H.R. 4103,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 642 (1983) (emphasis added). But the Act as passed, apparently
reflecting concern, contained the additional words, "Federal, State or local" between "the"
and "law" in the text just quoted. C.C.P.A. § 638, 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985).
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Federal, State, and local laws dealing with indecency in cable
television?
Mr. Goldwater. Yes, it does and that is the understanding of the
conferees. Indecency laws are relatedto laws prohibitingobscenity, and
thus would be covered by the phrasefrom section 638: "and other similar
laws. " Under this section, Federal,State, and local laws regulatingindecency on cable would be preserved. Restrictions on indecent programming in a broadcast context have been upheld by the
Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court said in FCC
against Pacifica Foundation that indecent speech on radio
could be restricted to certain times of the day in order to protect children. Such restrictionson indecency-ifotherwise constitutionally permissible -would not be preempted by this legislation or other
409
provisions of the Communications Act.
This colloquy was adopted by the conferees as expressing their understanding and intent. 4 10 Thus, Congress clearly intended not to preempt
state and local regulation of indecent cable television programming.
E.

Attempted Federal Preemption of State and Local Indecency Regulations
Would Raise Serious ConstitutionalQuestions

Finally, it is questionable whether Congress constitutionally could
preempt all regulation of indecency by state and local authorities. Just
as the supremacy clause establishes the preeminence of federal law in
the areas of regulation assigned by the Constitution to the federal government, the ninth and tenth amendments establish the preeminence of
state and local law in the reserved areas of local concern. 4 '1 If state and
local regulations of indecency "would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system
leaves to state regulation" then "the Constitution requires that the state
rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule."' 4 12 Awareness
of the constitutional problems which could be created by federal preemption of matters left by the Constitution to the states for local regula409. 130 CONG. REC. 14,288 (Oct. 11, 1984) (emphasis added); see also id. at 14,285.
410. 130 CONG. REC. 14,288 (Oct. 11, 1984); see also id. at 14,285.
411. See, e.g.,
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938); The Federalist
No. 39 (J. Madison) p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("[L]ocal authorities form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject within their respective spheres to
the [national] authority than the [national] authority is subject to them in its own sphere."
Id.
412. Hannah v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965), (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan explained the significance of the Erie decision in terms of constitutionally mandated federalism:
I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of
our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation ofjudicial power between the state and federal systems. Erie recognized that there
should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of
citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a
debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs. And it recognized
that the scheme of our Constitution invisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds
of congressional legislative powers in this regard.
Id. at 474, 475.

19861

CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING

tion may be one reason why the Supreme Court has shown
extraordinary caution in applying the doctrine of preemption to state
laws regulating domestic relations. 4 13 Thus, preemption is not just a
one-way, pro-federal doctrine; it is a rule of "respect for the separate
spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist
4 14
system."
The interests which "indecency regulations" are designed to protect are interests primarily entrusted to the states to regulate, not to the
federal government. 4 15 The United States is a nation of pluralities.
States and local communities are much closer to their constituencies and
much more accurately reflect the local sensitivities than does the federal
government. Regulations designed to protect standards relating to sexual indecency are more manageable at the state or local level than at the
national level. 4 16 At the national level some voices speaking on appropriate sexual programming could not be adequately represented or
would be ignored. These voices would have a more representative influence at the state and local level. 4 17 Local regulations of cable television
programming may withstand constitutional scrutiny even if similar regu4 18
lations adopted by the federal government would not.
In recent years the interpretation of the tenth amendment has been
inconsistent. 4 9 However, under any substantial interpretation of the
meaning of the tenth amendment, 4 20 the reasons for deference to local
413. The Court has held that it will not find federal preemption of state domestic relations laws, unless it is shown that they do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); see also Sosnma v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975);
Ohio ex rel Popovich v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
167 (1899); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
414. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
415. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan,J., dissenting). Thus,
a national commission investigating pornography recently noted "that in our federal system primary responsibility for law enforcement has always been with the states. The police power of the states has commonly been taken to include primary responsibility for
dealing with the very types of harms at which the obscenity laws are directed." 1 Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 374 (1986).
416. See generally Note, Cable Television: The PracticalImplications of Local Regulation and
Control, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 391 (1978). Cable television regulation "ultimately functions at
its best when specifically designed to meet local conditions and needs." Id. at 418.
417. This could justify deference to state sovereignty even under the restrictive dicta of
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth.. 105 U.S. 1005. 1018 (1985). See generally Note. On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J.723, 35-43 (1984).
418. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985),
overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
419. See generally Harrison, Access And Pay Cable Rates: Off-Limits to Regulators After MidWest Video 11?, 16 COLUM. J. & Soc. PROBS. 591, 645 (1981).
420. It might be that federalism suggests not a division of power, but a division of
function. See S. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 143, 186 (1978).

On a functional basis,

implementation and protection of community values regarding when and how limits upon
the transmission of sexually explicit programming into homes over systems requiring the
use of community resources would be for local, not national, regulation. See also Nagel,
Federalismas a FundamentalValue, 1981 SuP. CRT. REV.101-09; Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1028-29
(Powell, J.. dissenting) (reviewing history of adoption of tenth amendment and intent of
the framers that the states retain power to regulate matters of local, everyday concern).
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regulation of sexually explicit indecent cable programming could be
even more compelling. 42 1 Thus, the tenth amendment could be interpreted as requiring that local laws which further state interests may not
be preempted by inconsistent federal laws.
CONCLUSION

The constitutionality of laws regulating the transmission of sexually
explicit "indecent" programming over cable television is a matter of farreaching significance. The federal courts which have directly addressed
this issue have uniformly invalidated state and local laws restricting indecent programming on cable television. Legal commentators have
generally endorsed that result. The courts, however, have erroneously
refused to apply the Pacifica doctrine in assessing the constitutionality of
cable indecency regulations.
Applying first amendment analysis, the intrusiveness of the regulated communication must be assessed and weighed against the intrusiveness of the challenged regulation. Sexually explicit cable
programming is intrusive, because it invades the privacy of the home,
because cable television viewers have no control over the programming,
because of the accessibility of cable television to children, because the
medium monopolizes public resources which could be dedicated to programming suitable for the entire community, and because of the vulgarity of the manner of expression.
Insofar as cable television is analytically similar to broadcast television and since it involves private exploitation of the public domain,
some regulation of cable television programming is constitutionally permissible. Whether any particular cable TV indecency regulation is permissible or not depends upon the type of regulation and the context of
enforcement. Assessing the balance of harm to protected interests,
criminal laws banning all nonobscene, but sexually explicit programming from all cable channels probably are not justifiable. Reasonable
regulations which require cablecasters to "channel" or segregate the
time or manner of presenting sexually explicit material are justifiable.
Regulations which merely shift the cost or burden of taking the initiative
from persons who do not want to have sexually explicit programming
intrude into their home via cable television to persons who want to have
access to sexually explicit programming by means of cable television are
justifiable under this analysis, because they provide a better remedy for
the real but often intangible injuries which individuals suffer when undesired, sexually explicit, indecent matter intrudes into their lives and
when they are excluded from full access to mass media.
Finally, Congress and several states have enacted laws designed to
421. The four dissenters in Garcia all predicted that the de minimus content of the tenth
amendment suggested in the majority opinion would not be the final word on the subject.
105 S. Ct. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.); id. at 1033 (RehnquistJ., dissenting); id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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protect the public from the uninvited intrusion of sexually explicit cable
television programming. Federal laws do not preempt state laws regulating indecency. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 explicitly reserves the power of state and local governments to regulate and
restrict sexually explicit material to the extent permitted under the Constitution. The scope of authority for state and local governments to regulate sexually explicit material under the preemption doctrine is
determined under the first amendment: if a cable indecency regulation
is constitutional it is not preempted. If Congress had attempted to preempt state and local indecency laws, it would have triggered serious constitutional questions regarding the balance of powers inherent in our
federal system.

THE CITY OF CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER AND
THE SUPREME COURT: Two MINORITIES MOVE
TOWARD ACCEPTANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The plight of this nation's mentally retarded citizens was brought to
the fore recently by the United States Supreme Court in the case of City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.' On its face, Cleburne is simply the
Court's affirmation of a renewed societal awareness of one of the forgotten minorities in the United States, and the next logical step in a judicial
process which guarantees that this group will have an adequate and fair
opportunity to assimilate into the mainstream of our culture. 2 However,
the case indicates a noticeable shift in the undercurrent ofjudicial interpretation practiced by the Burger court. More specifically, the traditional method ofjudicial review is perhaps being supplanted by a newer
model of equal protection analysis.
This Comment will highlight the growing dissatisfaction with the
inconsistency and rigidity of the traditional standard of review, and will
probe the Cleburne decision in order to gain valuable insight into both
the direction of the Court and the future of the equal protection doctrine. Particular attention will be focused on the concurring opinion of
Justice Stevens, an individual who shows increasing signs of leadership
on a Court which lacks direction.
II.
A.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE -

AN OVERVIEW

HistoricalBackground
Equality andjustice are synonymous: to bejust is to be equal, to be unjust
is to be unequal.
3

Aristotle
To say that equal protection has undergone a significant metamorphosis in the course of the Twentieth Century would certainly be an
understatement. From its humble origins in the fourteenth amendment, 4 as the most deferential form ofjudicial scrutiny 5 focusing merely
1. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. Professionals within the area of mental retardation have developed the concept of
"normalization" to define the goal and process of helping retarded citizens lead a "normal" life. Achievement of this goal involves undoing the multitude of formal restrictions
placed on retarded citizens, such as, restrictions on residence, education, and the right to
marry. See Chambers, The Principeof the Least Restrictive Alternative: The ConstitutionalIssues,
in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIrrEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 486-487 (1976).
3. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA EUDEMIA VII § 1241(b) (W. Ross ed. 1925).

4. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Justice Holmes noted that equal protection was "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments ....
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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on legislative means, 6 the equal protection clause was transformed during the Warren era and particularly in the political and intellectual explosiveness of the 1960's. Equal protection literally became a symbol
for combatting unjust governmental classifications of persons. While
the Supreme Court did not dispose of the minimal standard of review, it
developed a much stronger level of scrutiny to delve into the social inequalities that plagued the American culture, most notably, racial discrimination. 7 Additionally, the advent of "new" equal protection
required a closer relationship between the legislative classification and
its purpose - careful scrutiny of the goals of the particular legislation. 8
"New" equal protection, strict scrutiny under the Warren Court,
developed into strands. First, strict scrutiny would be appropriate
where a legislative classification burdened "a fundamental right or interest." 9 Second, a more intensive review was applied where the presence
of a "suspect classification" necessitated intervention into inequities in
governmental categorization of a group of persons. 10
Although the legacy of "new" equal protection under the Warren
Court passed to its successor, the Burger Court has been reluctant to
adopt the spirit of hope and anticipation which permeated the Warren
Court. In fact, the Burger Court has taken a "thus far and no further"
stance with regard to equal protection." Although the Supreme Court
still adheres to the traditional model, it has not been as loyal to the bifurcated system as it may have envisioned. For instance, the Court today
utilizes a three-tiered approach, having inserted a middle tier of heightened or intermediate scrutiny. 12 This intermediate level of scrutiny has
6. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 670 (10th ed. 1980). Professor Gunther cites
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[I]nvocation of the equal protection clause.., does not disable any governmental body
from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact."), as indicative of the fact that "old" equal protection emphasized only the rationality of classifications, not the objectives of the legislature.
7. Thus the Warren Court adhered to a rigid "two-tiered" model of review: the
"older" rational basis test, or deferential standard of review; and strict scrutiny, the aggressive brand of review. Borrowing a phrase from Professor Gunther, strict scrutiny was
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; whereas old equal protection used " 'minimal' scrutiny
in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
8. GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 671.
9. Fundamental rights or interests protected by the Court include: Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the political franchise of voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (freedom of interstate migration); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(the right to criminal appeals).
10. Suspect classifications triggering strict scrutiny are limited to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); ancestry or national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (resident aliens
could not be denied welfare benefits). One should note however that the Court's scrutinization of alienage classifications has wavered in recent years, especially where governmental functions are involved. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
11.

GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 672.

12. Of critical importance in this commentary are the limitations imposed on the
equal protection clause by the Burger Court. Therefore, it may be prudent to identify the
adjectival phraseology which distinguishes the three levels of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is
the most intense level of review, requiring that a classification be necessary to achieve a
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clearly affected classifications based upon gender,' 3 alienage,' 4 and
illegitimacy. 15
Another significant change, under the Burger Court is a new perspective on the "old" equal protection standard. Where social and economic legislation had been perfunctorily sustained under "old" equal
protection, the Burger Court has been increasingly willing to invalidate
legislation using the supposedly deferential rational basis test, in what
has been termed new "bite" for the "traditionally toothless minimal
scrutiny standard."16
Therefore, equal protection clearly is no longer "a last resort of
constitutional arguments," but has developed into a concept overshadowing the express language of the fourteenth amendment. Therein lies
the source of the doctrinal confusion which pervades the Court's equal
protection analysis. The Supreme Court, in essence, created an ideal
which may be reflected only in specific instances before the Court.
Thus, the Burger Court is left to examine each problem confronting a
disadvantaged class on a case by case method.
B.

Growing Discontent With the Present Status of Equal Protection

While the Warren Court ushered in a new age of equal protection
analysis, the transition was not completely welcomed into the arms of
jurisprudential thought. True, the emergence of the intermediate level
of scrutiny seemed to pacify some critics of the bifurcated model; however, the result of the middle tier of review has been merely to create an
interventionist tool for making so-called "just" decisions without extending the analysis beyond the importance of the personal interest or
the value of the legislative end.1 7 Therefore, equal protection has come
under attack from various groups and, as a result, has led to further
factionalization on the Court and a corresponding reduction in
deliberation. 18
Justice Marshall figures most prominently in the mounting dissatisfaction with the multi-tiered system of review. In a series of dissenting
opinions beginning in 1970,19justice Marshall has called for a reexamicompelling governmental interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). Middlelevel scrutiny demands that the means chosen by the state must be substantially related to
achievement of an important governmental objective or end. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). Finally, the rational basis test is the most deferential and relaxed standard, whereby the Court will uphold any classification rationally related to an articulated
legitimate state interest. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17
(1973).
13. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
14. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illegal aliens).
15. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
16. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mfodel for a

Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972). See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
17.

Seeburger, The Muddle of the Aliddle Tier: The Coming Crisisin Equal Protection,48 Mo.

L. REV. 587, 616 (1983).
18. Id. at 615.
19. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Mar-
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nation of the Warren Court model, with its Burger Court modifications, 20 and reformulation of an appropriate method of review. He has
suggested a "sliding scale" analysis, whereby the level of scrutiny would
be adjusted along a multifactored spectrum depending on the invidiousness of the governmental classification, the "relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive," and the strength of the interests asserted by
the state in defense of the classification. 2 1 In Chicago Police Department v.
Mosley, 2 2 justice Marshall proposed a single standard which consolidated
the tiers of review into one question appropriate in all equal protection
cases; that is, is there "an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment?" 23 One need only look to the
Court's subsequent refinement of the intermediate standard to determine the less than enthusiastic response of the Court toward Justice
Marshall's opinion in Mosley.
A number ofJustices, including those outside Justice Marshall's liberal bloc, have also shown their dissatisfaction with the multi-tiered approach. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Craigv. Boren, 24 the first case to
articulate the intermediate level of scrutiny, opposed heightened scrutiny on the literalist ground that "the Equal Protection Clause contains
no such language, and none of our previous cases adopt that standard."12 5 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist observed that the Court has "had
enough difficulty with the two standards of review.., to counsel weight'2 6
ily against the insertion of still another 'standard' between those two."
Justice Stevens, writing a concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, argued for a single standard of review for, after all, there "is only one
Equal Protection Clause."'2 7 Responding to Justice Rehnquist's adherence to the two-tiered approach, Justice Stevens commented that
"whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that
there are at least three such standards applies with the same force to a
double standard." '28 Justice Stevens, sounding much like Justice Marshall, was inclined to believe that equal protection analysis "does not
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a
method the Court has employed to explain decisions that apply a single
29
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."
shall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. Even with the addition of a third level of review, Justice Marshall remains critical
of the present system of equal protection review. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231
(1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
21. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
23. Id. at 95.
24. 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 211 (Stevens,J., concurring).
28. Id. at 212 (Stevens,].. concurring).
29. Id.
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Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the Court's discontent
with the multi-level approach is its frequent departure from it. The
Court implements several means for achieving this result. First, the
Court may vary the strength of the tests used to review the law. 30 For
example, the Court may upgrade minimal scrutiny or downgrade intermediate scrutiny to either invalidate or uphold governmental objectives,
respectively. 3 1 Second, the Court has been known to create exceptions
to strict scrutiny through judicial sophistry in order to bypass a heightened standard of review. 3 2 For example, although the Court has accorded special constitutional protection to aliens through use of strict
scrutiny, it has recently exempted alienage classifications from the most
intensive review when they relate to matters "firmly within a state's con33
stitutional prerogatives."
III.

A.

CITY OF CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

Factual Background and the Lower Courts' Response

The genesis of this decision was a zoning dispute in which the City
3 4
of Cleburne, Texas, pursuant to its comprehensive zoning ordinance,
30. The Court utilizes various techniques for altering the standard of review. First,
the less drastic means or least restrictive alternatives theory requires that the legislature
impose restrictions that result in the least intrusion upon individual rights. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
770 (1977). Second, the actual state interest theory requires the legislature to show an
actual justification for imposition of a restriction. Therefore, the Court will not accept
rationalizations concocted solely for litigation purposes, see, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 270 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
Third, rational basis testing counters the actual state interest theory in that it involves
hypothesizing by the Court, hence the Court may accept any rationalization which conceivably justifies a challenged law. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 307 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
Last, the Court may incorporate "deed-intent translocation" to repair constitutional peculiarities in legislation which causes unintended violations of equal protection. Comment,
Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REV. 407, 432-34 n.213 (1983); see, e.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
31. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 166-69 (1984). Professor Shaman cites United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) as examples of the Court's technique of upgrading minimal scrutiny. The Court critically
examines governmental objectives, i.e., rejects the legitimate purpose, in order to invalidate the legislation. Alternatively, the Court may not grant wide latitude to governmental
means, thereby striking down legislation using minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Furthermore, the Court has taken at least one
occasion to downgrade intermediate scrutiny in.
order to sustain a classification usually
deserving a heightened level of scrutiny. Thus, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 468 (1981), Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion succeeded in upholding a genderbased classification which made only males criminally liable for statutory rape by reducing
intermediate scrutiny to a level "somewhat" sharper than the rational basis standard.
32. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 161, 170-72 (1984).
33. Id. at 172. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291. 296 (1978) (quoting Sugarman v.
Dugare, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
34. Under Section 8 of the ordinance, the following uses are permitted in a district
zoned R-3, the district in which the Featherston Street home is situated: any use permitted
in District R-2; apartment houses or multiple dwellings; boarding and lodging houses;
fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories; apartment hotels; hospitals, sanitariums,
nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other than for the insane or feeble
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required Jan Hannah, owner of the house and lot located at 201
Featherston Street in Cleburne, to obtain a special use permit for operation of the house as a group home for the mentally retarded. 3 5 Hannah,
acting on behalf of Cleburne Living Center (CLC), purchased the building in July, 1980, with the express intention of establishing and operating a group home for thirteen mentally retarded adults in the moderate
to mild range of retardation.3 6 OnJuly 28, 1980, Hannah applied to the
City for the special use permit, but on August 18, 1980, the City's Planning and Zoning Commission voted to deny the permit. The City Council, at a public hearing concerning the permit application, denied the
37
permit by a vote of three to one.
CLC and Hannah brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas against the City, alleging equal protection violations committed against them and potential residents of the
home. The district court found that the availability of group homes in
the community was an "essential ingredient of normal living patterns"
for mentally retarded persons and that the denial of the permit was
"motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home would be
persons who are mentally retarded." 38 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the permit on its face was constitutional and that the Council's denial of the permit was constitutional. After deciding that the
ordinance had no impact on a fundamental right and that mental retardation was not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, the court applied
a weak standard of review. 39 Therefore, emphasizing the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, the safety and fears of the residents in the
adjoining neighborhood, and the number of people to be housed in the
home as legitimate interests of the city, the court found the ordinance
rationally related to the interests, and not "arbitrary, capricious, or
minded or alcoholics or drug addicts; private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose
chief activity is carried on as a business; philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other
than penal institutions; and accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses.
Section 16, subsection 9 of the zoning ordinance requires the issuance of an annual special
use permit for: "[h]ospitals for the insane or feebleminded, or alcoholic or drug addicts,
or penal or correctional institutions." Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726
F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1984).
35. The group home, classified as a Level 1 Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded would be subject to extensive federal and state regulations and guidelines.
105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.2 (1985).
36. Roughly 89% of retarded persons are categorized as "mildly" retarded, meaning
their IQ is between 50 and 70. "Moderately" retarded persons have an IQ between 35
and 50. A small minority of retarded persons are either "severely" retarded (IQbetween
20 and 35) or "profoundly" retarded (IQ under 20). Id. at 3256 n.9.
37. City Council members considered the following factors in their decision to deny
the special use permit: "(a) the attitude of a majority of owners of property located within
two hundred (200) feet of 201 Featherston; (b) the location of a junior high across the
street from 201 Featherston; (c) concern for the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood; (d) the size of the home and the number of people to be housed; (e) concern over
the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions which the mentally retarded residents might
take; (f) the home's location on a five hundred (500) year flood plain; and (g) in general,
the presentation made before the City Council." 726 F.2d at 202.
38. Cleburne, Joint App. at 94, Findings 30, 28.
39. Id. at 102-103.
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irrational."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 4 1
finding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and
that, under heightened scrutiny, the zoning ordinace was invalid on its
face and as applied because it did not substantially further any important
governmental interest. The Fifth Circuit relied on the indicia of suspectness identified in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4 2 to
conclude that, first, mentally retarded persons have been subject to a
history of grotesque mistreatment which has led to popular fears and
uncertainty; 4 3 second, mentally retarded people have been relegated to
a position of political powerlessness; 44 and third, mental retardation is
an immutable condition deserving of special consideration. 45 The court
hinted that the mentally retarded may be a "discrete and insular" minority meriting protection. 4 6 The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to apply the
heightened standard of scrutiny, rejecting all of the objectives posited
by the City in defense of the ordinance and all the factors which influenced the Council's decision to deny the permit.
B.

The Response of the United States Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion

The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, 4 7 sent a mixed
message to the developmentally disabled and the advocates who championed their cause, leaving the taste of a bittersweet victory. On one
hand, the Supreme Court voted nine to zero that the special use permit
requested by the Cleburne Living Center (CLC) and Jan Hannah was
unconstitutional. At the same time, this substantial triumph for CLC
was marred by the Court's decision, in a vote of six to three, that people
with mental retardation are not entitled to be recognized as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class deserving the special constitutional protection of
heightened scrutiny. Observers of constitutional trends received a similarly mixed signal from the Court and bore witness to the rare phenomenon of rationality with bite4 8 when the Court struck down the ordinance
as providing no rational relation to the City's legitimate interests.
Justice White began his analysis with an overview of past equal protection cases in an attempt to reaffirm the Court's adherence to the
40. Id. at 103.
41. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
43. 726 F.2d at 197.
44. Id. at 197-98.
45. Id. at 198.
46. Id. This criterion is taken from Justice Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
47. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
48. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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multi-tiered standard of review. 4 9 He set the tone of the decision by
indicating that "[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide latitude.., and the Constitution presumes that even important decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes." '50 Armed with this constitutional
premise, Justice White foreshadowed his ultimate conclusion by noting
that deferential treatment based on age had yet to be accorded interme51
diate scrutiny.
Against this background, the majority concluded that mental retardation would receive the treatment normally accorded any other classification based on social and economic legislation. Justice White advanced
several arguments to support his decision. First, mentally retarded persons' reduced ability to cope with the everyday world legitimizes the
state's interest in dealing with and protecting them. 52 Moreover, mental
retardation covers such a broad array of conditions 53 that decisions on
how to treat retarded people are best left to legislators aided by quali54
fied professionals, and not the judiciary.
Justice White's second point stresses the recent legislative solutions
to the problems facing the mentally retarded at both the federal and
state levels that "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." 5 5 The
abundance of legislation, for Justice White, reflects the undeniable distinction between retarded persons and others. 5 6 Therefore, the approval of such legislation indicates that governmental, and not judicial,
consideration of the differences should be the desirable end. Given the
"wide variation" in the abilities and needs of retarded persons, governmental bodies must be accorded some freedom in shaping their reme57
dial efforts.
Third, the significant legislative response to the needs of this group
persuaded Justice White that the mentally retarded were not politically
powerless. 58 This proposition is indeed ironic if one closely examines
the majority opinion. Previously, Justice White had cited the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 59 as reflecting the
affirmative response the legislature has taken toward the plight of the
mentally retarded citizen. However, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman60 (Pennhurst I), the Supreme Court concluded that the
rights provisions of the Act were merely advisory guidelines and not ab49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See generally Part II supra.
105 S. Ct. at 3254.
Id. at 3255.
Id. at 3256.
See supra note 36.
Id. at 3256.

55.

Id.

56. Id. at 3257.
57. Id.
58.

Id.

59. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1982).
60. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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solute obligations which could be enforced against the states. 6 ' Congress has yet to make these guidelines enforceable.
Last, Justice White predicted that if mental retardation was recognized as a quasi-suspect classification, then the floodgates would be
open for other groups with "immutable disabilities setting them off from
others" to claim special constitutional deference. 6 2 Instead of creating a
new quasi-suspect class, "we should look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general
matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us." ' 63 Therefore,
the majority settled on the rational relationship standard which afforded
government the latitude both to assist the retarded and to engage in
activities which would burden retarded persons in "incidental
matters."64
Surprisingly, despite use of the minimum level of scrutiny, the
Court invalidated the zoning ordinance insofar as it required a special
use permit for group homes. 6 5 Because the requirement of a special use
permit, as applied under the circumstances of this case, violated equal
protection of the laws, the Court did not decide whether the special use
permit was facially invalid where mentally retarded persons were concerned, leaving unanswered questions concerning the rights of mentally
retarded persons to live in the community. 6 6 The majority focused its
decision on the fact that the City required a special use permit for the
operation of a facility for the mentally retarded, while other uses, such as
hospitals, dormitories, and nursing homes for convalescents or the
aged, did not require a special use permit. Justice White concluded that
mentally retarded persons as a class may be different from those persons
occupying facilities permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit,
but the difference was "largely irrelevant" to any legitimate interests of
the City. 6 7 The record revealed no rational basis for the City of
Cleburne to believe that the group home posed any special threat to
68
legitimate interests of the City.
Justice White proceeded to specifically reject the factors upon which
the decision of the district court purportedly rested. First, and most significantly, the negative attitudes or fears of neighborhood residents,
"unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings,
and the like." 6 9 The City's concern for the location of the facility across
the street from a junior high school (itself attended by about 30 mentally
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 17.
105 S. Ct. at 3258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3258-60.

66. Id. at 3254 n.8. The Court in Cleburne refused to address the issue of "Single fam-

ily" zoning restrictions on group homes.
67. Id. at 3259.
68.

Id.

69. Id.
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retarded persons) and the fact that the home was situated on a 500 year
flood plain were quickly dismissed by Justice White as "vague, undifferentiated fears" especially when considered with the other dwellings sim70
ilarly situated which were not required to obtain the special permit.
Additionally, doubts raised by the City about the legal responsibility for
actions which the mentally retarded might take; the size of the home and
number of people that would occupy it; fire safety; congestion of the
streets; concentration of population; and the serenity of the neighborhood, failed to rationally justify singling out this particular group home
for a special permit when no restrictions were imposed on the other uses
71
freely permitted in the neighborhood.
Justice White ended his analysis by noting that the requirement of
the special use permit for the Featherston facility was based on an "irrational prejudice" against the mentally retarded. 72 Therefore, Cleburne is
certain to remain a useful precedent in attacks on zoning ordinances
which discriminate against the housing needs of people who are mentally retarded, especially where the fears and prejudices of neighbors lie
73
at the heart of the community's decision to exclude a group home.
2.

The Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote a separate
concurring opinion to express a shared view of equal protection analysis. Quite succinctly, Justice Stevens reaffirmed his opinion first expressed in Craigv. Boren 74 that equal protection cases have delineated
no separate, identifiable strands of review; but instead, reflect "a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one
75
extreme to 'rational basis' at the other."
In an interesting development, Justice Stevens focused on the special needs and limitations which the mentally retarded, and for that matter, any disadvantaged group could recognize in themselves., Thus,
there are many legitimate legislative decisions placing mentally retarded
persons in a special class, which although they disadvantage retarded
persons, are not presumptively irrational. 7 6 For example, restrictions
on a retarded person's right to operate an automoblile, which deprive
him of the employment opportunities and freedom to travel that other
citizens enjoy, seem rational. However, in this particular case, Justice
Stevens stated that the court of appeals was correct when it "observed
70.

Id.

71. Id. at 3259-60.
72. Id. at 3260.
73. Ellis & Luckasson, DiscriminationAgainst People with Mental Retardation: A Comment on
the Cleburne Decision, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 249, 251 (1985).

74. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
75. 105 S. Ct. at 3261. Justice Steven's reference to a "continuum ofjudgmental responses" is outwardly similar to the "sliding scale" analysis of Justice Marshall posited in
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-99, reh'gdenied,411 U.S. 959
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. 105 S. Ct. at 3262.
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that through ignorance and prejudice the mentally retarded 'have been
subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment.' 77
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's reasoning with regard to invalidation of the special use permit, concluding that "a rational member
of this disadvantaged class" would never "approve of the discriminatory
application of the City's ordinance in this case.''78
The Opinion of Justice Marshall

3.

Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, agreed
with the outcome of the case, but vigorously dissented from the majority's "novel and truncated" proposition that mentally retarded persons
were not entitled to a quasi-suspect classification. 79 The first part of
Justice Marshall's opinion amounted to a scathing criticism of Justice
White's majority decision. Justice Marshall initially raised two paradoxes in the majority decision: first, a discussion of heightened scrutiny
was superfluous to an invalidation of the zoning ordinance on rational
basis grounds; 80 and second, the Court, while labeling its decision a rational basis review had, in fact, utilized a heightened standard of review
dubbed "second order" rational basis - to declare the requirement
of a special use permit unconstitutional. 8 1
Justice Marshall continued, stating that normally "the burden is not
on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it has drawn are
sensible," yet in this case, the majority required a justification from the
City. 8 2 Additionally, under the traditional rational basis standard, the
Court does not rely on the record to judge whether policy decisions are
supported by a firm factual foundation. 83 In Justice Marshall's view, the
Cleburne majority, by refusing to acknowledge that a heightened standard
of review was being used, created a precedent for a rationale review, and
not a rational basis standard of review. The Supreme Court and lower
courts now have a license to search for rationales which support economic and commercial classifications in a manner similar to the dark
days of equal protection. 8 4 Furthermore, in failing to articulate the factors which justify invocation of this "second order" rational basis standard, Justice Marshall believes the majority has left the lower courts "in
the dark" as to when the more searching scrutiny is required.
The second part of Justice Marshall's opinion reiterated his longheld belief8 5 that "the level of scrutiny.., should vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and
the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular clas77. Id. at 3262 (quoting Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 197).
78. Id. at 3263.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 3264.
Id. at 3265.
Id. at 3264.
Id. at 3265. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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sification is drawn.' "86 He then set forth his test by which the zoning
law should be judged; that is, the ordinance should "be convincingly
justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes. '"87 Analyzing the case, Marshall found that mentally retarded
persons have a substantial interest in establishing group homes. 8 8 Second, mentally retarded persons have been subjected to a "grotesque"
history of segregation and discrimination based only on vague
generalizations. 8 9
Justice Marshall proceeded to reexamine the justifications used by
only to conclude that they could not
the majority to support its opinion,
"withstand logical analysis." 90 In spirited language, Justice Marshall
presented a forceful argument for judicial interventionism, since courts
"do not sit or act in a social vacuum." 9 1 Developing an evolving doctrine of constitutional equality, Justice Marshall advocated a Court which
advances, or "catalyzes," legislative changes that would constantly remain loyal to the fundamental undercurrent of equality running through
the law. 9 2 Justice Marshall then noted that the fact that mentally retarded persons are no longer politically powerless does not indicate that
they are no longer a group with special characteristics and needs. For
example, simply because legislation has been enacted to deal with racial
discrimination, does not mean that the Court has made race-based clas93
sifications any less suspect.
Justice Marshall continued by criticizing the two principles apparently central to the majority opinion. First, the belief that heightened
scrutiny is inapplicable where the individuals in a group are different
and that the legislature properly may take this into account, is unsound.
Women have distinctive characteristics, and yet heightened scrutiny applies to them. 94 Similarly, the fact that legislation affecting a group is
likely to be valid has no logical application to the denial of heightened
illegitiscrutiny, especially where similarly situated groups - women,
95
mates, and aliens - have the benefit of a higher standard.
Last, Justice Marshall expressed his concern that the majority
merely invalidated the ordinance as it applied to the respondents in this
case, and did not strike down the permit requirement on its face. He
dissented "from the novel proposition that 'the preferred course of adjudication' is to leave standing a legislative act resting on 'irrational prej86. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 99, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
87. 105 S. Ct. at 3265. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31 reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) (Marshall,J., concurring); see also, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
88. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266.
89. Id. at 3266-68.
90. Id. at 3268.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3268-69.
93. Id. at 3269.
94. Id. at 3269-70.
95. Id. at 3270-71.
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udice' . . . thereby forcing individuals in the group discriminated against
to continue to run the act's gauntlet." 9 6 In effect, the Court left unanswered questions for the future "[b]y leaving the sweeping exclusion of
'9 7
the 'feeble-minded' to be applied to other groups of the retarded."
Instead, facial invalidation of the ordinance's treatment of the mentally
retarded would have placed the responsibility for tailoring a new ordinance on the City of Cleburne. 98
IV.

THE COURT AFTER CLEBURNE: JUSTICE STEVENS' PRAGMATIC
STABILITY AMIDST THE REIGN OF CONFUSION

The discussion thus far has attempted to expose equal protection
adjudication as a constitutional procrustean bed which forces governmental classifications into three inflexible positions on an anachronistic
scale. Disenchantment with the multi-tiered standard of review has
transformed the equal protection clause into a talisman for the Court's
divination of legitimate state goals when weighed implicitly against the
interests of disadvantaged persons. In Cleburne, though, lies an inkling
of hope that the seeds of transition have been sown byJustice Stevens.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, summarized above, 9 9 is
therefore worthy of special attention in that it proposes a viable alternative to traditional equal protection.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens presages an increased
willingness by the Supreme Court to redefine equal protection. Indeed,
it is significant to note that the concurrences of Justices Stevens and
Burger, when grouped with the dissents of Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Blackmun, constitute a five Justice bloc which would not have applied the same quality of equal protection analysis as the Court. As a
result, the Court left the door open for the lower courts to apply a level
of review running the gamut from somewhere just below heightened
scrutiny to something a little more than the deference of the rational
basis standard.' 0 0
Admittedly, upon examination, Justice Stevens' early opinions in
the area of equal protection are as obfuscated as the opinions of the rest
of the Court. In Mathews v. Lucas,i0 l where the court upheld a classification scheme based on illegitimacy, Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued for
a more intensive scrutiny of legislative categorizations based on the
"habit" of considering illegitimates as undeserving of special protection. 10 2 Aside from a discomfort with the multi-tiered standard and a
fierce loyalty to traditionally disfavored groups, the Justice's dissent in
Lucas provided little insight into a unique interpretive philosophy. How96. Id. at 3272.
97. Id. at 3273.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
100. Summary, Analysis, and Commentary, 9 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP., 242, 243 (1985).

101. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
102. Id. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ever, Craig v. Boren, 10 3 a case presenting a challenge to a statute which
set the minimum age for purchasing 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen for
women and age twenty-one for men, marked Justice Stevens' abandonment of the three-tiered system in favor of a "single standard" of review. 10 4 Although Justice Stevens' refusal to articulate a proper
standard of review may have frustrated those in search of a well-defined
judicial decree from on high, perhaps Boren foreshadowed a loftier purpose. Justice Stevens, in opting for a balancing approach, recognized
that attempting to define an appropriate standard is futile, 10 5 because
the range of potential "modes" of review between utter deference and
the strictest scrutiny is infinite.
Cleburne suggests that Justice Stevens finally has synthesized the
doctrinal threads running through the fabric of equal protection into a
workable theory destined to be implemented in Supreme Court practice.
More importantly, Cleburne reflects a dialectical progression by Justice
Stevens which transcends the muddled confusion that pervades equal
protection analysis. It is indeed prophetic that a man who has confused
conservatives, liberals, and scholars alike with his refusal to be typecast
should lead the Court from chaos into coherence.' 0 6 In a similar fashion, Justice Stevens has purposely avoided categorizing his approach to
equal protection, and therefore, it is difficult to label a test which the
Court and practitioners may employ in every equal protection case.
Some characteristics ofJustice Stevens' interpretive philosophy, though,
are readily identifiable and, in all likelihood, will be honed into a newer
equal protection.
First, Justice Stevens deliberately eschews the troika of traditional
standards in equal protection. In Cleburne, he stated that he has "never
been persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately explain the
decisional process."' 1 7 Second, theJustice has a "pronounced streak of
Frankfurterianism tempered by a willingness to apply the law vigorously" 10 8 in those areas where the rights and interests of a disadvantaged group outweigh countervailing interests of judicial restraint and
federalism. In other words, Justice Stevens engages in a "balancing of
interests" approach which determines the strength of conflicting interests - which presumably exist outside of the judge's mind - and balances them objectively.
Justice Stevens' balancing formula is three-pronged. First, an initial
determination of the character of the challenged governmental classification, as it relates to the class that has been allegedly harmed, is made.
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977).
104. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105. Special Project,justiceStevens: The First Three Terms, 32 VAND. L. REV. 671, 713-15
(1979).
106. Ball & Ulhman, JusticeJohn Prul Stevens: An Initial Assessment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV.
567, 569 (1978).
107. 105 S. Ct. at 3261.
108. Beytagh, Mr.Justice Stevens an.' the Burger Court's Uncertain Trumpet, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 946 (1976).

1986]

CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER

Justice Stevens looks to either: the nature of the classification itself, that
is, if the class has been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor"' 10 9 as in
Cleburne and Lucas; or, the effect of the legislation on those persons affected by it, as in Zablocki v. Redhail.'I1 In Zablocki, the Court invalidated
a Wisconsin statute which provided that a resident "having minor issue
not in his custody and which he is under an obligation to support by any
court order" could not marry without court permission."' Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, concluded that although the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting children who were not in custody, the
statute, in effect, deliberately discriminated against the poor. Thus, Justice Stevens provides both a qualitative and quantitative aspect, respectively, to a determination of the character of a classification.
Second, after characterizing the classification, Justice Stevens considered whether the proffered legislative purpose was the actual basis
for the decision to create the restrictive classification. He concluded, in
Cleburne, that the proffered purpose for the requirement of an annual
special use permit - protection of the mentally retarded persons who
would live in the group home - was merely a guise for the actual basis,
the irrational fear and prejudice of the neighboring land owners.' 12
In theory, after satisfaction of the requirement of an actual purpose,
Justice Stevens' formula is applied to closely examine the justifications
urged to support the governmental action. Therefore, this third step
comprises the actual balancing of the state's legitimate purposes and the
interests of the disadvantaged group. Justice Stevens quickly concluded
in Cleburne that zoning ordinances are not usually justified by an unconvincing desire to protect mentally retarded persons from "the hazards
presented by the neighborhood." 1 3 This prong operates to discourage
legislative bodies from conjuring up unconvincing and irrational justifications solely in defense of challenges to a classification.' 14 Another
significant characteristic of Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis is
his redefinition of the term "rational" and the consequent bolstering of
the "old" rational relationship test.' 15 Cleburne advises that "rational
basis" demands a stronger showing by the legislature: that the classification be actually a legitimate interest of the state; and that, as applied,
the classification treat all whom it affects impartially.' 16
Moreover, the intellectual merit ofJustice Stevens' approach cannot
be overestimated. As mentioned above, Justice Stevens' opinion in
109. 105 S. Ct. at 3261. See Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalJursprudence ofJustice
Stevens, 46 U. Cil. L. REV. 155, 214 (1978).
110. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
111. Id. at 375.
112. 105 S. Ct. at 3262. See Special Project, supra note 105 at 714 ("[T]he principal
concern in Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis is finding an actual legislative purpose. If he finds none, the classification is invalid; if an actual legislative purpose is evident, he generally defers to it.").
113. 105 S. Ct. at 3263.
114. See Special Project, supra note 105 at 714.
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 3263.
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Cleburne represents a dialectical progression towards a workable reformulation of equal protection. If one reads Cleburne in the order of Justice White's majority opinion, then justice Marshall's dissent, and finally,
Justice Stevens' concurrence, the dialectical synthesis is self-evident. In
other words, Justice Stevens retained the best elements of both Justice
White's thesis - rationality with bite - and Justice Marshall's antithesis
- intermediate scrutiny - to develop a wide-ranged synthesis fully capable of filling the immeasurable void between the traditional tiers of
review, and thus competently adjudicate the broad scope of equal protection challenges intrinsic to this generation. For example, one of the
characteristics comprising intermediate scrutiny - the assessment of the
importance of the governmental interest - has been appropriated into
the first prong of Justice Stevens' balancing approach, the characterization of the governmental classification.1 7 This type of intellectual innovation is certain to distinguish Justice Stevens from the rest of the Court
and solidify a position of Court leadership and constructive influence.
However, one would be most neglectful in analyzing Justice Stevens' approach if one refused to unmask the inherent flaws in his argument. While Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis frees the Court
from the doctrinal confines of the three-tiered model, it gives no guidance to legislatures as to the limits of constitutionally permissible legislation.1 1 8 Another criticism of Justice Stevens' balancing approach,
which by its very nature contains elements of a more searching rational
basis test, is the potential for the Court to review an even broader array
of governmental classifications and thereby infringe upon that which is
properly within the legislative domain." 19
V.

CONCLUSION

Cleburne marks a transition in equal protection analysis. The divergent opinions ofJustices White and Marshall reflect the inconsistency of
the three-tiered model, and therefore, indirectly reinforce Justice Stevens' substitute method of review.
The decision is also noteworthy in that it signals a change in the
personality of the Court, guided by the pragmatism of Justice Stevens.
Cleburne reflects the shift of Justice Stevens from the undifferentiated
middle to the intellectual standard-bearer of the Court. Therefore, the
future of the Court appears much brighter if the skillfully structured
consistency of Justice Stevens can unseat the strong ideologies - both
liberal and reactionary - that constitute the Supreme Court.
Charles T. Passaglia

117. Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalJurisprudenceofJustice Stevens, 46 U.
155, 214 (1978).
118. Id. at 216.
119. Id.
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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE:

A JUDICIAL

FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERZEALOUSNESS

CURE
IN

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v.
National Conservative Political Action CommitteeI abandoned its traditional
conservative mode of analysis and invoked the first amendment 2 to
strike down statutory limits on the independent expenditures

ical action committees (PACs).

4

3

of polit-

This uniquely aligned opinion 5 applied

a liberal interpretation of the first amendment to unlock the shackles

placed by Congress upon PACs' independent expenditures. The conservative faction of the Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, 6 stepped away
from its deferential attitude toward legislative determinations in com-

plex lawmaking, and refused to constitutionally approve a key section of

Congress's election financing scheme.
Specifically, in Part I of its opinion, the majority found that a Democratic group of petitioners lacked standing to invoke expedited judicial
1. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Specifically, the Court invalidated 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1982), which set forth:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any political
committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such
candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an
authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding
$1,000.
Paragraph (2) of the section has no application to the facts in this case.
Independent expenditures are spent without the guidance of or coordination with a
candidate or a campaign committee. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61. The party
who makes an expenditure directly controls the avenue by which a political view is expressed. For example, an expenditure includes purchasing a newspaper ad independently
to voice one's opinion on an issue. See infra Comment, note 29, at 432-36.
Contributions, on the other hand, are given directly to the campaign committee of a
candidate. At the time of contribution, the campaign committee gains complete control
over the donated funds. See Richards, The Rise and Fall of the Contribution/Expenditure Distinction: Redefining the Acceptable Range of Campaign Finance Reforms, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 367,
370-72 (1983) (discussing the nature of contributions).
4. PACs are formed by various corporations and groups to influence elections and
lobby for special interests. PACs represent a wide range of special interests, including
doctors, gun enthusiasts, auto workers, carpenters, and real estate agents. Lawscope, 67
A.B.A.J. 280-81 (1981).
5. Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, CJ., Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor, JJ. joined. Brennan, J., joined only in Part II of the opinion.
Stevens,J., concurred in Part II of the opinion and dissented as to Part I. White, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in Part I of which Brennan, J., and Marshall. J.. joined. Marshall. J..
filed a separate dissent.
6. Thomas, Court at the Crossroads, TIME Oct. 8, 1984, at 31.
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review 7 to request a declaratory judgment upholding the constitutionality of section 9012(f) of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
(Fund Act). 8 In Part II, the Court reached the central issue of the case,
and refused to declare the section constitutional. 9 In effect, the Court
proclaimed the unconstitutio-nality of limits on PACs' independent
expenditures.
This comment will elucidate the facts surrounding the Supreme
Court's decision. It also will trace the extensive background behind
congressional and judicial policymaking in the election area. Finally,
this comment will analyze the Court's holding and illuminate the underlying message of Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
I.

FACTS OF FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

The National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC)
and the Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM) are corporations registered as political committees 10 with the Federal Election Commission
(FEC). I1 Prior to the 1984 presidential elections, the two PACs announced their intentions to spend vast sums of money to further the
reelection of President Ronald Reagan.' 2 To counteract this conservative threat, the Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee
(DNC), and a citizen 13 (collectively, the Democrats) filed an amended
complaint seeking a ruling which would declare section 9012(f) of the
Fund Act constitutional, 14 and thus prohibit the PACs' spending. The
FEC then intervened as a defendant to press for a dismissal of the complaint based on the Democrats' lack of standing. 15 One month later, in
June of 1983, the FEC brought a cause of action seeking the same de7. 26 U.S.C. § 901 l(b)(2) (1982), sets forth that "[sluch proceedings shall be heard
and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section
2284 of title 28, United States Code, and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." This
statute provides for expedited review directly from the special three-judge district court
panel to the United States Supreme Court.
8. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 26 U.S.C. §§ 90019013 (1971) (amended 1974).
9. 105 S. Ct. at 1471.
10. 26 U.S.C. § 9002(9) (1971) defines a political committee as "any committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or
makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public
office."
11. The FEC (created by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), see infra note 36)
has the duty to administer, enforce, and formulate policy with regard to the FECA and the
Fund Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1974) (amended 1980).
12. As an example of the magnitude of previous spending, NCPAC's election expenses in 1980 were over $7 million. See Lawscope, supra note 4, at 280. FCM spent over
$2 million on President Reagan's bid for election in 1980. See Comment, Independent Political Committees and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 962 (1981).
13. The private citizen, Edward Mezvinsky, was the Chairman of the Pennsylvania
Democratic State Committee. 105 S. Ct. at 1462.
14. Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp.
797, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983), revd in part, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
15.

Id.
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claratory judgment requested by the Democrats. 16 The three-judge
panel formed pursuant to the Fund Act 17 consolidated both of the cases
and heard arguments.'"
The district court granted the Democrats and the FEC standing
under section 9011 (b)(1) 19 and Article III of the Constitution. 20 On the
21
merits, the court refused to declare section 9012() constitutional.
The panel did not, however, declare the section unconstitutional. The
panel found that the limitations on political committee expenditures
constituted an impermissibly overbroad violation of fundamental first
amendment rights of freedom of speech and association. 22 Furthermore, the court refused to save the law by limiting the scope of the Fund
Act.

23

The Democrats and the FEC filed cross appeals to the Supreme
Court in accordance with the expedited review provisions of the Fund
Act. 2 4 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the grant of standing
to the Democrats, but affirmed the panel's refusal to declare section
25
9012() constitutional.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

HistoricalAnalysis of the Federal Campaign FinancingLaw Scheme

Issues of campaign funding have challenged the people of the
United States and their government since the founding fathers
presented the Constitution to the original thirteen colonies. James
Madison warned that when the citizen loses control over the government, wealth and birthright can poison a free election process. 2 6 To
avert this evil, Madison suggested a system in which the people play the
27
role of the masters with the elected officials as slaves.
Unfortunately, Madison's fears came to reality at the turn of this
century, when corporations during the industrial revolution began to
exhibit undue influence over the nation's election process. The industrial giants of the time were amassing huge sums of money and using
16. Id.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2) (1982). See supra note 7.
18. Democratic Party, 578 F. Supp. at 803.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 901 l(b)(1) (1982) (states that "[t]he Commission, the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President are authorized to
institute such actions, including actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, as
may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true any provision of this chapter").
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which provides that "[the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."
21. Democratic Party, 578 F. Supp. at 840.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2) (1982). See supra note 7.
25. 105 S. Ct. at 1471.
26.

Roeder, Is Congress the Best that PAC's Can Buy?, Rocky Mountain News, July 21,

1985, at 61, col. I (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (J. Madison)).
27. Correspondence from Lewis H. Larue, Politics and the Constitution, 86 YALE L.J.
1011 (1977).
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"war chests" to make unlimited campaign contributions. In an effort to
prevent the corrupt effects of large accumulations of wealth upon the
federal election process, Congress enacted the Tillman Act in 190728
which barred national banks and other federally-chartered corporations
from making contributions to candidates in any election. 29 Eighteen
years later, Congress strengthened the Tillman Act by voting into law
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.30 The new law created the first contribution reporting requirements 3 ' in an attempt to curb the political
32
indebtedness of elected officials to their major campaign contributors.
Labor unions were similarly regulated by the 1943 War Labor Disputes
Act. 33 Regulation of individuals, however, did not occur until the enact4
ment of the Hatch Political Activities Act of 1939.3
These statutes were fairly effective in creating a basic framework for
election financing. Spiraling campaign expenditures, however, became
35
a topic of intense debate during President Nixon's term in office.
Congress toughened the regulatory system in 1971 by enacting two
complex campaign financing laws: the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) and the Fund Act. 36 Congress promulgated the FECA to
28. Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Star. 864 (1907), stated
[tihat it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection
with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at
which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress
is to be voted for or any election by any State Legislature of a United States
Senator.
29. See Comment, The Constitutionalityof Limitations on Individual Political Campaign Contributions and Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25 EMORY L.J. 400,
402 (1976) (technical analysis of the early campaign laws).
30. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed 1972).
31. Ifshin & Warin, Litigating the 1980 PresidentialElection, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 487 (1982).
These requirements forced campaign committees to file a statement containing names and
addresses of all contributors with the Clerk of the House of Representatives. The law also
required the committees to report- the amount of all contributions received.
32. Comment, supra note 29, at 403. Justice Frankfurter explained that the statute's
"aim was not merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity of the electoral process. Its
underlying philosophy was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government." United States v. UAW, 352 U.S.
567, 575 (1957).
33. Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) (also known as the SmithConnelly Act); see also Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No.
80-101, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Star. 136, 159 (which strengthened the power of the War Labor
Disputes Act).
34. Pub. L. No. 76-252, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7327
(1976)) (barring federal employees from campaigning for candidates for federal office, and
barring candidates from using federal employment or benefits as a reward for campaign
support).
35. Spending during the 1968 presidential campaign equaled $44.2 million. In 1972,
spending for the presidential race rose dramatically to $83 million. Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of Election Campaigns, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (1982).
As spending continued to skyrocket throughout the 1970's, large disparities between
Republican and Democratic monetary outlays became evident. For instance, in all 1980
campaigns, approximately $400 million were raised by candidates. Republicans solicited
$108 million from individual contributors, while the Democrats could raise only a paltry
$19 million from individuals. T. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF 426 (1982).

36. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-454
(amended 1980); Fund Act, supra note 8.
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broaden the public's awareness of the source of campaign contributions. 3 7 For the first time, this statute set forth ceilings on campaign
spending and extensive disclosure provisions. 3 8 Concurrently, the Fund
Act created a public funding mechanism for presidential elections.3 9
These two laws, although enacted separately, blended to form an exten40
sive set of election financing guidelines.
Despite congressional efforts to control campaign corruption
through the FECA and the Fund Act, the eruption of Watergate caused
the nation to view the presidential election process in an intensely skeptical manner. In response to this public outcry, 4 1 Congress amended
each of the Acts in 1974. The FECA amendments placed limits on campaign contributions 42 and expenditures, 43 required reporting of campaign committee receipts and disbursements, 44 and created the FEC to
enforce the provisions of the Acts. 45 The Fund Act amendment required presidential and vice-presidential candidates to make the mutually exclusive choice between accepting either public campaign funding
46
or financing from private sources.
B.

Buckley v. Valeo

A major setback for Congress occurred in 1976 when the Supreme
Court determined that several sections of the 1974 FECA amendments
could not pass constitutional scrutiny. Before the 1976 presidential
47
campaign went into full swing, a variety of politically involved parties
brought suit against the federal government to determine the constitu37. Annot. 18 A.L.R. FED. 959 (1974).
38. The Act placed specific limits on expenditures made by candidates for advertising
in the media. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 47 U.S.C. 104 (a), (b)(1972) (repealed 1974).
See Berry & Goldman, Congress and Public Policy: A Study of the FederalElection Campaign Act of
1971, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 331 (1973) (thorough analysis of the FECA's legislative history).
The FECA's disclosure requirements mandated that political committees follow a certain form of organizational structure. 2 U.S.C. § 432 (1972) (amended 1980). The FECA
also required political committees to register and file a statement of organization with the
FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 433 (1972) (amended 1980). After a political committee began accepting
contributions, the statute required the committee to file reports of receipts and disbursements with the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1972) (amended 1980). See also Ifshin & Warin, supra
note 31, at 495.
39. The Fund Act provided for public funding of presidential elections. To raise
money for the election fund, Congress established a system whereby taxpayers could contribute one dollar with the filing of their tax returns. 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (a) (1971).
40. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 31, at 495.
41. Id. at 492.
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1974) (repealed 1976) (as an expenditure limit example).
44. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (1971) (amended 1980).
45. 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1974) (amended 1980). See supra note 11.
46. In 1976, Congress repealed several provisions of the law which had been struck
down by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i (1976). In 1979 and 1980,
Congress made further incidental revisions to the FECA and Fund Act. The latest improvements attempted to streamline the Acts' procedural application by simplifying disclosure requirements. See Ifshin & Warin, supra note 31, at 496.
47. The plaintiffs included candidates, political parties, public interest groups, and
PACs. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
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tionality of the 1974 FECA amendments. After accepting jurisdiction,
the Court granted standing to each party. 48 The Justices also sanctioned the public funding 4 9 and disclosure 50 aspects of the law, while
striking down the FEC appointment procedure. 5 1
More importantly, however, the per curiam opinion upheld the contri53
52
bution limitations of the Act while invalidating the expenditure ceilings.
Generally, the Court found that fundamental rights of free speech and
54
association were infringed upon by both categories of limitations.
The first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis applied by the Court required the government to prove "compelling" congressional interests
behind the promulgation of the law. 5 5 The second prong required congressional means "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement" of
the interest. 5 6
The contribution limits passed strict scrutiny because the Justices
believed that these caps only incidentally affected crucial first amendment guarantees. 57 The Court concluded that Congress's motive to
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 92-93 (The Court agreed with Congress's goal in creating public financing
"to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
election process, goals vital to self-governing people."); see supra note 39.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84; see supra note 38.
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135. The Court concluded that since a majority of the members of the FEC were appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House, the selection procedure violated appointment guarantees provided to the
President by the appointment clause. The appointment clause states that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint...
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ...." U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl.2.
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. The contribution limitations upheld by the Court included
individual contribution caps of $1,000 to a single candidate, a political committee contribution ceiling of $5,000 to a single candidate, and a $25,000 limit on individual contributions to all candidates within a single year. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (repealed 1976).
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51. The expenditure limits overturned included independent
expenditure restrictions placed on relatives of candidates, limits placed on a candidate's
expense of personal funds, ceilings placed on individual expenditures targeted to affect a
clearly identified candidate, and limits placed on the overall expenses of a campaign. 18
U.S.C. § 608(a), (c), and (e) (1974) (repealed 1976).
54. The Court acknowledged that expenditures are entitled to first amendment
protection:
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) ....This no more than reflects our "profound national committment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open," N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 270 (1964).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
55. Id. at 25; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (elucidating the
Court's strict scrutiny first amendment test).
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
57. Id at 21. The Court defined what later became known as "speech by proxy": "the
transformation of contributions into political debate [which] involves speech by someone
other than the contributor." Id; see also Note, The Constitutionality of Regulating Independent
Expenditure Committees in Publicly Funded Presidential Campaigns, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 679
(1981). See generally Comment, supra note 29, at 429 (analyzes the Court's "speech-byproxy" statement); Recent Decisions, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 814 (1981) (criticizing and
explaining the application of Buckley's contribution distinction in Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), affd 101 S. Ct. 1344 (1981)).
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eliminate the infamous quid pro quo 58 was sufficiently compelling to justify this minor infringement.
The independent expenditure ceilings, on the other hand, failed to
pass the Court's strict scrutiny review. The opinion equated constitutionally-protected speech with the spending of money to directly further
one's political views. 59 The Justices then found that basic constitutional
rights were heavily infringed upon by the expenditure limitations. 60
The Court rejected the law as a method to further the government's
single compelling interest of eliminating the evil quid pro quo, since expenditures were made without prearrangement, cooperation, or coordination with the candidate. 6 1 Therefore, the expenditure ceilings were
invalidated.
C.

Post-Buckley Decisions

After Buckley, the Supreme Court began to show a definite trend in
its holdings concerning election financing laws. The Court struck down
several laws which limited independent expenditures. 62 In First National
Bank v. Bellotti,63 various corporations and banks opposed an amendment to the Massachussetts Constitution that would have allowed a
graduated personal income tax. Yet they could not fight this amendment because of a state law which prohibited corporate spending to influence the outcome of public issues submitted to the voters. 64 The
groups, therefore, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
the law. The Court struck down the statute, 6 5 and noted that spending
to express political views "is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech
66
comes from a corporation rather than an individual."
In another public-issue case, a group of citizens vehemently opposed a ballot measure which would have placed rent controls on many
58. When a contributor gives money to a candidate in exchange for a favor in the
future, a quid pro quo has occurred. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley,

454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981).
59. According to the Court, the first amendment must protect political expenditures
"because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires
the expenditure of money." Federal Election Commission, 105 S. Ct. at 1467 (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 19).
60. 105 S. Ct. at 1467.
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47. See generally, Comment The Federal Election Campaign Act
and PresidentialElection Campaign Fund Act: Problems in Defining and Regulating Independent Ex-

penditures, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 977, 992 (1981) (analyzing the distinction made by Buckley
between contributions and expenditures).
62. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), aff'g 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C.
1980); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
63. 435 U.S. at 795.
64. The law prohibited corporations from making expenditures or contributions for
the purpose of "influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters.
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corpora-

tion." Id. at 768 n.2 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
65. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
66. Id. at 777.
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of the city's rental units. 6 7 However, these citizens felt they could not
effectively lobby against the measure because a city ordinance placed a
$250 expenditure limit on any contributor who wished to influence the
outcome of such elections. 68 Consequently, the citizens brought suit to
have the law declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the law
could not promote the government's compelling interest of preventing
the quidpro quo, because public question elections involve issues and not
candidates.6 9
A further indication of the Court's distaste for limits on independent expenditures occurred in its summary affirmation of a district court
70
ruling that held as unconstitutional section 9012(f) of the Fund Act.
This decision foreshadowed the Federal Election Commision decision, but
71
had no precedential value since the Court was evenly split on its vote.
On the contribution side of the coin, two important election financing laws have been sanctioned by the Court. In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 7 2 the Court upheld an FEC
enforcement action against the National Right to Work Committee
(NRWC), a nonprofit corporation formed to oppose compulsive unionism. The FEC sought to enjoin NRWC from soliciting contributions for
its segregated campaign fund from nonmembers, in violation of 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(4)(A) and (C). 73 The Court found that the regulation was
"sufficiently tailored" to promote the government's interest in protect74
ing the integrity of the campaign process.
Limitations on individual contributions to PACs were upheld in California MedicalAssociation v. FederalElection Commission.75 According to the
76
Court, contributions to PACs at best represented "speech by proxy,"
and a strict scrutiny analysis did not apply. The majority accepted the
congressional motive of preventing actual or apparent corruption by
limiting contributions. 77 The majority also explained that without the
limits imposed on contributions to PACs, contributors might evade
67. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 292.
68. The law prohibited any person from making, or any campaign treasurer from accepting contributions "in support of or in opposition to a measure . . . [exceeding] two
hundred and fifty dollars ($250)." Id. at 229 (quoting Election Reform Act of 1974, Ord.
No. 4700-N.S. (approved by the voters in Berkeley, CA)).
69. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297-98.
70. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), aff g 512 F.Supp. 489 (D.D.C.
1980).
71. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 (1910) (affirmations by evenly split vote are
of no precedential value).
72. 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A), (C) (1976)).
73. Since corporations may not contribute to federal elections, this law allowed a corporation to create a "separate segregated fund" and to use this fund for campaign purposes. Money can only be solicited for the fund from "members" of the corporation.
National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. at 198 n.l.
74. Id. at 208.
75. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding several statutes which restricted contributions to
PACs).
76. Id. at 196. See supra note 57.

77. California Medical Association, 453 U.S. at 197.
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other campaign financing laws by giving large sums of money to PACs. 78
In essence, the Court placed this law within the Buckley contribution category and upheld the statute with little discussion.
The post-Buckley decisions demonstrate that the Court will strictly
scrutinize laws that impinge on first amendment rights by limiting independent campaign expenditures. Conversely, the Court will take a more
deferential approach to contribution limitations.
III.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

V. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE.

In Federal Election Commission, the Court reaffirmed that it will not
accept independent expenditure limitations which impermissibly infringe upon basic first amendment rights. Yet, before reaching a decision on the constitutionality of section 9012(), the Court denied the
Democrats' standing. 79 The Court allowed only the FEC the right to
bring a declaratory action to test the constitutionality of the Fund Act. 80
A.

Standing

Justice Rehnquist discounted the Democratic Party's request to
bring an action against another private party, because Congress did not

81
expressly include this group in the statute's list of eligible plaintiffs.

Justice Rehnquist's rationale in denying the DNC and Mr. Mezvinsky
standing, on the other hand, combined interpretations of sections
437c(b)(1), 8 2 9010,83 and 9011,84 to find that under the present circum-

stances these plaintiffs could not bring a declaratory action to determine
the constitutionality of section 9012(f).
Crucial to Justice Rehnquist's determination of the effect of these
laws was his interpretation of the word "appropriate" in section
9011(b)(1). 8 5 He set forth that Congress intended "appropriate" actions to include only private suits against the FEC. 86 According to the
Justice, a judicial grant of standing to the Democrats would seriously
78. Id. at 198.
79. 105 S. Ct. at 1465. Because the Court's interpretation of the statute denied the
Democrats' standing, the Court refused to reach the Article III issue analyzed by the lower
court.
80. 105 S. Ct. at 1464. See 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(l) (1982); see also supra note 19.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 1464.
82. U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (1982) (gives the FEC "exclusive primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions").
83. 26 U.S.C. § 9010(a) (1982) (grants the FEC the power "to appear in and defend
against any action filed under section 9011").
84. See 26 U.S.C. § 901 l(b)(l) (1982); see also supra note 19.
85. 105 S. Ct. at 1464. The Court conceded that section 9011 (b)(l) allows a named
party to implement a suit without exhausting the administrative remedies as required by 2
U.S.C. § 43 7 g (1982).
86. 105 S. Ct. at 1464. See S. REP. No. 677, 94th Cong. 6, !st Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 929, 934. The legislative history provided in this report
states that "with the exception of actions brought by an individual aggrieved by an action
by the Commission, the power of the Commission to initiate civil actions is the exclusive
civil remedy for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act."
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undermine the FEC's exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Fund Act. 8 7
Furthermore, he noted that a grant of standing would allow millions of
eligible voters the right to expedited judicial review by direct appeal
under section 9011 (b) (2).88
B.

Constitutionality of Section 9012(f)

In part II of the decision, the Court reached the merits of the case
and began a comprehensive analysis of the constitutionality issue surrounding section 9012(f). The Court first pointed out the self-proclaimed positions of the PACs as ideological organizations which
advocate conservative doctrines. 89 The opinion also set forth the funding mechanisms of NCPAC and FCM. 9 0 As Justice Rehnquist explained,
each of the PACs spent money in a totally independent manner, free
from any cooperation with the Reagan team. 9 1 With this expository section, the majority laid the groundwork for placing PAC spending within
the "expenditure" category of Buckley.
The Court next furnished a brief overview of the Fund Act's regulatory scope, contrasting its impact with the much broader boundaries of
FECA control. 9 2 The Court then reviewed section 9012(f) of the Fund
Act, which imposed a criminal penalty against any political committee
that incurred expenses in excess of $1,000 to further the election of a
3
presidential or vice presidential candidate. 9
Justice Rehnquist applied the challenged law to NCPAC and FCM
by placing the PACs within the congressional definition of "political
committees," 9 4 and determined 95 that their mode of spending fell
within the definition of "qualified campaign expense."' 96 Finally, the
Court concluded that the expenditures of NCPAC and FCM were within
97
the expressed prohibitions of section 9012(f).
After finding that the constitutionality of section 9012(f) was di87. 105 S. Ct. at 1464; see also 121 CONG. REC. 12199 (May 3, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Hayes).
88. 105 S. Ct. at 1464.
89. 105 S. Ct. at 1465. NCPAC, for instance, spent $7 million in 1980, which contributed to the defeat of four well-known Democratic senators: Frank Church (D - Idaho),
George McGovern (D - S.D.),John Culver (D - Iowa), and Birch Bayh (D - Ind.). Lawscope,
supra note 4, at 281.
90. The PACs solicit money from the general public and place the funds in a pool.
The Board members then decide where and how to spend the contributions. The contributors have no input into these spending decisions. 105 S. Ct. at 1465.
91. Id. The Court even suggests that these expenditures could produce counterproductive results with regard to President Reagan's campaign. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
92. The Fund Act specifically governs the public financing of presidential elections.
The FECA regulates all federal elections. 105 S. Ct. at 1466.
93. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982).
94. See supra note 10.
95. 105 S. Ct. at 1466.
96. According to the Court, "[t]he term 'qualified campaign expense' simply means
an otherwise lawful expense by a candidate or his authorized committee 'to further his
election' incurred during the period between the candidate's nomination and 30 days after
election day." 105 S. Ct. at 1466 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9002(11) (1982)).
97. 105 S. Ct. at 1466-67.
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rectly at issue, the Court began a review of this provision, using Buckley
as the applicable precedent. The Court placed the PACs' expenditure of
funds "to propagate political views" 9 8 under the protection of the first
amendment's right to free speech. 9 9 The majority quoted Buckley to illustrate the necessity of incurring large expenses when trying to further
one's political views in a highly media-saturated society.10 0 The Court's
first amendment analysis also included a discussion of the PACs' associational rights. Justice Rehnquist found freedom of association rights implicated' 01 by examining the PACs' funding mechanism - public
for excontributions. He accepted these groups as valuable tools
10 2
panding the often inconsequential voice of the individual.
Justice Rehnquist then discussed several prior opinions to rebut the
FEC's argument that PACs' spending should be categorized as regulatable "speech-by-proxy."1 0 3 The Court distinguished its holding in California Medical Association, which upheld limitations on contributions to
PACs, rather than expenditures by PACs, as was the case here.' 0 4 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist cited the special nature and history of congressional regulation over corporate activity in the election arena as the
0 5
basis for differentiating the National Right to Work Committee opinion. '
He agreed with the FEC that NCPAC and FCM exhibit all of the characteristics of a corporation. Yet he looked beyond these two highly professional groups, and focused on the effects of section 9012(f) upon smaller
groups formed to influence the outcome of an election. He cited his
concurrence in Citizens Against Rent Control, where the Court interpreted
informal neighborthe scope of a challenged ordinance to include both
1 6
hood groups and extremely well-organized PACs. 0
The next phase of the Court's analysis included an examination of
section 9012(f), using strict scrutiny review. 10 7 The majority opinion
expressly distinguished the precedential value of two prior Supreme
Court rulings which applied a lenient test to superficial first amendment
98. Id. at 1467.
99. The Court noted that the law applies only when the expression of political views is
accompanied by the expenditure of money. Id.
100. Id. See supra note 59.
101. Id. at 1467. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (which placed the freedom of association among the Constitution's most cherished rights).
102. 105 S. Ct. at 1468. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (applying first amendment associational rights when groups are formed to "amplifly] the voice of their adherents").
103. 105 S. Ct. at 1467-68. "Speech by proxy" does not receive full first amendment
protection. See California Medical Association, 453 U.S. at 196 (where the Court placed contributions to PACs under the regulatable contribution category using a "speech by proxy"
approach); see also supra note 57.
104. 105 S. Ct. at 1468. See California Medical Association, 453 U.S. at 199 (advancing
contribution limitations as a valid means to preserve the integrity of the election process).
105. 105 S. Ct. at 1468. See National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. at 210; see also
Tillman Act, supra note 28; Federal Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 30.
106. 105 S. Ct. at 1468-69. See Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 300 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist argued that the invalidated Berkeley ordinance expressly affected the rights of small political groups, as well as large corporations. According to the Justice, the misguided intent of the Berkeley City Council was as unacceptably
broad as the congressional intent here. 105 S. Ct. at 1468.
107. Id. at 1469-71. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
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questions.10 8

The Court reiterated the importance of Congress's interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. The majority
sanctioned this interest as the only identifiable compelling purpose vital
enough to justify congressional regulation over political speech. ' 0 9 According to Justice Rehnquist, however, this purpose was not furthered
by the means chosen, because PAC expenditures were not prearranged
or coordinated with any candidate. 10 He acknowledged that independent expenditures by groups such as NCPAC and FCM could create the
appearance of corruption. Nevertheless, the Justice expanded his analysis of section 9012(f) I"' past the "multimillion dollar war chests"' 12 to
include those smaller groups searching for a realistic and noticeable
political outlet.
Justice Rehnquistalso dismissed any possible justification for limiting the scope of the law." 3 The Court declined the opportunity to de1 14
termine the size at which PACs would become regulatable.
Furthermore, the majority renounced, as "intolerably vague," the drawing of arbitrary lines between those PACs which permit contributors direct input into expenditure decisions and those PACs which fail to
permit such participation.' 15
In conclusion, the Court expressly addressed the overbreadth issue.
It agreed with the FEC that the law at issue did constitute a proper prophylactic measure focused at preventing large PACs from engaging in
corrupt practices. 1 16 However, it refused to validate section 9012(f) because the statute unjustifably encroached upon the constitutional rights
108. 105 S. Ct. at 1469 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (where the Court
exhibited a deferential attitude toward a governmental employer's decision to terminate
an employee) and United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114 (1981) (which applied a rational relation test because the Post Office's regulations were not content-based)).
109. The Court refused to accept any other government interest as "compelling." 105
S. Ct. at 1469. For other government interests rejected by the Court, see Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298 (rejecting the asserted purpose of the law as a prophylactic
measure to make known the identity of contributors). Justice White's dissent in Federal
Election Commission suggested Congress's goal was to make public financing workable. 105
S. Ct. at 1479 (White, J., dissenting). See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 (rejecting the reduction of skyrocketing campaign costs as a "compelling" interest); 117 CONG. REC. 42397
(1971) (statement of Sen. Taft) (mentioning a congressional purpose to hinder individuals
from using an expenditure loophole to avoid the Act's contribution limits).
110. 105 S. Ct. at 1469.
111. Id. at 1469-70. The Court explains that "[e]ven were we to determine that the
large pooling of financial resources by NCPAC and FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption, § 9012(t) is a fatally overbroad response to that
evil." Id.
112. Id. at 1470.
113. Id. at 1470-71. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971) (stating that
a statute's constitutional validity must be upheld whenever possible).
114. 105 S. Ct. 1471. See 117 CONG. REC. 42398 (1971) (statement of Sen. Taft spelling out the purpose behind regulating independent expenditures).
115. See 117 CONG. REC. 42398 (1971) (statement of Sen. Pastore illustrating the difficulty of drawing regulatory lines in a sensitive constitutional area).
116. 105 S. Ct. at 1471.
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of smaller "committee[s], association[s], or organization[s]". 117 According to the majority, section 9012(o failed to pass the Court's "rigorous" first amendment review.' 18 The majority concluded by citing
the seminal overbreadth doctrine case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma. 19
C. Justice Stevens's Concurring Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens concurred with the majority
in striking down section 9012(f).120 He differed in theory, however,
with the Court's standing determination. Justice Stevens believed that
section 9011 (b)(1)'s plain language 12 1 clearly conferred standing to the
DNC. According to the Justice, however, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marinerosde Honduras122 rendered any discussion of the standing issue
unnecessary.
D.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice White's dissent 123 disagreed with the majority's rulings on
both the standing and constitutional issues. Justice White read the plain
terms of section 9011(b)(1) to grant the Democrats' standing. 1 24 The
Justice also disagreed with the majority's linchpin interpretation of the
word "appropriate."' 125 He recognized the word as qualifying only the
nature of the case and not the plaintiff's identity.' 2 6 For instance, a
plaintiff could not seek a Supreme Court adjudication of damages, but
could bring a lawsuit to question the Fund Act's constitutionality. His
dissent accused the majority of confusing the clear intent of Congress by
judicially intertwining the plain meanings of three separate election law
27
provisions.1
In summary, Justice White ascertained a clear congressional intent
merely to centralize the enforcement of the Acts in one administrative
agency 128 and interpreted section 9011 (b)(1) to grant an equal opportunity for standing upon each of the named groups.' 29 He criticized the
majority's standing determination' 30 as a boondoggle for individuals or
117. Id. at 1471. See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982).
118. 105 S. Ct. at 1471. The Court borrows Buckley's use of the word "rigorous," 424
U.S. at 29, to illustrate the magnitude of the applicable test.
119. 105 S. Ct. at 1471 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
120. 105 S. Ct. at 1471 (Stevens, J, concurring).
121. Justice White's dissent further elucidated the background behind this interpretation. Id. at 1472 (White, J.,dissenting).
122. 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (in which the Court rejected reaching a jurisdictional issue in
one case because the merits of that case were disposed of in a companion opinion).
123. 105 S. Ct. at 1471 (White, J, dissenting).
124. Id. at 1472. See supra note 19.
125. 105 S. Ct. at 1471 (WhiteJ., dissenting). See supra note 19.
126. Id.
127. Justice White condemned the Court for finding in the statute "complex hidden
meanings" which Congress could not have created. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 19.
130. Justice White criticized the Court's decision requiring 9011 (b)(l) parties (except
for the FEC) to have a legitimate argument with the FEC before bringing suit. 105 S.Ct. at
1473 (White, J., dissenting).
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13
groups who challenge a provision of the election laws. '
He then discussed his reasons for dissenting from the majority's
holding that section 9012(f) was unconstitutional. Initially, he stated his
disagreement with the majority opinion in Buckley, and criticized its
"house-that-Jack-built" 132 analysis equating expenditures of money with
actual speech.' 3 3 Justice White continued to disagree with the contribution/expenditure distinction made in Buckley. 13 4 He asserted that uncoordinated expenditures could easily foster the appearance of corruption
and, in support, outlined a number of situations demonstrating the close
relationships existing between PACs and various campaign
35
committees. 1
As an alternative argument, the White dissent accepted the Buckley
holding but classified PACs' spending as within the regulatable contribution category. According to Justice White, the financial control of
PACs rests within the hands of only a few powerful PAC leaders, thus
the contributing citizen never actually voices his or her political
views. 136 Consequently, he supported the governmental interests behind section 9012(f), and concluded that these goals outweighed the
statute's marginal interference with an individual's first amendment
rights.
As a final alternate basis for dissenting, Justice White suggested that
the Buckley holding was not applicable to the present case. He determined that, because Buckley invalidated only selected provisions of the
FECA, 137 the Court could not cite this case as precedent for an analysis
of the Fund Act. Justice White relied upon the special purpose for
which Congress enacted the Fund Act' 38 as a bona fide rationale for
upholding section 9012(f). Justice White clearly advocated Congress's
goal of closing any loophole which innovative individuals or groups
139
might use as a subterfuge to avoid FECA's contribution limitations.
He also approved of Congress's intention to control the skyrocketing

131.

See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS supra note 86, at 935-36 for an illustration of

Congress's intent to foster quick reviews of the election financing laws.
132. 105 S. Ct. at 1475 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. For a politician's view of Justice White's skepticism with regard to expenditures,
Senator Russell Long stated, "[w]hen you're talking in terms of large campaign contributions [in the context of independent expenditures] the distinction between a campaign
contribution and a bribe is almost a hairline's difference." Cox, supra note 35, at 396.
135. 105 S. Ct. at 1476 (White, J., dissenting). See 113 CONG. REC. 10201 (observation
by Sen. Gore that so long as unregulated expenditures are defined as being uncoordinated
with the candidate, "lack of 'control' is very easy to manage").
136. See supra note 90.
137. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
138. 117 CONG. REC. 41937, 41938 (remarks of Sen. Mansfield explaining an important
congressional purpose surrounding the enactment of the Fund Act: "relieving the candidate's dependence on the gigantic economic interests within the nation [because] when
someone gives us [Senators] $1,000, $2,000, $3,000, or $5,000, we spend a little more
time with that guy").
139. See 117 CONG. REC. 42402 (remarks of Sen. Dominick for legislative history relating to expenditure limitations).
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costs of campaigns. 14 0 According to Justice White, the legislative history demonstrated that section 9012(f) was narrowly drawn, and the majority's bifurcation of the Fund Act would destroy these valuable
purposes.
Partially in agreement with Justice White, Justice Marshall filed a
separate dissent.' 4 ' His analysis contained a straightforward criticism of
Buckley and rejected its artificial constitutional distinctions between contributions and expenditures. 142 Therefore, Justice Marshall would have
held that both campaign contributions and expenditures fall within legitimate regulation by the government.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Standing

The Court's denial of standing to the Democrats has unfortunate
implications. It steps beyond the boundaries of proper judicial review
and ventures into the realm of Congress's lawmaking power. The Court
based its opinion on the fear of granting millions of people standing to
challenge the Fund Act. This phobia, however, should not sanction the
Court's disallowance of justiciability to parties with a sufficient "per143
sonal stake in the outcome of a controversy."
The Court's intertwining of sections 437c(b)(1), 9010, and
9011 (b) (1), represents a transparent exercise in judicial rhetoric. Simply
stated, the Court's analysis should have concentrated solely upon section 9011 (b)(1) which clearly granted standing to the Democrats. 1 44
While the legislative history may support the majority's interpretation of
section 437c(b)(1), 145 which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, Congress failed to exhibit such motivation when enacting section
9011(b)(l). 14 6 In fact, by expressly naming three groups within the
Fund Act's provision, the lawmakers plainly mandated their intent to
14 7
grant each party a coequal right to file a lawsuit.
The Court usually construes standing strictly when faced with a
constitutional attack upon a statute.' 48 An exception arises, however,
when Congress expressly provides for judicial review. 1 49 For example,
140. 105 S. Ct. at 1480 (White, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1481.
143. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
144. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) (1982). See supra note 19.
145. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS supra note 86, at 934, 936.
146. See Ifshin & Warin, supra note 31, at 502.
147. 105 S. Ct. at 1472 (White, J., dissenting).
148. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Commission, 455 U.S. 557
(1982); Keefe, It's Tough to Get "Standing"and "Ripeness" These Days, 67 A.B.A.J. 228 (1981);
Note, Standing to Challenge the Constitutionalityof the FECA: The Effect of a CongressionalAttempt
to Relax Standing Requirements, 65 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1235 (1977).
149. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) (even though the Court held
that the Sierra Club did not have standing to sue federal officials in this case because
neither the club nor its members suffered any injury, it stated that, in other situations,
standing can be gained by an express grant of Congress).
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in Buckley, the Court opted for a relaxed standing test, in deference to
the congressional grant. 150 Because Congress explicitly granted standing to individuals eligible to vote and national committees of political
parties,' 5 ' their standing should have been upheld by the Court.
Moreover, the Court erred in not bringing the overbreadth doctrine
to its logical conclusion. The application of this doctrine normally allows a relaxation of the standing requirement.' 52 To meet the standard,
the plaintiff must only assert a legitimate claim of actual harm or, in the
alternative, a threat of definite harm in the future.15 3 Because of their
154
historical inability to keep pace with Republican Party capitalization,
the Democrats will undoubtedly suffer a substantial threat of future
harm if section 9012(f) does not remain in effect.
Finally, the Court should remain flexible and mold judicial standing
requirements to protect those who have been or will be harmed by an
unconstitutional law. 1 5 5 Unfortunately, the present ruling deprives
more than just the two politically active groups involved here from litigating the constitutionality of the Fund Act in the future. An unrealistic
fear of a massive litigant invasion descending upon the high Court cannot justify deprivation of an express grant of standing.
B.

Constitutionality of Section 9012(f)

The Court's decision on the merits truly furthered the constitutional rights of politically active citizens. The traditionally conservative
members of the Court, joined by Justice Brennan, openhandedly applied the Constitution to protect the interests of the little guy. The
Court struck down every justification for section 9012(f) by using an
overbreadth interpretation.
As the Buckley opinion noted, individuals can hardly voice their
political views today without spending large sums of money. 156 Justice
Rehnquist eloquently applied this reasoning to allow small groups of
individuals the opportunity to combine efforts and money to compete
with wealthy fat cats who can personally afford to bankroll a candidate's
5 7
bid for election.1
Furthermore, even though large PACs engage in "speech by
150. See supra note 148.
151. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(l) (1982). See supra note 19.
152. When an overbroad statute may chill protected free speech, the Court has found
that potential litigants must be allowed the opportunity to challenge the law. See Secretary
of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2846 (1984).
153. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816 (1975), quoting NAACP v. Burton, 371
U.S. 415,433 (1963) (applying a relaxed standing requirement because the challenged law
had potential for "sweeping and improper applications").
154. See Cox, supra note 35.
155. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (a stockholders' derivative suit
was allowed "to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose").
156. But see Comment, supra note 29, at 427; Wright, Politicsand the Constitution: Is Money
Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1003 (1976).
157. See 105 S. Ct. at 1467; see supra text accompanying note 46.
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proxy,"' 15 8 smaller political groups, whose members control spending
decisions, directly voice their beliefs. The Court correctly ruled against
expenditure limits to protect the direct political expression of all
groups. At the same time, the FEC properly classified NCPAC and FCM
as corporations, which are historically subject to legislative control.' 5 9
The Constitution, however, protects all types of associations, and the
Court rightfully placed smaller organizations beyond the permissible
scope of congressional regulation.
It is well established that when fundamental rights are infringed,
strict scrutiny applies. 160 The Court has recognized only one compelling interest 1 6 ' and that is to guard the election process from corruption
or the appearance of corruption. The Court did not accept any other
interest as compelling, agreeing with the Buckley Court's rejection of interests such as "the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns ....
,,162 The Court correctly refused to sanction any new
governmental interests because of its commitment to protect neighborhood political groups.
At the means end of the spectrum,' 6 3 Justice Rehnquist reiterated
Buckley's rejection of utilizing expenditure limitations to control corruption. 164 On the other hand, a variety of commentators, including Justice
White, voice legitimate concern over this decision.1 6 5 Each of these critics believe that both expenditures and contributions breed corruption.' 66 They support congressional motives to protect campaign
integrity as being equally applicable to independent expenditures and
contributions. Nevertheless, these individuals fail to grasp the broader
benefits of the majority's opinion. Small organizations cannot possibly
have a significant effect upon any evil that Congress finds necessary to
control. Even if large, highly-organized PACs foster the appearance of
corruption, a small faculty group forming a political committee 16 7 does
not necessarily reflect such evil doing. Section 9012(0, however, regulated the activities of both. The Court properly administered a dose of
overbreadth's "strong medicine"1 6 8 to destroy this unjustified infringement on first amendment rights.
Finally, by refusing to limit the scope of section 9012(f), the Court
sent a none too subtle message to Congress. When Congress has enacted a statute using its high degree of expertise in an area, the Court
158. See supra text accompanying note 100.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34; cf. Cox, supra note 35, at 409; Recent Decisions,
supra note 57, at 814.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
161. See supra note 109.
162. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57; see also supra note 109.

163. See National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. at 208.
164. See supra text accompanying note 61.
165. See 105 S. Ct. at 1476 (White, J., dissenting): Cox. supra note 35, at 409; Recet,
Decisions, supra note 57, at 815; Note, supra note 12, at 977.
166. See supra note 139.
167. See supra note 115 (statement of Sen. Pastore).

168. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
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will generally exercise great deference in reviewing the law. 16 9 Federal
statutes regulating speech and association normally hold a presumptively valid status.' 70 Moreover, where Congress has expressly considered the constitutionality of the law under review, 17 1 the judiciary
respects the legislative decision. 172 However, because of Congress's
blatant attempt to step beyond constitutionally permissible boundaries,
the Court pointedly refused to apply these precepts in limiting section
9012(0)'s impact. The underlying message of the opinion suggested that
Congress must modify the Act, using its legislative and political expertise to regulate only those groups which illegitimately corrupt the election process.
CONCLUSION

Every citizen holds an allegiance to a special interest: farmers believe in government subsidies, students advocate financial aid, and environmentalists wish to protect nature. The Supreme Court has protected
the amplification and advocation of many interests in Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee. Obstacles to
the direct expression of one's view, in conjunction with the voices of
others of similar opinion, will no longer hinder free political speech.
Congress has the power to regulate large, highly-organized
PACs, 17 3 and the Court has challenged it with the opportunity to amend
section 9012(f). Congress must seize upon this opening and narrow the
scope of election finance regulation. When Congress meets this challenge, a proper balance will be struck between legitimate lawmaking
power and first amendment protection.
David C. Puchi

169. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (affirming the congressional
power to regulate presidential and vice-presidential elections).
170. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
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